Interactive music: Balancing creative freedom with musical development. by Murray-Browne, Tim
Interactive music: Balancing creative freedom with musical development.
Murray-Browne, Tim
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/8608
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
Interactive music:
Balancing creative freedom
with musical development
Tim Murray-Browne
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University
of London for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Centre for Digital Music
School of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science
Queen Mary University of London
Submitted: April 2012
Revised: October 2012
I certify that this thesis, and the research to which it refers, are the
product of my own work, and that any ideas or quotations from the work of
other people, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance
with the standard referencing practices of the discipline. I acknowledge the
helpful guidance and support of my supervisors, Prof Mark D. Plumbley and
Dr Nick Bryan-Kinns.
2
Abstract
This thesis is about interactive music—a musical experience that involves participa-
tion from the listener but is itself a composed piece of music—and the Interactive Music
Systems (IMSs) that create these experiences, such as a sound installation that responds
to the movements of its audience. Some IMSs are brief marvels commanding only a few
seconds of attention. Others engage those who participate for considerably longer. Our
goal here is to understand why this difference arises and how we may then apply this
understanding to create better interactive music experiences.
I present a refined perspective of interactive music as an exploration into the rela-
tionship between action and sound. Reasoning about IMSs in terms of how they are
subjectively perceived by a participant, I argue that fundamental to creating a capti-
vating interactive music is the evolving cognitive process of making sense of a system
through interaction.
I present two new theoretical tools that provide complementary contributions to our
understanding of this process. The first, the Emerging Structures model, analyses how
a participant’s evolving understanding of a system’s behaviour engages and motivates
continued involvement. The second, a framework of Perceived Agency, refines the notion
of ‘creative control’ to provide a better understanding of how the norms of music establish
expectations of how skill will be demonstrated.
I develop and test these tools through three practical projects: a wearable musical
instrument for dancers created in collaboration with an artist, a controlled user study
investigating the effects of constraining the functionality of a screen-based IMS, and
an interactive sound installation that may only be explored through coordinated move-
ment with another participant. This final work is evaluated formally through discourse
analysis.
Finally, I show how these tools may inform our understanding of an oft-cited goal
within the field: conversational interaction with an interactive music system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
. . . it is necessary to start to engage the audience in a way that can
sustain interest for a noticeable period of time. The behaviour of
the work needs to be interesting. The problem is identifying just
what is interesting in interactive experiences.
(Edmonds et al. 2006, p. 315)
1.1 Beyond marvellous
It is a familiar situation for many interactive artists. A work of magnificent
complexity is created with a vision of an audience immersed exploring its
endless possibilities. When exhibited, however, for those who participate it
appears little more than a momentary marvel. In a museum, 5–10 seconds
could be considered a long interaction (Edmonds et al. 2006). In contrast,
both music and other interactive systems are able to captivate people for
hours on end. For example, a videogame is often expected to last for 40–
60 hours (Collins 2009). It does not seem to be the case that people are
disappointed with a work and so move on, although undoubtedly this happens
sometimes. The interaction simply appears to have been a fleeting distraction
rather than an involving experience.
In this thesis, we will consider music-oriented interactive art—interactive
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music—and how it might be made more captivating over longer periods of
time. There is evidence that interactivity has the potential to make sound
installations more enjoyable (Gonzales et al. 2009). But whilst it is easy
to gain attention, sustaining continued exploration remains elusive (Blaine
2006; Machover 2002). It seems that people lose their sense of wonder as
soon as they ‘figure out’ a work (Rokeby 1998).
1.2 Interactive music
This thesis is about interactive music—a musical experience that involves
participation from the listener but is itself a composed piece of music. In
doing so the listener becomes a participant. Interactive music may take
many forms such as a smartphone app or a sound installation exhibited in
a public space. We will be focusing on interactive music experiences that
arise when a participant interacts with a computer system, which we will
describe as an Interactive Music System (IMS). Our enquiry will be limited
to participants without any particular expertise who are interacting with a
system for the first time. We will see a more specific definition of an IMS in
Section 2.2.3.
1.3 Subjectivity
At the beginning of this chapter, a quote from Edmonds et al. (2006) de-
scribes the need to identify what it is about interactive experiences that
makes them interesting, from which we may be able identify how a work
might behave in an interesting way. We might have asked: ‘interesting to
whom?’ The participant doing the interacting? The artist? An onlooker?
However, the notion of an interesting interactive experience arrives with the
assumption that it is the participant who we want to be interested.
The reason that we may ask this question is that ‘interesting’ is a subjec-
tive notion, by which we mean it is an attribute of a system that is measured
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based on an individual’s perception rather than an objective measuring tool.
We may sample a large number of individuals and aggregate their response
in order to predict more reliably whether a further individual may find a
system ‘interesting’. From here we may extract general properties of systems
that are likely to be found ‘interesting’. These properties may be objectively
defined and we may then be tempted to talk of them as if they were ‘ob-
jectively interesting’. However, ‘interesting’ remains a subjective attribute.
It does not make sense to talk of something being ‘interesting’ without an
individual to find it so.
As we will see in Section 2.1, for many interactive artists, the final medium
of the work is not the interactive system but the experience of interacting with
it—a position we shall adopt throughout this thesis. Such an approach, where
we are interested in the subjective experience of an interaction rather than
any material outcomes, is referred to within the field of Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) as experience-centred design (Blythe et al. 2006). It has
gained popularity within the study of computer-based musical interaction
(Stowell and McLean 2011; Kiefer et al. 2008). However, often ideas that
seem to begin with an experience-centred aesthetic vision result in abstract
criteria of interactive artefacts without a detailed analysis of how these cri-
teria will be perceived (e.g. Paine 2002).
Our interest in objective aspects of a system will be relevant only in terms
of how they are manifest as subjective aspects through perception. Therefore,
before stipulating requirements on how we want the system to behave we will
need to consider what kind of experience to which they will be contributing.
We will use the terms interactive music and interactive music system (IMS)
to distinguish between this subjective experience we are trying to achieve and
the system with which we interact to do so. The difference between between
the two is analogous to the difference between audio and music.
Fundamental to designing an experience is understanding how people
make sense of what they perceive (Wright and McCarthy 2010). Just as
analysis of music without consideration of musical perception misses a great
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deal of what makes it music (Wiggins 2009), trying to understand an inter-
active experience without considering how an individual makes sense of it
misses a great deal of what makes it an experience. Throughout this thesis,
we will gradually draw in on what aspects of an interactive music experi-
ence might make it captivating and aesthetically rewarding, as well as how
we might create it. Through modelling the process by which an interactive
system is perceived, acted upon and understood, we may then consider how
we may design IMSs to create such experiences.
For these reasons it does not make sense to begin with unnecessary ob-
jective limitations of interactive music system (IMS) is (cf. Rowe 1993; Paine
2002), or indeed what the difference is between ‘reactive’ and ‘interactive (cf.
Bongers 2006; Jorda` 2005). We will, however, consider what we may learn
from these approaches in Section 2.1.3.
1.4 Interdisciplinarity
This is an interdisciplinary work, spanning engineering, HCI, music, psy-
chology, performance art and interactive art. It is important when doing
interdisciplinary work not to become overly pledged to particular methods
or ways of thinking. This is especially the case when mixing art and engineer-
ing as they are often at odds with each other when it comes to methodology,
motivation, outcome and prejudices.
However, with that caveat, this PhD rests primarily as an engineering
thesis for the following reasons.
• Our ultimate motivation is to identify how to produce specific effects
(albeit subjective ones) rather than ideas or artefacts. Concepts, criti-
cal analysis and practical applications are important but remain tools
to achieve this goal rather than ends in themselves.
• Theories that arise should be demonstrated through application and
evaluated beyond personal introspection.
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• The key contributions are theories, approaches and tools rather than
artistic artefacts.
• These contributions should serve to assist others in producing similar
effects.
• While it may be necessary to consider the immediate artistic value
of how these contributions may be applied, it will be evaluated with
respect to how it is received by its audience. We will not be looking
for any further artistic or wider social significance.
Note that this is not to say that these topics are not important or
interesting; they are simply beyond the scope of this PhD.
Over the course of this thesis we will at different times have to be artists,
scientists and musicians. But ultimately, as an engineering thesis, the goal
is to apply these ideas to open up new possibilities.
1.5 Contributions
The primary contributions of this thesis are two complementary theoretical
theoretical tools, the Emerging Structures model of exploration (Chapter 4)
and a framework of Perceived Agency (Chapter 6), that assist in the under-
standing the subjective experience that arises through interacting with an
IMS.
Along the way, we will make the following further theoretical contribu-
tions.
• We develop two design principles (Chapters 5 and 7) providing a general
purpose means of applying the above theories in practice.
• We present a refined consideration of the composed instrument as a
means of computer music performance distinct from ordinary Digital
Musical Instruments (DMIs) (Chapter 3).
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• The methodology available for evaluating the quality of a creative or
aesthetic user experience is advanced. This includes a novel experimen-
tal design for investigating first-time use within a repeated measures de-
sign, created in collaboration with Prof Rosemary Bailey (Chapter 5),
and refinement of Stowell’s (2010) method of discourse analysis (Chap-
ter 8).
• We apply the above theoretical tools to present a new means to classify
types of interaction (Chapter 9).
In addition, the following practical works have been created during the
course of this PhD.
• Impossible Alone, a full body interactive sound installation, created in
collaboration with Tiff Chan (Chapter 7).
• The Serendiptichord, a wearable musical instrument for contemporary
dance performance, created in collaboration with Di Mainstone (Chap-
ter 3).
• The Manhattan Rhythm Machine, a screen-based interactive generative
rhythm system (Chapter 5).
• Instigative Heads, an interactive sound installation created to accom-
pany video work by the artist Alla Tkachuk, with support from Kurt
Jacobson, Steve Welburn and Enrique Perez Gonzales (not documented
in this thesis).
1.5.1 Publications
The following publications have arisen from this thesis (all based on material
from Chapter 3).
T. Murray-Browne, D. Mainstone, N. Bryan-Kinns and M. D. Plumbley,
“The Serendiptichord: Reflections on the Collaborative Design Process
between Artist and Researcher,” in Leonardo, 46(1):86-87, 2013.
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T. Murray-Browne, D. Mainstone, N. Bryan-Kinns and M. D. Plumbley,
“The medium is the message: Composing instruments and perform-
ing mappings,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on New
Instruments for Musical Expression (NIME-11), Oslo, Norway, 2011.
T. Murray-Browne, D. Mainstone, N. Bryan-Kinns and M. D. Plumbley,
“The Serendiptichord: A wearable instrument for contemporary dance
performance,” in Proceedings of the 128th Convention of the Audio
Engineering Society, London, 2010.
A. Otten, D. Shulze, M. Sorensen, D. Mainstone and T. Murray-Browne,
“Demo hour,” Interactions, 18(5):8–9, 2011.
The following papers have been presented without corresponding publi-
cations.
T. Murray-Browne, “The Serendiptichord: Balancing predictable control
with chance discovery in a wearable instrument for dancers,” presented
at the Sound, Sight, Space and Play postgraduate symposium, Leices-
ter, 2010.
T. Murray-Browne, D. Mainstone, M. Plumbley, N. Bryan-Kinns, “The
Serendiptichord: Balancing complexity with accessibility in a wearable
musical instrument for dancers,” presented at the Digital Music Re-
search Network, London, 2010.
T. Murray-Browne, “How can interactive music engage audiences for lon-
ger?” presented at InterFace postgraduate symposium, London, 2011.
T. Murray-Browne, T. Chan, “Impossible Alone,” presented at the Music
HackSpace, London, 2011.
1.5.2 Performances and exhibitions
The following performances and exhibitions have arisen from the practical
work involved in this thesis.
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Instigative Heads Installed:
Mar – Apr 2009, Shunt, London.
The Serendiptichord Performed:
Oct 2009 ACM Creativity & Cognition Conference, Berkeley Art Museum,
CA
Feb 2010 Kinetica Art Fair, London
Feb 2010 Swap Meet, The Barbican, London
Feb 2010 The Guthman New Musical Instrument Competition, Georgia
Institute of Technology, GA
Jun 2010 INSPACE Gallery, Edinburgh
Sep 2010 Victoria & Albert Museum, London
Oct 2010 The Sweden National Touring Theatre
Feb 2011 Kinetica Art Fair, London
Impossible Alone Installed:
Jul 2011 The Secret Garden Party (with Guerilla Science), Huntingdon,
Cambridgeshire
Sep 2011 Centre for Digital Music 10th anniversary event, Queen Mary,
University of London
Nov 2011 Music Hackspace, London
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1.6 The structure of this thesis
PhDs that mix art and engineering follow divergent pathways through theory,
practice and evaluation (Edmonds and Candy 2010). In this thesis, the
theoretical content has both guided and been guided by concurrent practical
application and accompanying evaluation. Material is presented primarily in
the order in which it was conducted. We iterate twice through the engineering
style presentation of theory, application and then evaluation in Chapters 4–5
and Chapters 6–8. However, the actual development of this material was
more interwoven than this. In particular, the outcome of the evaluation of
Chapter 8 subsequently informed the theoretical content of Chapters 4 and
6.
This thesis bridges a large number of fields. As a result, there is a sig-
nificant amount of background material to cover in Chapter 2. As well as
providing context, there are a number of topics we will be building upon later
in the thesis. We will indicate when this is the case.
Interactive music might be seen as a merging of the performance, creation
and reception of music. There is a considerable wealth of research into all of
these topics. Of particular relevance is the field of research into new musical
controllers, referred to as New Interfaces for Musical Expression (NIME). As
a result, we will consider quite closely the acts of performing and listening
to music created with new musical interfaces through an exploratory project
creating and performing a novel musical instrument, the Serendiptichord,
in Chapter 3. The key finding from this chapter will be the importance
of interaction design that develops throughout a performance, and the role
that what the audience is expecting to see plays in their understanding and
appreciation of a work.
In Chapter 4, we take the former of these lessons and consider how we
may apply it within the context of interactive music. We derive a model
of Emerging Structures to describe how an interactive experience may be
continually evolving and developing without being confusing or inconsistent.
Using this model, we unify a range of theories of exploration and musical
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perception. From this, we form a set of predictions as to what makes for a
captivating interactive music experience.
In Chapter 5 we apply a number of these predictions to derive a general
purpose design principle, incremental constraint unlocking, which is evaluated
in a controlled user study. We find the principle does not have a statistically
significant impact on user experience. However, a closer examination of the
results as well as an informal analysis of some complementary qualitative data
leads us to the conclusion that individual differences among the participants
are instrumental to their response. In particular, some users seem to have
preconceived ideas about how an IMS ‘should’ behave. We conclude that we
need a more specific tool to be able to understand this attitude.
To develop this tool, we consider again the nature of non-interactive mu-
sic in Chapter 6 to produce a framework of Perceived Agency. We justify
this framework through applying it to a range of traditional and recently
developed performance paradigms.
In Chapter 7, we use this framework to distinguish between implicit and
explicit constraints within an IMS. From this we address a number of the
problems with the above principle of incremental constraint unlocking with
a new design principle, the implicit constraint. We implement this principle
within a new IMS, Impossible Alone.
A rigorous qualitative evaluation of Impossible Alone is reported in Chap-
ter 8. Note that although this is an evaluation of the ideas presented up to
this point, the analysis it provided strongly informed our perspective on the
earlier theoretical chapters.
In Chapter 9, we discuss the consequences of the preceding work and
demonstrate the contribution it provides through addressing two questions:
what makes for an interesting interaction and how can we describe it in a
way that captures some of the richness of everyday experiences?
Finally, we conclude in Chapter 10 with a summary of the key findings,
reflect on the research process of this thesis and outline a number of suggested
avenues for further research that might continue this body of work.
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We may think of the work presented in Chapters 1–3 as identifying what
kind of experience we are trying to create with interaction music and forming
the first part to this thesis. Chapters 4–5 and 6–8 are iterations of theory,
application, evaluation forming parts two and three. Chapters 9–10 then
form the final concluding part of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
Interactive music is a topic that lies at the intersection of a number of fields.
The two that we will draw upon primarily are interactive art and New Inter-
faces for Musical Expression (NIME). these will be overviewed first (Sections
2.1 and 2.2). Following this, we briefly review some wider research on enjoy-
ment and musical perception that we will be drawing on later in this thesis
(Sections 2.3 and 2.4). Finally, we outline some of the evaluation methods in
common use within the field (Section 2.5) before concluding in Section 2.6.
2.1 Interactive art
Interactive music systems (IMSs) fall into both the fields of interactive art and
New Interfaces for Musical Expression (NIME). Both of these fields provide
us with extensive research into how system design affects experience. In this
section we review some relevant material from the former. NIME research
will then be covered in Section 2.2.
Penny (1996) considers an interactive artwork as an interactive system
that addresses artistic issues, where an interactive system describes ‘a ma-
chine system which reacts in the moment, by virtue of automated reasoning
based on data from its sensory apparatus.’ Elsewhere, an interactive work
is not considered ‘complete’ until it is interacted with. For example, Ed-
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monds et al. (2006) and Rokeby (1998) both see the medium of the work
as the experience of interaction rather than the machine by which this hap-
pens. This is analogous to the distinction we drew in Section 1.2 between
interactive music and interactive music systems: the former is the experience
arising through interacting with the latter. Therefore, whilst there are no
hard and fast rules about what qualifies as interactive art, we may likewise
distinguish between the interactive art experience and an interactive artwork
as the artefact which allows this to happen. Typically, as with our IMSs (see
Section 1.2), this will happen through the use of a computer and not require
further assistance from its creator or another third party, and our scope of
enquiry will be limited to these cases.
Whether or not it is interactive, any artwork will be perceived in a dif-
ferent manner by different individuals. However, interactive art extends this
notion by invoking a spectator to act based on their perception of the work,
which then leads to an altered perception. The spectator must take a more
active role in order to perceive the work, exploring its behaviour through
experimentation. Correspondingly, the artist must find a way to express
themselves creatively whilst leaving the ultimate realisation of their work
open (Tanaka 2007). If others in the audience are present, then through
interaction the participant’s response to the work is visible and the process
of viewing art becomes a more social and shared experience.
Rokeby (1998) describes the creation of interactive art as the construction
of experience, experience that involves making decisions and doing something
rather than experience in which content is simply fed to the audience. Ir-
respective of debates over the definition of interactive art, many interactive
artists argue that the value of the work is within the interaction itself rather
than the response of participant or system considered in isolation (Edmonds
et al. 2006).
Examples of interactive art range from public space installations to web-
sites and smartphone applications. We may question where we draw the
boundary. For example, when are smartphone apps considered ‘interactive
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artworks’? We avoid prescriptive definitions by simply relying on how the
creator describes their work, which we assume indicative of their intent.
Our area of interest will typically be work where an audience may be
inquisitive but has not been trained and is not significantly motivated to use
the system by factors beyond the potential experience they might have with
it. This context is common to work installed within a public space (Paine
2002). A crucial consideration of such works is how their audience will learn
to use the interface, given the limited amount of time participants will invest
in doing so and how diverse they are likely to be in terms of behaviour and
familiarity with interactive systems (Blaine 2006; Dipper 2009)—although
not all interactive artists necessarily seek to create a work that is ‘learnable’
(Boden 2005).
2.1.1 The perceptual feedback loop
Fundamental to any conscious interaction between human and machine is
the perception/action cycle, or perceptual feedback loop, which describes the
process whereby the output of an interface provides the user with details of
the result of their input (Sales Dias et al. 2009). This allows them to evaluate
what they have done and plan further actions and in doing so establish a
feedback loop (Norman 2002) (Figure 2.1). A simple example of this is a
console application, where characters entered into the interface are displayed
onscreen.
Through this process, a user is able to form a mental model of how the
machine works. Our mental model is a cognitive representation that allows
us to reason about the consequences of our actions. It need not be a true
representation of how a system actually works, just accurate enough to allow
us to form plans and achieve our goals (Norman 2002). Such models may be
formed both consciously and unconsciously (Preece et al. 2011, p. 86). The
exploratory process by which they are established will be considered in detail
in Chapter 4.
The perceptual feedback loop describes the process through which an
32
MachineHuman
Feedback
Perception
Action
Figure 2.1: The perception/action cycle, or perceptual feed-
back loop. The user is able to construct a mental model of
how the system works through perceiving the feedback that
results from their actions.
individual becomes aware of how they may exert control over their environ-
ment. In Section 2.2.11, we will review literature that considers this issue
in terms of how reliable, diverse and accurate a sense of control this feed-
back loop provides. Later on, in Section 6.3, we will introduce the more
specific concept of agency to describe the exertion of intentional control over
a process.
In the remainder of this section, we will outline a number of theories that
attempt to understand in more detail the experience of interactive art. As
well as drawing upon these ideas later in the thesis, they provide the context
within which our work is created.
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(a) The static system
Art work
Spectator
Environment
Time
(b) The dynamic-passive system
Environment
TimeArt work
Participant
(c) The dynamic-interactive system
Environment
TimeArt work
Modier
Participant
(d) The dynamic-interactive system (varying)
Figure 2.2: Cornock and Edmonds’s classification of
process-oriented art. Adapted from Cornock and Edmonds
(1973).
2.1.2 Cornock and Edmonds’s process-oriented art
Cornock and Edmonds’s (1973) provided one of the earliest classifications
of interactive art within their framework of process-oriented art. Taking
a systems-theory approach, they consider how influence flows between the
artwork, an individual member of its audience, a ‘modifying agent,’ time and
the environment. They provide four categories (Figure 2.2).
1. The static system refers to any unchanging work of art and includes
most traditional works of art. It is simply spectated by the individual.
2. The dynamic-passive system changes in response to time or the en-
vironment but not in response to the spectator.
3. The dynamic-interactive system changes in response to the individ-
ual, who is now referred to as a participant. A feedback loop is estab-
lished.
4. The dynamic-interactive system (varying) is a special case of sys-
tem 3 where ‘an artist modifies the system or process in a way not
allowed for in its original definition.’
Different members of the audience may be involved in different systems that
include a single artwork. For example, if one member of the audience has
influence over the work and another does not then the former will be in a
dynamic-interactive system whereas the latter will be in a dynamic-passive
system as the participant is considered an environmental influence from the
spectator’s perspective.
There are a number of problems with this model.
The definition of system 4 is unclear. What is the ‘original definition’ of
a system? Edmonds et al. (2006) expand the definition to allow the modifier
to be a human or software process stating that the resulting interaction
will depend on the history of interactions with the work and is thus not
predictable. But they still refer to the ‘original specification’ of the work.
From this should we infer that system 3 is predictable and thus deterministic
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and non-chaotic? Can the artwork be its own modifying agent? Clearly
not, otherwise that would have been allowed for in the original specification.
Should we infer that the output of system 3 does not depend upon earlier
input from the participant? Would this then disallow simple signal processing
such as smoothing a gestural input?
The classification is oriented around the artist’s perspective. An audience
member may be within system 4 from the artist’s perspective but unaware
of the modifying agent and so think themselves in system 3. If the individual
does not realise that they are influencing the artwork then there will be a
feedback loop but no perceptual feedback loop (Section 2.1.1) and they may
think themselves in system 2.
There is an unstated presumption that ‘normal interaction’ is a learnable
well-defined specification relating input/output pairs whilst ‘varying inter-
action’ ranges in scope from the artist correcting a bug in the software to
an interaction design that evolves with such speed and complexity that it
appears completely random. Here the artist would observe system 4 but the
audience system 2.
In spite of these shortcomings, the motivation behind the model seems
similar to ours. Cornock and Edmonds (1973, p. 13) write of system 3: ‘this
system can be very rich, though the speed with which the participant may
exhaust the set of possibilities means that the result could lack substantial
interest or value.’ The implication being that system 4 by varying will con-
tinually have something original to offer keeping the audience interested. In
Chapter 4, we will examine this idea in more detail.
There is also a strong insight underlying the model. It aims to classify not
through attributes of the artwork itself, but the relationship between work
and audience. Someone may move through different types of system as they
interact with a single work and there may be multiple systems of interaction
happening simultaneously with different members of the audience.
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2.1.3 Definitions of interaction
What should be meant by the term interaction has received considerable
debate within the field. Throughout this thesis, we will use the term to
describe any process in which user and system are influencing each other’s
behaviour in a perceptual feedback loop as interaction. A system capable of
being a part of an interaction is hence described as interactive.
Others have presented more stringent requirements on what interaction
‘should’ mean. It is not our intention to debate the meaning of words—our
focus is experience rather than classification. However, we will review some
definitions proposed by others as it will inform our understanding of what
types of experience others are trying to create with their systems.
Dannenberg and Bates (1995) presents a model of interactive art with
loosely defined requirements as an agent of the artist. He ‘looks for’ systems
that
• perform a substantial amount of decision making and generation of
artistic content,
• can perform rudimentary perception, create internal models of their
users, plan future activities, and call upon stored concepts,
• have large amounts of memory giving rise to complex behaviour,
• have a significant interaction component (Dannenberg and Bates 1995,
p. 5).
Dannenberg and Bates acknowledge that these requirements are on a spec-
trum leaving no clearly defined boundary of what counts as interactive art.
However, note that there is a blend between unquantifiable subjective re-
quirements (amounts of decision making, the significance of the interaction
component, the complexity of the behaviour, the extent to which content is
artistic) and objective requirements that could well be imperceivable to a
participant (perception, user models, future plans, stored concepts).
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Figure 2.3: Bongers’s human-computer interaction loop
with the requirement of memory and cognition. Adapted from
Bongers (2000).
Bongers (2000) describes human-machine interaction as a feedback loop
between human and machine requiring sensing, memory, cognition and ac-
tuators from both parties (Figure 2.3). Without cognition, for example, it is
merely reactive. Bongers believes that ‘ideal’ interaction should be mutually
influential, which according to Bongers (2006) means that following the in-
teraction both human and machine are left in a different state, frame of mind
or with different views. But he does not justify why this might be ideal, why
we would like our machine to think and remember or why the state of the
machine following the interaction should matter.
Jorda` (2005) similarly defines interaction as a process of mutual influence
where information from each party influences the behaviour of the other.
‘True’ interaction requires extensive two-way influence. However, common
use of real-time signal processing effects, for example, he deems lacking in
Human→Machine interaction as the effects that are applied are independent
of the performer. This is a strange objection: even without influencing which
effect is applied, the entire output of such a system is a transformation of the
input and therefore quite strongly influenced by the human. The effect may
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also require, as Bongers desired, significant cognition and memory. There
appears to be some unspoken assumptions about exactly what needs to be
influenced.
Interactive artist Paine (2002), like Bongers, argues that without a level
of cognition a system (and we have moved now from considering a process to
considering the system in isolation) is reactive. However, Paine then provides
the example of a racing arcade game, which he deems non-interactive because
the racetrack is not changing in response to the user. His requirement is then
refined to demand that the entire history of inputs be influential on each
output and that the system promises continually new outcomes.
In each of these cases, although mutual influence is stated as the require-
ment, there appears to be a hidden demand that this influence is not with
the system but some entity within the system. This is an echo of Cornock
and Edmonds (1973) modifying agent that alters a system’s ‘original specifi-
cation’ (Section 2.1.2).
These discussions assume that the difference between interaction and re-
action is an objective reality determined by properties of the machine. But
from the participant’s point of view (i.e. subjectively), the only means by
which any change in the system may be determined is through how input
affects its output. The modifying agent with whom we are interacting is
completely imperceptible except through its influence over this relationship.
Chadabe (2005) provides three metaphors to describe interaction (Drum-
mond 2009).
1. The powerful gesture expander (a deterministic system that translates
simple inputs into complex musical outputs).
2. Sailing a boat on a windy day and through stormy seas, where precise
control is not assured.
3. The conversational model, where both party contributes but neither is
in control of the final outcome.
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Bongers, Jorda` and Paine all refer to conversation or dialogue in their at-
tempts to describe what makes some feedback loops more interactive than
others, Paine most explicitly. Therefore, we may assume that they all fall
within Chadabe’s conversational metaphor.
Johnston et al. (2009) categorise interaction as being instrumental, orna-
mental or conversational depending on whether control of the sound output
is respectively with the participant, the system or shared between the two.
Conversational interaction is described as rapidly shifting between instru-
mental and ornamental interaction.
The term conversational interaction implies that there is something of
the conversational experience that we would like to have when interacting
with our system. As the distinction between Chadabe’s latter two metaphors
imply, there is something more that mutual interaction. However, as evoca-
tive as Chadabe’s metaphors are, it is unclear how they might be practically
realised. Even from an abstract perspective, there are numerous possible
distinctions that we might draw between sailing from conversing. Which
ones are important? After we have defined the two fundamental theoretical
frameworks of this thesis—Emerging Structures in Chapter 4 and Perceived
Agency in Chapter 6—we will be able to provide a more concrete answer to
this question in Section 9.4. In particular, we will justify the point of view
that conversational interaction is necessarily a subjective experience that
cannot be defined without a consideration of the participant’s perception of
the interaction.
For these reasons we have avoided including any loosely defined subjective
requirements such as complexity or memory within the above definition of
interactive and use it simply in the objective sense outlined above to describe
a system that establishes a feedback loop with a participant. How interaction
is subjectively perceived is a topic that we will build up in detail throughout
this thesis.
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Figure 2.4: A participant standing in front of Absolute 4.5
(2006) by Ernest Edmonds and Mark Fell. Photo: Greg
Turner. Reproduced with permission from Candy and Ed-
monds (2011).
2.1.4 Edmonds et al.’s model of engagement
Edmonds et al.’s (2006) model of engagement draws on observational research
of how visitors engage with interactive exhibits in museums. It is explored
in relation to Edmonds and Fell’s work Absolute 4.5 (2006) where solid bars
altering in colour and position are projected onto a screen with synthetic
sounds driven by the same algorithmic process (Figure 2.4). Participants
influence the behaviour of the work through hidden pressure sensitive floor
pads providing a two dimensional input.
The framework considers how a work establishes a relationship with its
audience through three stages: attracting interest, sustaining interest and
retaining interest beyond the interaction.
Attractors are the aspect of a work that attract potential participants to
it in the first place. These will be aspects that catch the attention of passers
by. In Absolute 4.5, this was initially dealt with by setting the resting state
of the work, where nobody was interacting with it, to be noisy and flashing
(a tactic similar to those found in videogame arcades (Collins 2008)). This
was effective, but detracted from other works in the space and so had to be
adjusted to find a balance.
Sustainers are aspects of the work that keep an audience interested once
it has their attention. In museums, exhibits that have a strong holding
41
power lead to what Bollo and Dal Pozzolo (2005) describe as hot spots. The
behaviour of the work has to be interesting and it is identifying what exactly
is interesting in interactive experiences where the difficulty lies (Edmonds
et al. 2006). With Absolute 4.5, although loud and active in its resting state,
the work quickly became subdued and quiet once a participant entered its
space. This was an initial sustainer through puzzling the participant about
what would happen next. Within the space, the work then responded to two
dimensions of input, one reacting in an immediately perceptible manner and
one more subtle, giving the audience a combination of something they could
quickly grasp with something more difficult to work out.
Relaters are aspects of a work that establish a continuing relationship
with a participant beyond the interaction, potentially leading to them re-
turning or recommending it to others. Absolute 5, a developed version of the
above work, investigated relaters somewhat through implementing a long-
term evolution of the means by which it responded to its participants, as
well as also responding to participants in a different city. Edmonds et al.
(2006, p. 319) write that the concept behind this work was to create an in-
teractive experience that was unique each time it was visited, and that ‘The
changes are not random, although perhaps they might be thought to be, but
are influenced deterministically by people out of sight in another city.’
The topic of our investigation is primarily in the middle category of the
work—the sustainers. The framework is useful in highlighting other aspects
of a work that should be considered in many contexts. Attractors and relaters
are typically overlooked in lab-based research although for the latter we might
reasonably assume that a long captivating experience will form a stronger
relationship with a participant than a brief momentary marvel. However,
the museum-based background of the model carries assumptions of works
competing for attention much like in a videogame arcade, which may not
necessarily be the case.
Edmonds et al. description of the sustainers in Absolute 4.5 is a pattern
we shall meet in a variety of forms throughout this PhD—a puzzle provided
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to its participants in combination with an indicator that there is a solution
to be found.
2.1.5 Rokeby’s construction of experience
Rokeby (1998) sees interactive art as an extension from simply providing
content to a spectator as also specifying the means by which that content
may be experienced. The interface to the work privileges certain paths of
exploration, sometimes explicitly but often more subtly by making some
actions easier and more obvious. This leads to what Rokeby dubs operational
cliche´s—mechanisms that are so neat and easy that they become overused.
Any interface embodies a model of the user in terms similar to the way
we model systems: what they may perceive (their input) and what inputs
they may provide to the system (their output). In order to use the system,
the user must internalise this schema to some extent and this modifies their
sense of self within the installation. Rokeby provides an example how this
distorted sense of self may manifest with his work Very Nervous System
(Rokeby 1986).
The Very Nervous System is a sound installation that responds to move-
ment. The system receives input from an 8x8 pixel camera and calculates a
Fourier transform on each pixel, which trigger different sounds. This effec-
tively projects a fixed grid onto the space, with a participant able to control
the sound through varying the location, amount and speed of their move-
ment (Rokeby 2011; Winkler 1997). Rokeby (2011) found that participants
would begin to respond unconsciously to the system with reflexive move-
ments and this would establish a feedback loop. However, the participant’s
consciousness of their movement would ‘lag’ behind these reflexes leading to
a perceived loss of conscious control over one’s physical actions.1 Rokeby
(1998) describes the effect as intoxicating, addictive and leading to states
1This sensation is referred to as losing a sense of agency within psychological literature
(Moore et al. 2009). However, we will be using the term agency extensively in Chapter 6
to mean something slightly different so we will avoid this specific use of the word.
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that could be described as ‘shamanistic’. At the other end of the spectrum,
reducing the dimensions of interaction available to the participant can make
their impact on the system more immediately recognisable. This, paradoxi-
cally, can increase their sense of empowerment (Rokeby 1998).
Rokeby’s reflective research practice provides some compelling insights
into his diverse artistic practice. He highlights the way an interface can lead
users along certain pathways without establishing explicit limitations as well
as the crucial role of the perceptual feedback loop in establishing a sense of
control over events. However, as an artist he provides examples what can
be achieved and what the consequences are, rather than general principles of
how to go about achieving it.
2.1.6 Fels’s model of embodiment
Embodiment describes an approach within HCI that considers the role of
the body in perception (Larssen et al. 2006). It is grounded in the notion
that our understanding of abstract interaction is derived from our familiar
understanding of interacting with the physical world (Preece et al. 2011,
p. 96).
The term is also used to describe a relationship between user and tool in
which the tool drops from the user’s conscious awareness and they instead
perceive themselves as directly interacting with the final medium (Fels 2000).
For example, computer users quite quickly stop talking about ‘pressing the
mouse button’ and instead refer to ‘clicking on the screen’.
Fels (2000, 2004) argues that embodiment can also be perceived the other
way, where the user sees themselves as being manipulated by a system. This
leads to a model of how a person relates to an object of four categories as
follows.
Response. The person is disembodied from the object and communicates in
a dialogue. Any pleasure from the relationship derives from the result
of their interaction rather than the interaction itself.
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Control. The person embodies the object and feels like it is an extension of
their own body and mind. In this situation, pleasure arises from the
relationship itself rather than its outcome. This relationship is similar
to that between an experienced musician and their instrument.
Contemplation. The object communicates to the person. This situation
is similar to traditional forms of media where there is no interaction.
The person may respond to the signals coming from the object through
introspection.
Belonging. The object embodies the person. In this category, the per-
son derives pleasure from a relationship where they have relinquished
control to the object. Fels (2000) sees this final category as rich for
experimentation.
This model arose through Fels observing participants progressing through
these different stages (excluding the third) with his interactive artwork Ia-
mascope (Fels and Mase 1999). Iamascope is an installation consisting of
a video projection, sound system and camera positioned to capture a par-
ticipant looking at the projection. The projected video is created through
cropping and reflecting the camera feed into sectors of a circle in a manner
similar to a kaleidoscope (Figure 2.5). To create the sound, the same cropped
camera feed is divided into zones. Each area is associated with a particu-
lar pitch selected from an automatically cycling list of chords. Notes of a
fixed duration are triggered when the average intensity over a zone exceeds a
threshold. Whilst musical, it is a system created for an aesthetic experience
rather than expressive musical performance (Fels et al. 2002).
Fels identifies a number of aspects of Iamascope that lead participants
to progress into this fourth category of embodiment, such as mirroring their
body in the transformed image whilst not being abstracted so far that it
becomes unidentifiable. Elsewhere, he has identified metaphor and collab-
oration as additional tools that may lead to this type of experience (Fels
2004). This notion of the participant relinquishing control is similar to the
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Figure 2.5: A participant interacting with Iamascope
(1997). Reproduced with permission from Fels and Mase
(1999).
loss of agency reported by Rokeby (1998) in Section 2.1.5, as is the proposed
cause: a feedback loop that is very sensitive to the participant’s body.
Costello et al. (2005) conducted three in depth qualitative studies of Ia-
mascope combining video-cued recall2 with video-based observation which
was then coded by a multidisciplinary team (Bilda et al. 2006). They found
evidence supporting Fels’s categories of embodiment as well as more detailed
subcategories.
1. Response was observed to progress through two subcategories:
How to work it, where the participant tests the broad parameters of
the system with few expectations about the outcome,
Realisation, when the participant recognises their face within the im-
age making the underlying concept behind the mapping clear.3
2. Control through three subcategories:
Purposeful movement where the participant moves with more con-
fidence and commitment and has expectations about the outcome,
Fine and detailed movements where the participant investigates
more nuanced aspects of the mapping and gains satisfaction from
exercising creative and expressive control,
Goals and aims where the participant not only has expectations re-
garding the outcome but goals and aims that they are trying to
carry out.
3. Contemplation was accompanied by the participant relating the work
to other parts of their life such as who they might discuss their expe-
rience with.
2Video-cued recall is a research method where participants are invited to be videoed
interacting with the system and then provide a running commentary whilst watching the
video. See Section 2.5.5.
3Mapping is defined in more detail in Section 2.2.7.
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4. Belonging was identified in one participant, who was strongly engaged
with the installation for longer than the others.
Costello et al. observed that Realisation typically marked the start of a
transition from Response to Control and describe a shift in attitude from
investigative exploration (‘what does this object do?’) to diverse exploration
(‘what can I do with this object?’). They observed that participants would
shift between these states, returning to the response state when they were
bored.
They also proposed a fifth stage Disengagement, observing that before
decided to stop using the system each participant had repeated an action
sequence they had recently done. This corresponded with participants de-
scriptions of exhausting the possibilities.
Fels’s model provides a useful model of the process of engagement a par-
ticipant might follow with an interactive system. In particular, we will review
in more detail Costello et al.’s identification of alternations between inves-
tigative and diverse exploration and the issue of exhausting the possibilities
in Section 4.1. However, even with the fifth category of disengagement, it
remains an ideal model focusing on what can go right. It does not account
for frustration with how the installation responds or goals that could not be
achieved. It provides some indication of how to achieve the different states,
but it is not entirely clear how easily these would generalise to other works.
Furthermore, although Fels (2004) acknowledges that the states are not mu-
tually exclusive, Contemplation does not seem to fit into the model with the
other states which themselves do seem somewhat more mutually exclusive.
2.1.7 Reeves et al.’s model of the spectator experience
Reeves et al. (2005) created a two-dimensional taxonomy of spectating inter-
action by considering the extent to which the manipulations and the effects
of the interaction are visible. Each axis ranges through hidden, partially
revealed or transformed, revealed and amplified.
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Figure 2.6: Reeves et al.’s model of the spectator experi-
ence. Four quadrants describe the quality of an interaction
depending upon the extent to which the manipulations and
the effects are revealed. Adapted from Reeves et al. (2005).
Reeves et al. establish four categories of interaction from the four quad-
rants of the graph (Figure 2.6).
Expressive interactions have strongly visible manipulations and effects.
These allow for the understanding by spectators of how a system is
being interacted with. In performance this may be to appreciate skill.
With an interactive installation it may serve the role of allowing spec-
tators to form an understanding of how to interact with the system
before they use it.
Secretive interactions have mainly hidden manipulations and effects. With
an interactive installation this may prevent surprises within the system
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from being revealed to future participants before it is their turn.
Magical interactions have hidden manipulations from a visible performer
but clearly visible effects.
Suspenseful interactions have visible manipulations but no visible effects.
Spectators may be attracted by seeing the interaction and drawn into
participating in order to see the effects.
Sheridan, Bryan-Kinns and Bayliss (2007) argue that the dichotomy be-
tween performer and spectator within this model does not capture the intri-
cacies of how spectators become performers—we will see how they address
this issue below. However, for us there is a more fundamental issue with
this model. Although the model describes what an audience may perceive,
it does not consider how they perceive it. For example, as we will argue
in Section 6.1.4, magical interaction may well be interpreted as automation.
Suspenseful interaction may simply be perceived as an error. The perception
of error will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.14
2.1.8 Sheridan’s framework of witting participation
Sheridan (2006) presents a framework of Witting Participation to describe
the multitude of roles an individual may take within a performance. Her
roles are described in terms of the performance frame which defines the cog-
nitive context defining the rules, interpretation and behaviour of an activity.
Behaviour is characterised along three dimensions.
Wittingness: The extent to which an individual is aware of the performance
frame.
Technical skill: Whether the individual demonstrates skills that are rele-
vant to the performance frame.
Interpretive skill: The extent to which an individual may use their tech-
nical skills to convey meaning.
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Sheridan (2006) argues that an individual progresses from being a by-
stander into a spectator when they become witting and choose to engage
with the performance frame. The extent to which they may then transition
to the role of participant is likely to depend on the extent they are able
to acquire the necessary technical skills as a spectator. However, a partic-
ipant remains separate from a performer, who possesses interpretive skills
and exercises control over the performance frame itself.
The framework is illustrated through two related interactive works iPoi,
(Bayliss et al. 2005; Sheridan et al. 2006a,b, 2007), later developed as uPoi
(Sheridan and Bryan-Kinns 2008; Bryan-Kinns et al. 2010).
Poi is a type of performance art where a weight attached to a length of
cord is held in each hand and swung around the body. The term poi also
refers to the objects that are swung. iPoi and uPoi are poi augmented with
embedded accelerometers that communicate wirelessly with a nearby laptop,
which produces an audio and visual response. Originally created for poi
performers within nightclubs with the intention of extending the impact of
the performance without detracting from the performer’s ownership or focus
(Bayliss et al. 2005), later developments focused on assisting transitions from
spectator to participant (Bryan-Kinns et al. 2010). They included, for ex-
ample, extra sensors not embedded within the poi to allow non-performative
participation (Sheridan and Bryan-Kinns 2008).
iPoi and uPoi differ from Iamascope or the Very Nervous System in that
they are created with a focus on participants who already have a specific
performative skill. Later developments allowed for multiple sets of iPoi to
run simultaneously as well as a sensor placed inside a teddy bear allowing
less performative interaction for shy participants (Sheridan, Bryan-Kinns,
and Bayliss 2007).
We will explore in more detail performative ownership and the role per-
formance context plays in perceiving skill when we develop a framework of
Perceived Agency in Chapter 6.
51
2.1.9 Jo and Tanaka’s matrix of musical participation
Jo and Tanaka (2009) present a framework with three levels of participation
considered over four areas of a musical activity. Participation is categorised in
terms of an individual’s ability to influence the outcome of an area and based
on Arnstein’s (1969) model of citizen participation. They are as follows.
Non-participation. The individual is unable to influence the outcome
Tokenism. The individual is somewhat able to influence the outcome but
power to change the status quo rests with others.
Citizen power. The individual is able to negotiate a change of outcome
with others.
The four perspectives of sound making practice over which they consider
an individual’s permitted level of participation are
Sound: Any attribute of the sound produced from their instrument includ-
ing pitch, temporal shaping, volume, timbre.
Instrument: The set of objects that people manipulate to create sounds.
Process: The sequence of actions taken by those present during the partic-
ipation.
Performance: The potential for linking listening to others with playing and
so forming a social exchange.
Jo and Tanaka consider a number of different musical performance con-
texts in terms of these categories including the traditional orchestra concert,
a drum circle and a number of experimental musical works that stipulate
experimental performance practice.
Somewhat inspired by a desire to explore new forms of musical practice,
the matrix encompasses a broad spectrum of musical activities. It is useful to
our needs through highlighting the importance of considering interactivity—
analogous to level of participation—beyond the audio output of a system.
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However, for the context of our enquiry, it is perhaps somewhat coarse. For
example, as every aspect of sound falls into a single category, it cannot dif-
ferentiate an improvised melodies from an expressive performance of a fixed
score. It also does not consider how one’s participation levels might change
throughout an activity as does, say, Sheridan’s (2006) model (Section 2.1.8).
In Chapter 6 we will return to these topics with a greater focus on authorship,
intention and performance context.
We have covered a few selected theories regarding interactive and perfor-
mance art that consider what is perceived, what kind of experience it leads
to and the role both an interactive system and a performance context may
play in determining the participatory role taken by those present.
Most of the work has identified what kind of experiences an audience
member may have and how aspects of a system and the context in which it
appears may influence this. In Chapter 4, we will attempt to consider much
more finely why the interactive experience itself unfolds as it does by drawing
on the psychology of musical perception, exploration and motivation. In
Chapter 6, although we derive it independently, our framework of Perceived
Agency will in particular build upon the frameworks outlined by Sheridan
et al. (Section 2.1.8) and Jo and Tanaka (Section 2.1.9).
2.2 New Interfaces for Musical Expression
The research field and community of those exploring new means to transform
human action into sound is often referred to as New Interfaces for Musical
Expression (NIME )—named after the key conference in this area.4
As mentioned in Section 1.2, we are using a specific interpretation of the
term Interactive Music System (IMS). The meaning of the term instrument
4The International Conference on New Interfaces for Musical Expression (http://www.
nime.org. Accessed 27 March 2012).
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is also often debated (e.g. Jorda` 2004). We will therefore use the term Digital
Music System (DMS) to cover the entire range of systems discussed in this
chapter.
2.2.1 A brief history of new musical interfaces
The Theremin (1928) is often given as a starting point in the history of
experimental electronic musical instruments (e.g. Roads et al. 1996, p. 622).
Whilst not the first instrument to be powered electrically rather than through
human effort (organs were being electrified as early as the 1900s (Sefl 2006)),
it diverged significantly from previous instruments. Firstly, its sound was
created from oscillators rather than the vibration of physical materials inter-
acting. However, arguably more significant within the field of NIME was the
interface through which its performer controlled the instrument. With two
sensing plates capacitively coupled with the performer’s hands, pitch and
amplitude were each controlled continuously and independently by one hand
without any contact with the instrument (Paradiso 1997). Throughout the
mid-20th century, further electronic instruments were developed, often using
interfaces derived from the piano keyboard such as the ondes Martenot and
the Mellotron (see Chadabe (1997) for a detailed overview).
From the 1950s onwards, modular synthesisers became commercially avail-
able—most notably from companies founded by Robert Moog and Don Buch-
la—consisting of separate signal generating units that were connected to-
gether through plugging in cables known as patch cords. Although early
modular synthesisers typically had keyboards attached, the synthesiser it-
self required time and expertise to patch—neither of which needed to be the
performer’s. This opened the door for new types of relationships between per-
formers and instruments: an instrument that one knows how to play but not
program, or vice versa. The possibilities for programmable instruments mag-
nified in the 1980s with the introduction of the Musical Instrument Digital
Interface (MIDI) protocol, an industry standardised communication protocol
that allowed an arbitrary controller (often either a keyboard or a sequencer)
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to be easily and quickly connected to an arbitrary synthesiser (Miranda and
Wanderley 2006, p. 19).
Within the past two decades, however, we are within something of a re-
naissance within the field. A huge range of novel musical interfaces are cur-
rently being created by professionals and amateurs around the world. This
has been driven largely by the availability of powerful computers bringing
with them cheap software synthesisers as well as affordable sensing technol-
ogy. Just about any kind of existing sensor that measures some aspect of a
performer’s gestures can be (and quite likely has been) adapted as a musi-
cal interface. Examples include the microphone (e.g. Stowell and Plumbley
2010), the webcam (e.g. Lyons et al. 2003; Kiefer et al. 2009) and accelerom-
eters (e.g. Magnusson 2010). Most of these systems perform a substantial
amount of processing to reduce the huge amount of sensor data into some-
thing more manageable.
There are two key paradigms within NIME research that are most relevant to
our research: the Digital Musical Instrument (DMI) and the interactive sound
installation/application. We discuss both of these below, before considering
some other paradigms of interest in Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.
2.2.2 Digital Musical Instruments (DMIs)
In recent years, the Digital Musical Instrument (DMI) has been the most
dominant paradigm within NIME research. A DMI is defined by (Wanderley
2001a) as an instrument that divides into a separate gestural interface and
sound generation unit with a mapping to specify how the interface controls
the generator. Miranda and Wanderley (2006, p. 1) define DMI similarly with
the further stipulation that a computer is used to generate the sound. DMIs
are created as musical instruments and thus arrive with the assumption that
they are to be used in the same context as a conventional instrument might
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(Gurevich and Fyans 2011). However, in spite of the extensive amount of
research into DMIs, there is a sense of dissatisfaction that those performing
live computer music still rely on ‘generic and dull’ MIDI controllers (Jorda`
2004), the laptop keyboard (Widmer et al. 2007) or are simply unsatisfying
to watch (Schloss 2003).
Jorda` (2005) distinguishes a range of characteristics that any instrument
should have, many of which we will cover in more detail later in this section.
However, he argues that instruments differ from other interactive music sys-
tems in that they permit
• improvisation,
• experimentation,
• the performance of a range of different pieces of music.
The division between input and output has been referred to as splitting
the chain (Jorda` 2004). It frees those creating instruments from physical
constraints but at the same time can lead to losing fundamental physical
traits such as tactile feedback (Wanderley 2001a). There is no longer the feel
of creating sound (Widmer et al. 2007). Furthermore, a problem of coher-
ence arises with controllers or synthesis engines created independently and
then ‘glued’ together at the last moment. The physical origins of controlling
conventional instruments are intuitively felt by performers and spectators
alike, even if they are not explicitly understood. However, a general purpose
‘musical controller’ will not necessarily relate to the sound it controls in a
meaningful way (Jorda` 2004). Both Fels (2004) and Jorda` (2005) have cited
the fact that few DMIs persuade musicians beyond their original creators to
invest time to learn and master them as a sign that they are not being made
to satisfaction.5
5This state of affairs may be changing. There is evidence instruments such as the
Reactable, the Ocarina and the Eigenharp (all discussed below) have begun developing
their own dedicated performers.
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Figure 2.7: The Reactable with a number of its marked
objects above the translucent surface onto which the visual
feedback is projected. (Photo: Massimo Boldrin. Reproduced
with permission.)
Examples
Space limits us from providing extensive details of existing DMIs. However,
we will briefly describe a few examples to illustrate some of the diversity
within the field.
One of the most successful instruments in recent years is the Reactable
(Jorda` et al. 2005). The instrument consists of a round translucent table.
Underneath the surface, a projector, infrared camera and computer turn this
into a large touch screen. As well as touches, specially marked objects placed
on the table can be tracked with respect to their position and orientation.
Each object acts as a module as part of a modular synthesiser transmitting
either control or audio data, with proximity between objects determining
whether or not they are connected. Crucial to the Reactable is the projection,
providing instantaneous and rich feedback about how the physical location
of the objects is being interpreted by the system (Figure 2.7). Although it is
also used in performance as a solo instrument, the Reactable was designed
from the outset to be a collaborative instrument allowing a group of musicians
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to create music within a shared space (Kaltenbrunner et al. 2006).
Some DMIs are created in imitation of traditional instruments, though
usually extending their capabilities somewhat. This can allow performers to
draw on established technique (Cook 2001, 2009). It may also assist audiences
in understanding the interaction that they are spectating.
Don Buchla’s Marimba Lumina (Buchla 2005) is a controller with bars
laid out in a similar manner to the marimba. It is played with colour coded
mallets containing tuned coil, each of which are detected electronically by
the bars, allowing the instrument to detect velocity, position along the bar
and which mallet hit it.
Smule’s Ocarina (Wang 2009) is an imitation of the ocarina wind instru-
ment that runs on the iPhone. The player blows into the microphone, which
estimates the degree of pressure, and presses zones on the touch screen cor-
responding to the holes on the original instrument. However, in addition
to these traditional aspects, tilting the phone allows for modification of the
timbre (Figure 2.8).
An augmented instrument is an extension to a traditional acoustic instru-
ment (Widmer et al. 2007). Typically, extra capabilities are provided through
the addition of sensors that create additional sounds or control effects ap-
plied to the acoustic sound (Miranda and Wanderley 2006). For example,
McPherson’s (2010) Magnetic Resonator Piano uses the Moog Piano Bar
(2005) to optically senses the position of each key on a grand piano. This
input is then mapped to an array of magnetic transducers installed above
the piano strings that individually vibrate each key’s strings in response to
the position of each key.
Finally, a number of notable commercial DMIs created in recent years
are actually controllers designed to control arbitrary software ‘instruments’
running on a computer. Sometimes they are bundled with optional software
but often with the assumption that many musicians are expected to advance
from this when ready. Examples include the Eigenharp (2010) and the Karlax
(2010).
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Figure 2.8: Design schematic for Smule’s Ocarina. Repro-
duced with permission from Wang (2009).
Creating DMIs with character
A lesson from DMI research has been that increasing the capabilities of a sys-
tem does not always improve it. Tanaka (2006) argues that it is the idiomatic
characteristics of instruments—effectively their own unique limitations—that
give them their voice. He illustrates this point with reference to Sensorband,
a three person ensemble in which he performs. The three musicians all per-
form with unique and custom made DMIs that would be unknown to an
audience. However, each has a unique way of articulating sounds allowing a
listener to gradually unravel the voices making up the sound of the ensem-
ble. In a similar vein, Magnusson (2010) proposes that with the boundless
possibilities of modern synthesis software, we need to think less in terms of
affordances—what an instrument permits its player to do—and instead focus
on which constraints we need to impose.
The potential of constrained instruments to provoke original and creative
musical styles was demonstrated in a study by Gurevich et al. (2010). They
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provided nine music students with a highly constrained instrument and gave
them a week to prepare a solo performance, which was videoed and analysed
following a formal coding process. The instrument was simply a box with a
button that caused it to output a tone of fixed pitch and amplitude, some
holes allowing the sound to escape and an on/off switch. However, a diversity
of different performance techniques arose including tapping the box, filtering
the sound by covering the speaker holes and creating timbral effects through
operating the power switch whilst the button was pressed.
The dominance of the DMI paradigm
The Digital Musical Instrument has become the dominant paradigm within
NIME research for systems that translate human action into sound for the
benefit of an audience (Gurevich and Fyans 2011) including, for example, per-
formances conducted entirely using a laptop (e.g. Zadel and Scavone 2006).
However, considering all computer-based performance systems as drop-in re-
placements for musical instruments can place unnecessary constraints on the
performance possibilities may arise from NIME research (Gurevich and Fyans
2011). Magnusson (2005), in the discussion of his and Hurtado’s ixi software
point out that the instrument paradigm was useful, but they outgrew it
eventually. In the other direction, consideringeverything as an instrument
risks overlooking what makes instruments different from tools (Tanaka 2006;
Van Nort 2009). We will return to both of these arguments in Chapter 3.
Composed instruments
The composed instrument is defined by both Wanderley et al. (1998) and
Fiebrink et al. (2010) as an instrument where the gestural controller is inde-
pendent form the sound synthesis model. This is identical to our definition
of a DMI (Section 2.2.2). However, Schnell and Battier (2002) refines this
notion in a manner that we might expect from the name, as an instrument
embodying some kind of precomposed musical work.
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The term recognises that within NIME, the distinction between compo-
sition and instrument is somewhat blurred (Magnusson 2009; Drummond
2009). However, it is also an acknowledgement that prior to performing or
improvising with a DMI, a degree of preparation may take place, such as
defining mappings or loading samples (Dudas 2010). Such preparation is
not exclusive to DMIs. Cage (1973) wrote for prepared piano and one may
program presets into a synthesizer. However, as we will see in Section 2.2.7,
the mapping of a DMI is fundamental in defining not only how it sounds but
the types of musical interactions it lends itself towards.
Hahn and Bahn (2002) describe a composed instrument as a cohesive
combination of controller, sounds, processing methods and display systems.
Their work Pikapika, a performance where a wearable instrument was tai-
lored around Hahn (who is a trained dancer), demonstrates the idea. The
instrument was developed alongside the character of the show, with choreog-
raphy, sound and interaction design emerging throughout the process with
input from the experience of the dancer.
In Section 3.3.1, we will consider the relationship between composing
instruments and composing music to extend this concept of a composed in-
strument.
2.2.3 Interactive Music Systems (IMSs)
We define an Interactive Music System (IMS) as a system that responds
with music to input from a non-expert human participant without requiring
assistance from a non-participatory human (e.g. an artist working behind the
scenes). Our focus will be on systems that do so by use of a computer.
The two key types of IMS that are most suited to our formulation of
interactive music (see Section 1.2) are installations and applications. We dis-
cuss both of these here—other relevant IMSs will then be covered in Sections
2.2.4 and 2.2.5.
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Interactive sound installations
Interactive sound installations are a form of interactive art installed in a
public space where visitors are able to influence what is heard. A key design
consideration for this context is that few assumptions may be made about the
audience, especially with regards to their experience interacting with similar
systems (Dipper 2009). Visitors may not even be aware an installation is
interactive. In this case, they are unlikely to engage with the system unless
a perceptual feedback loop is quickly established (Schacher 2009). However,
whilst it may be easy to get attention, it can be a challenge to provide longer
‘nourishing’ experiences (Machover 2002).
With interactive installations, the creator typically relinquishes control
over timing aspects of their work (Klein 2009). Unlike, for example, on a
smartphone app (or a lab-based evaluation), potential participants are likely
to come and go individually at arbitrary times.
We saw Rokeby’s Very Nervous System in Section 2.1.5 and Fels’s Iamas-
cope in Section 2.1.6 as examples of interactive sounds installations. Another
example is Tanaka and Bongers’s (2001) Global String, where a virtual mu-
sical string stretches across two distant locations with each end being phys-
ically realised as a steel cable within a public space. Visitors could interact
through vibrating the string, which provided input to a synthesiser at both
locations, as well as being actuated into physical vibrations on the string in
the opposing space.
Further examples include Livingstone and Miranda’s (2004) reactive space
that responds to visitors’ gestures as detected via video and PlaySound-
Ground (St. Clair and Leitman 2009), an installation where accelerometers
were installed onto playground furniture to drive synthesiser parameters.
Interactive sound applications
Interactive sound applications might be considered similar to interactive
sound installations except transplanted from a public space onto a personal
computing device such as a laptop, mobile phone or games console. This
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leads to a number of distinctions with installations. The potential partici-
pant is less likely to ‘chance upon’ a work. There is less scope for learning
through observing other participants. In addition, the application has the
potential to remember its state and be aware when the participant is ready
to interact, allowing it to personalise its behaviour to the user over time.
Interactive sound applications may also be referred to as sound or musical
‘toys’ (Robson 2001). However, we will avoid this term as it may be used in
a derogatory manner to imply something is lacking in musical potential (e.g.
Jorda` 2004).
An example in this category is Block Jam (Newton-Dunn et al. 2003), an
interface consisting of 26 physical blocks that magnetically connect. Sensors
within the blocks detect the arrangement and use this configuration to drive
a sequencer following the metaphor of bouncing virtual ‘cue balls’ through
the connections.
Another example is Electroplankton designed by Iwai (2005) for the Nin-
tendo DS. The user interacts with a set of animated marine animals, who
each respond in a different way though animation and sound. Although it is
created on what is predominantly a gaming platform, there are no explicit
goals. Pichlmair and Kayali (2007) call this Active Score Music, where the
artist has created an interface to a musical process for a user to explore.
With an application such as Electroplankton where user input may be
reliably turned into sound, we may ask why it is not considered as a DMI.
The potential diversity of outputs is often cited, which we will discuss in
more detail in Section 2.2.11: in this sense we may think of Electoplankton
as having a fixed number of pieces. However, in Chapter 6, I will propose
creative agency as a more suitable means of answering this question.
2.2.4 Other performance paradigms
Digital Music Systems (DMSs) blur traditional distinctions between per-
former, composer, instrument and audience (Drummond 2009). Beyond
DMIs and interactive sound installations a variety of different paradigms
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have been proposed. Whilst we will try to avoid where possible debates over
the meaning of words, a key reason for establishing these paradigms is to
facilitate communication of what kind of problem each system is attempt-
ing to solve and consequently which lessons might be applicable in different
scenarios. Therefore, we will review here some of those that are most rel-
evant. However, it is important to bear in mind that such paradigms are
descriptive rather than prescriptive having been based on observations and
generalisations rather than a requirement analysis (Linson 2011).
In this section, we review performance paradigms where a DMS is used
by an expert performer for a non-participatory audience. Paradigms where
DMSs are used without an expert performer follow in the subsequent section.
Interactive Composition, Intelligent Musical Instruments
Interactive composing is a term introduced by Chadabe in 1982 as ‘a perfor-
mance process wherein a performer shares control of the music by interacting
with a musical instrument’ (Chadabe 1997, p. 293). He describes it as a two
stage process of creating a interactive composing system and then simulta-
neously performing and composing by interacting with that system. The
requirements on the system are to function within a performance automati-
cally and in real time to
• Interpret a performer’s actions as partial controls for the music,
• Generate controls for those aspects of the music not controlled by the
performer,
• Direct the synthesizer in generating sounds (Chadabe 1984, p. 23)
An intelligent musical instrument, a term also used by Chadabe to de-
scribe an interactive composing system, which he reports was introduced
earlier by Laurie Spiegel and Max Mathews around 1973 as an instrument
that analysed the performer’s expressive intention and then automatically
created the music (Chadabe 1997).
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Mathews, reasoning that the notes of a piece were predetermined but a
key source of difficulty, created the Radio Baton and Conductor Program
as a sort of ‘expressive sequencer,’ allowing a listener to be more active and
conduct their own interpretation of a piece. As Chadabe describes, it shares
‘control of the music with the user, thus compensating for the user’s lack of
previously acquired skill’ (Chadabe 1985).
Spiegel describes intelligent instruments as letting people play music on
a compositional level.’6 Keeping accessibility as a motivating factor, she
created Music Mouse (Spiegel 1988), which used the two-dimensional coor-
dinates of the mouse as a direct input to two on-screen keyboards. Further
control from the computer keyboard altered a range of settings, which were
then used in the automatic creation of additional musical material.
Thus we might be able to see interactive composing systems and intelli-
gent instruments as two sides of the same desire to automate some aspects
of the music making process, with the former being used in the conventional
performance context and the latter in the informal improvising or home enter-
tainment scenario. Chadabe sees a sense of performance-time unpredictabil-
ity from the system as a crucial aspect of interactive composition as it allows
mutual influence between performer and system. After all, guitar frets au-
tomate some aspect of the musical creation process and surely influence the
actions of the performer but a guitar is not an interactive composition.
However, a number of questions remain unanswered. How far does the
performer of an interactive composing system learn to use it? If a system is
designed to provoke and behave in unexpected ways, does rehearsing with it
to become more familiar with its behaviour make it less interactive? ‘Unpre-
dictable’ is often used in a computer science sense, meaning non-deterministic
behaviour—that is, a program in which providing identical inputs will at
some stage give distinct outputs. But any musical systems receiving contin-
uous input data is unlikely to receive an identical input twice. Even when
‘unpredictable’ is understood more subjectively as ‘unexpected’, to whom is
6Personal communication between Spiegel and Chadabe as quoted in Chadabe (1997,
p. 334).
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it unexpected? The audience? The performer? The creator of the system?
Finally, Chadabe (2004) describes an interactive instrument as a dynamic
musical system with an identity of its own and that can ‘seem to think for
itself’. This requirement is familiar from our discussion in Section 2.1.3 of
the many meanings of the word ‘interactive’. The framework we describe
in Chapter 6 will provide a more specific grasp of what it means for an
instrument to ‘seem to think for itself’.
Rowe’s Interactive Music Systems
Rowe defined an interactive music system as a system ‘whose behaviour
changes in response to musical input’7 (Rowe 1993, p. 1). Although not
explicit in this definition, Rowe characterises computer music systems as
those that listen to, and in turn respond to, a performer with some kind of
originality in their response. They become an active participant in a musical
performance occupying the same role as a human musician might.
Rowe’s definition has been criticised for being too restrictive in consider-
ing only music as input (Jorda` 2005) or for limiting its scope to fit within
established performance practices (Paine 2002). However, Drummond (2009)
points out that at the time it was written, the vast majority of music software
and controllers were MIDI based. Their criticism is perhaps more of the all
encompassing nature of the term interactive music system rather than the
merit of such systems.
Rowe identifies a number of dimensions along which to classify interactive
music systems.
The first classifies between score-driven and performance-driven systems.
Rowe’s conception of a score follows traditional ideas of collections of notes
organised by pitch and time.
Score-driven systems make use of fragments of scores both in terms of what
7Rowe actually defines an interactive computer music system although the term inter-
active music system is used throughout his book and in his title so we assume he means
the two to be synonymous.
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they are listening for and how they respond.
Performance-driven systems, on the other hand, tend not to anticipate a
particular score and listen out for more perceptual parameters such as
density and regularity.
The second categorises the method used by the system to generate an
output.
Sequenced methods make use of prerecorded fragments of music with per-
haps some slight modifications of rhythm or dynamics.
Transformative methods also rely on musical material but this may be
heard live rather than stored and transformed in some way so that the
output may not be recognisable from the source.
Generative methods have only elementary source material such as scored
scales or sets.
The third dimension distinguishes between instrument and player para-
digms and is concerned with whether the role is assumed to fill the role
of an instrument (resulting in a solo if used by a single performer) or a
type of artificial player (resulting in more of a duet if used used by a single
performer).
Jorda` (2005) criticises these first two dimensions as being highly corre-
lated. After all, a score-driven system is surely relying on sequenced methods.
We may perhaps address this criticism by reinterpreting the first dimension
as the range of input to which the system has been intended to respond and
the second as how far the performer may predict the output. Alternatively, we
may consider the first as relating more to the greater compositional structure
and the second to more microscopic aspects.
An example of an interactive music system is Pachet’s (2003) Continua-
tor. The Continuator responds in real-time to MIDI input by generating a
musically interesting but stylistically consistent response. The style model
may be learned online as the user interacts with the system or a previously
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recorded model may be used. Interactions with the Continuator tend to fol-
low a pattern of call and response. It fits neatly into Rowe’s classification sys-
tem as a performance-driven, generative system within the player paradigm.
It also satisfies some of the more tricky definitions of interactive: interacting
with it is conversational requiring perception, memory and cognition by both
parties (Bongers 2000). It is capable of changing and evolving in response to
these interactions (Paine 2002). However, Pachet (2003) points out that the
stylistic models can only ‘fool’ the listener on a short scale. Responsibility
remains with the performer to establish structure within a piece.
Another system that aligns with Rowe’s definition is Swarm Music (Black-
well and Bentley 2002; Blackwell and Young 2004). Blackwell et al. draw on
analogous concepts between group improvisation and the dynamics of a par-
ticle swarm such as emergence as structure arises in an unplanned manner
from individual musicians and attraction and repulsion. Examples of this lat-
ter concept include the notes in a chord that may be seen as avoiding being
too close to each other (though not too much) and being attracted to con-
sonant intervals. We may also think of musicians responding to each other’s
motifs (attraction) but developing them into something of their own rather
than purely repeating them (repulsion). Blackwell et al.’s system interacts
with a performer through
1. Parsing an audio or MIDI input into events,
2. Mapping them into attractors within a multidimensional vector space
with different dimensions representing different musical parameters,
3. Applying the swarm update function to a (pervasive) set of particles
within the space,
4. Mapping the set of particles back into audio events.
In terms of Rowe’s classification, this system would be performance-driven
and within the player paradigm. Arguably, it is both a transformative and
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generative system being driven ultimately by a chaotic generative system but
providing responses that are directly based on previously heard material.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, we are using the term interactive music
system in a more broad sense than Rowe. Where we wish to refer to Rowe’s
definition, we will explicitly write Rowe’s Interactive Music System.
Interactive dance / Trans-domain mapping
Pikapika, discussed in the Section 2.2.2, is also an example of an interactive
dance performance. Interactive dance refers to the use of audio or visual
systems within a dance performance that are influenced by the actions of the
dancer (Bevilacqua et al. 2011). Gestures are typically sensed through
• motion capture8(e.g. Bevilacqua et al. 2001; James et al. 2006),
• off-stage cameras (e.g. Camurri et al. 2000, 2003; Ng 2002a)—often
using a computer vision toolkit such as EyesWeb (Camurri et al. 2004)
or Music-via-Motion (Ng 2004),
• wireless accelerometers attached to the dancer (e.g. Park et al. 2006;
Morales-Manzanares and Morales 1997; Aylward and Paradiso 2006),
• a controller held by the dancer (e.g. Murray-Browne et al. 2010).
Creating an interactive music system that responds to dance presents a
unique set of challenges. Dance is a predominantly visual medium and it
will often be desired for hardware to be hidden. It is also common to avoid
using hardware that imposes physical constraints, both in terms of bodily
movement as well as the dancer’s position within the performance space.
Of greater interest to us, however, is the question of how the dancer
exerts influence over the music. Typically we would not want to limit our
potential performers to dancers who are also musicians and, regardless of
8Motion capture refers to systems such as those produced by Vicon (www.vicon.com)
that sense the skeletal position of a person through attaching reflective markers to their
limbs and inferring their 3D position using an array of infrared cameras. Such systems
are accurate but expensive and not very portable (Geroch 2004).
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whether or not they are, there is not usually the time to learn a new musical
instrument for a single show. However, our dancer most likely is a highly
skilled performer with a mastery of expressive movement. For these reasons,
systems that provide low level control tend to be inappropriate (Siegel 2009).
Not only will the dancer be ill-equipped to express themselves musically
but the detailed gestures required to exert this control are likely to prevent
them from fully expressing themselves through movement. In the language
of gesture (see Section 2.2.6), we might consider dance as a medium entirely
of ancillary gestures that risks being disrupted through the introduction of
technical gestures. Therefore, with interactive dance it is the task of the
designer to adapt to the gestural language of the dancer, rather than the
dancer the gestural language of the designer. However, low level mappings
may make a brief appearance. We see this, for example, in the interactive
dance performance CoIN (Ng 2002b) which included a section where absolute
position of the hands of dancers were mapped to pitch.. Although, as Ng
reports, it becomes quickly tiresome, simple low level mappings were used
early in the performance to demonstrate to the audience that movement and
sound were related.
Thus, the aim with interactive dance systems is typically to provide the
dancer with high level control over the expressive aspects of the music, pro-
viding an interface that is both intuitive and lets them feel they are in control
(Morales-Manzanares et al. 2001; Siegel 2009). This requirement is similar to
Spiegel’s intelligent instruments (Section 2.2.4). However, it is worth remem-
bering that unlike Spiegel’s users, a dancer is a performer. They are trained
to express themselves and experienced in structuring an entire performance.
Ng (2002a) describes this process of translating activities from one creative
domain to another as trans-domain mapping.
The introduction of material in CoIN demonstrates another important
difference between interactive dance performance and a concert. In a concert,
the audience arrives with the expectation that the performer will be creating
the music. This cannot be taken for granted in a dance performance (Siegel
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2009). We will consider this issue in more depth in Section 3.3.2.
Other performance paradigms
Finally, we will briefly outline a number of other performance paradigms
that are not a direct part of the argument of this thesis but are relevant to
understand its context.
Tape music is simply the listening of an audio recording in a concert
environment (Rowe 1999). It is common to mix tape music with live instru-
mentalists. This practice remains common in many modern gig scenarios
where a band play on top of a sequenced backing track (Robertson 2009).
Examples performed in a more classical context include Steve Reich’s Dif-
ferent Trains (1988) for (unamplified) string quartet and tape. Rowe (1993,
1999) sees the mixing of performers and tape as an expression of the desire to
include human musicianship within computer music but identifies a number
of limitations. For example, the performance is restricted to a fixed tempo
and both instrumentalist and tape cannot make a simultaneous attack after
a considerable period of silence unless audio or visual feedback is provided
to the performer.
An important lesson to draw from tape music is that the concert perfor-
mance scenario has more to offer than simply providing a space for a musician
to perform. As Rowe argues,
the communal experience of hearing tape music in a large space
through superlative sound equipment is a valid and exhilarating
aesthetic venture in its own right. (Rowe 1999, p. 86)
We will explore the nature of concert experience in more detail in Chapter 6.
An accompaniment system is defined by Roads et al. (1996, p. 681) as a
system that ‘plays along with a human musician, following the performance
of a score by the human, and playing its own score simultaneously.’ These are
often created with the clear goal of providing more flexibility in timing than
a traditional tape recording when musicians are performing with a backing
track (Robertson 2009).
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Similar in definition, Jorda` (2005) argues that a system that only allows
for a predefined piece to be played in a performance is a score follower, a
definition that itself relies on the definition of the term ‘piece’. Under this
interpretation, we may also include systems that are not designed necessarily
for musicians. For example Castellano et al. (2007a,b) created a system that
renders a performance of a fixed piece of music with the body position and
movement of a participant controlling parameters such as tempo and sound
level. More detail on score following systems may be found in Stark (2011).
Finally, live coding is a type of musical performance that involves creating
music through programming during the performance (Collins et al. 2004). As
a result, it permits a high level of abstract process-oriented control (Brown
and Sorensen 2009). An interesting aspect of live coding is that the code is
usually made visible to the audience as well as the performer (Magnusson
2011). It is also common for performers to provide comments within their
code to assist the audience’s understanding of it (Fyans et al. 2010). Al-
though live coding does not form a part of the argument of this thesis, it is
relevant to Chapters 3 and 6 when we consider how an audience forms an
understanding of performed musical interaction—and what effect this has on
their ability to appreciate what they are hearing.
2.2.5 Other participatory paradigms
In Section 2.2.3, we stated that interactive sound installations and applica-
tions are the most suitable domain for our formulation of interactive music.
In this section we review a number of other relevant participatory paradigms
that fall within our definition of an IMS.
Music games
Music games refer to videogames that embody a strong musical focus. Re-
cent examples include Guitar Hero (Harmonix Music Systems 2005) and
Rock Band (Harmonix Music Systems 2007). Both of these games are often
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referred to as rhythm games as the objective of the game is to push but-
tons in time to the music (as indicated by a scrolling piano-roll style score)
(Richardson and Kim 2011). As musically-related as these tasks may get,
there remains an objective evaluation criteria determining whether a player
performed correctly or not. Other games may provide music as a reward for
progress (e.g. Saint and Stallwood 2008).
Rosenstock (2010) attempted to incorporate more improvisatory (and
hence less objectively evaluated) aspects in the game iGotBand where play-
ers could collect ‘fans’ by playing sequences of notes that contain a fan’s
requested notes. However, Rosenstock and the other developers struggled to
arrive at a meaningful condition for winning the game without completely
disregarding all improvisatory aspects.
Whilst interesting in their own right, music games are crucially different
than interactive music. Objective and explicit goals are established, with
the player’s input scored against an ‘ideal’. Where an explicitly stated and
objective goal has been established, a play activity has become a game (Sykes
2006). Musical ideas may inspire these goals, and music may serve as the
reward, but ultimately the motivation is not to explore and create but to
win.
Reactive music
Reactive music is a term popularised by the creators of the software RjDj
(2008). We will use the term to describe music systems in which non-musical
control influences what is heard such as the sound of the user’s environment
(e.g. RjDj 2008; Vawter 2006) or incidental gestures that were not performed
primarily to be sensed by the system such as walking (e.g. Inception 2010) or
subconscious responses to the music (e.g. Tanaka et al. 2005). These features
are often facilitated by running custom software on a phone. Reactive mu-
sic compositions retain a definite author but they are typically constructed
to respond continuously to input (Nordgren 2009). Most notable is RjDj
(2008), an iPhone app that implements PureData (Puckette 1996) as well as
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providing a platform for composers to distribute reactive music scenes and
users to record and share their realisations (Nordgren 2009).
Creators of reactive music are often motivated by a desire to make per-
sonal music listening less isolating—through connecting with the immediate
surroundings (e.g. Vawter 2006), collaborating with others (e.g. Tanaka 2007)
or sharing recordings (e.g. RjDj 2008)—as well as providing listeners the op-
portunity to be creatively involved in their music (e.g. Gaye et al. 2010;
Tanaka 2007).
Tanaka’s (2004a; 2004b) Malleable Mobile is a portable handheld system
that uses involuntary body gestures (grip pressure and acceleration) as well
as deliberate interaction with a touchscreen to drive a personal generative
music stream, which is then mixed with other users who are in range. Musi-
cal works for Malleable Mobile are in an open form that combines elemental
modules such as rhythm generators, time stretching algorithms, sequencers
and samplers. Tanaka highlights the need to allow the participant to distin-
guish their own personal music stream from that of remote partners.
Another example of a reactive music system is Sensory Threads (Marshall
et al. 2010), in which groups of four individual urban explorers are each
given a separate sensor which connects through bluetooth to a single portable
computer that generates a shared soundscape.
The defining difference between reactive music and our described interac-
tive sound applications (Section 2.2.3) is the focus of the participant. With
a reactive system, the participant interacts indirectly with the system via
their environment, with or without intention (Figure 2.9).
Adaptive music
Adaptive music describes a videogame soundtrack that adapts to the state
of a game (Clark 2007). The user interacts with the game but without the
explicit goal of interacting with the music (Collins 2007). As a soundtrack,
the music needs to remain contextually appropriate. An additional demand
made of adaptive music is to allow musical material to be reused without
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Figure 2.9: The flow of influence within a reactive music
system. The participant interacts incidentally with the envi-
ronment. The system then produces audio that is influenced
by the environment and sometimes incidental gestures.
seeming overly repetitive. Many modern games may be played for up to 60
hours but do not carry nearly as much audio as this (Collins 2009).
The most common procedural techniques used to perform adaptive music
are horizontal resequencing, where segments of a score are reordered, and
vertical reorchestration, where different tracks of the score are remixed in
realtime (McAlpine et al. 2009; Collins 2008).
Game composer Hannigan argues that a videogame player does not nec-
essarily want to be told what to feel (Durrani 2009). Therefore, adaptive
soundtracks may often be fairly ambient in how they sound, avoiding the
overtly emotionally charged material familiar from film scores. For example,
Nutt (2008) created a soundtrack system that simply places sound samples
within the game space to be played without any synchronisation and just a
few rules to prevent clashes.
As with reactive music, even though the user is directly interacting with
a model that drives the sound, adaptive music is distinct from interactive as
it is the state of the model rather than the music that is the focus of the
user’s attention (Figure 2.10). Whilst adaptive music may enhance the user’s
experience, it is not typically the primary output that motivates them to do
so. Furthermore, distinguishing it from music games, reactive music does not
typically serve a rewarding function for the attainment of goals.
Each of the above examples demonstrates IMSs where the participant inter-
acts with a different system or environment in order to influence what they
hear. However, these paradigms are not necessarily mutually exclusive; nor
are the boundaries between them clear cut. Our descriptions have focused
primarily on who is influencing whom and in what situation. The conceptual
tools we develop Chapters 4 and 6 will provide further perspective on the
effect this will have on a participant’s subjective experience.
Any kind of Digital Music System (DMS) creates sonic output in response
to a human input and there is a wealth of research into how design decisions
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Participant
Adaptive music
system
Audio
Figure 2.10: The flow of influence within an adaptive music
system. The participant interacts with a virtual environment.
The system produces audio that is influenced by the the state
of the environment and forms a part of the overall feedback
from the virtual environment.
affect the experience of both the user and an audience. Although much of
this research has been carried out under the DMI paradigm, there are some
key lessons that are relevant to our investigation. In the remainder of this
section, we outline gestures and mappings as the key tools used to reason
about DMSs, as well as a number of important issues to be considered when
designing them.
2.2.6 Gesture
The word gesture typically describes any kind of musically meaningful human
movement that may be sensed by an interactive system (Wanderley and Orio
2002; Malloch et al. 2006) or as any action produced by an instrumentalist
during a performance (Wanderley and Depalle 2004).
Musical gestures may be classified as manipulative or ancillary (Miranda
and Wanderley 2006). Manipulative gestures are those that affect the sound
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produced by an instrument. Ancillary are the remaining gestures musicians
produce when they perform, such as a pianist swaying their upper torso
(Wanderley et al. 2005). Ancillary gestures provide a means of further visual
communication and have been shown to influence how the expression of a
musical performance is interpreted by an audience (assuming they can see
the performer) (Davidson 1993). Wanderley et al. (2005) found that seeing
as well as hearing a clarinetist perform could heighten or dampen the tension
perceived by a listener depending on the motion of the performer. There may
also be interactions between what is heard and what is seen. For example,
both auditory and visual combine to inform an audience of phrasing informa-
tion (Vines et al. 2006). Of course, non-musical gestures also communicate
affect (e.g. Sanghvi et al. 2011).
Cadoz and Wanderley (2000) argue that considering gesture solely as a
one-way information channel from performer to instrument is simplistic. As
well as means of communicating information (the semiotic function) and
manipulating the environment (the ergotic function), gestures serve as a
means of perception through tactile feedback (the epistemic function). These
functions cannot be isolated: manipulation is often to facilitate perception
whilst tactile perception may affect how gestures are formed.
How we move is intimately linked with expression and emotion through
our embodied relationship with the world (Davies 2001). We also have intu-
itions about how sound and movement relate (Levitin et al. 2002). For ex-
ample, it seems more natural for more energetic movements to create louder
sounds (Hunt et al. 2003). Antle et al. describe these natural associations
between abstract concepts and our physical relationship with the world as
embodied metaphors. In a study, they interviewed a small number of dancers
and choreographers to derive a set of embodied metaphors relating music
and action. They then compared a mapping based around these metaphors
with a non-metaphorical mapping in a study where inexperienced adults and
children were given between four and six musical tasks to perform within
an interactive sound installation. Participants were permitted up to ten
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minutes to practice each task. They found that although there was no sig-
nificant difference in practice time, the metaphorical mapping significantly
improved accuracy in all but one of the tasks (Antle et al. 2009). As well
as carrying implications about how to make systems that are easy to learn,
this suggests that these embodied sound/action relationships are somewhat
invariant among individuals, although we should note that this was not a
cross-cultural study.
2.2.7 The mapping model
The specification by which gesture results in sound is typically reasoned
about in terms of information processing (e.g. Kvifte and Jensenius 2006)
through a layered model, consisting of an input controller, an output sound
generator and a mapping defining how the former affects the latter (Fig-
ure 2.11) (Drummond 2009).
Controller
Sound
generator
MappingGesture Audio
Figure 2.11: The mapping model. Gestures are sensed by a
controller, the output of which then controls the sound gen-
erator in a manner specified by the mapping.
Controllers and generators
There are a diverse range of controllers used to measure some aspect of a
gesture. Detail of controllers is not necessary for the argument of this PhD,
however we provide here a brief overview of what types of interaction they
make possible.
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Controllers vary in accuracy, inconvenience, precision, expense, reliability
(Fels and Lyons 2011). Different controllers lead to different types of input
signals. A key difference that arises is between event-based (i.e. triggers)
and continuous data (Stowell 2010). Continuous data will differ in terms of
the shape of signal provided (Tanaka 2006). This is a feature of a sensor,
but also of how it is used, for example to measure movement of the arms vs
that of the fingers.
All of these different properties have differing musical strengths and this
depends to a large part on people’s differing means of communicating. Sen-
sors that can detect grand sweeping gestures of the body may be suited for
continuously controlling dynamics but may not be so suitable for controlling
pitch, for example (Fels and Lyons 2011).
Some controllers are suitable for provide fixed input data (e.g. a ribbon
pad). However, if there is not a clearly fixed origin against which to base
measurements then relative data might be more appropriate (e.g. when using
a camera or accelerometer). Non-contact controllers such as the theremin are
poor for high resolution control due to their lack of direct physical interaction
(Hunt and Hermann 2004).
A controller will suggest different gestures. Likewise, the gestures an
instrument designer wants to capture will suggest different controllers.
Types of mapping
Mapping refers to how data from the controller influences the sound generator
(Hunt et al. 2000). Typically, we think of simple signal processing of the data
(e.g. blob detection of a video or smoothing of an accelerometer) as a part of
the controller. The controller will then provide a number of outputs, which
are used to determine the parameters of the generator.
When discussing mappings, the input to the mapping is the output of the
controller and the output of the mapping is the input of the generator. Map-
pings are often represented as a graph of arrows indicating the flow of infor-
mation (Figure 2.12), which sometimes leads to confusion. Mathematically,
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Controller Soundgenerator
Mapping
Figure 2.12: A mapping represented as a flow of information
from outputs of the controller to inputs of the generator. Note
that it is the mapping is defined over the vector space defined
by the inputs and outputs rather than the components as
might be suggested by this type of diagram.
a well-defined mapping relates elements of one set (our input) with elements
of a another set (our output) such that every element of the former is mapped
to a single element in the latter. Jorda` (2005) argues that this makes the
term mapping somewhat inappropriate as it neglects the possibility of two
controller outputs being used together to control a single parameter. How-
ever, the mapping refers to how elements in the vector space defined by the
inputs are mapped to the vector space defined by the outputs (Van Nort
et al. 2004) and not, as may be implied by the diagrams used, how compo-
nents of the input are paired with components of the output. This confusion
arises because mappings are typically reasoned about in terms of which in-
put components determine which output components. To support this line
of reasoning we think of the relation between output parameters and input
parameters. When we refer to the inputs and outputs, we are referring to
the determinacy relationship between different components of the input and
output. Therefore, diagrams showing arrows pointing from the components
of a controller output to the components of an input indicate that a par-
ticular component on the output is determined by a specific subset of the
components of the input space. They do not usually indicate how these sub-
spaces are related, although this may play as crucial a role if not more so
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(Van Nort and Wanderley 2006).
Mappings are often classified as one-to-one, many-to-one, one-to-many
and, combining these last two, many-to-many (Hunt and Wanderley 2002).
This refers to the dependency relationship between inputs and outputs.
Whilst one-to-one may seem to offer the simplest means of controlling the
generator, there is evidence that complex mappings involving many-to-many
(possibly non-linear) relationships may be more intuitive and expressive.
Hunt et al. (2003) conducted an experiment comparing a set of sliders mapped
to a synthesiser in a one-to-one fashion with those mapped in a more complex
fashion where, for example, volume was controlled by the speed of one slider
meaning it had to be ‘bowed’. They found that not only was the complex
mapping found to be subjectively more expressive and easier but also, using
a set of objective ‘musical tasks’, that participants’ ability to reproduce spe-
cific outputs increased more quickly. One of the conclusions we may draw
from the above-mentioned study by Hunt et al. (2003) is that the mapping
that is simplest to describe explicitly is not necessarily the one that is easiest
to control.
Jorda` (2005) illustrates the complexity of the ‘mappings’ of acoustic in-
struments by considering the violin. The volume of a violin is dependent not
only on the speed the strings are bowed, but the angle and pressure of the
bow (among other things). Likewise, the pressure of the bow controls not
only volume but also timbre. Most mappings map a moderate number of
controller outputs to a much larger number of generator inputs so could be
thought of as few-to-many (Jorda` 2005).
As well as a controller lending itself to certain types of gesture, it also
lends itself to certain types of mappings. Likewise, different generators will
suggest different mappings. The mapping defines the limits of what is possi-
ble, both in terms of its theoretical limits but also in terms of what kind of
physical action is necessary to produce a given output. The mapping also, in
combination with the controller, determines the first sounds a newcomer will
make with an instrument, thus defining ‘normal playing’ (Arfib et al. 2003).
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Given a fixed controller and generator, different mappings will make it easier
or hard to produce different outputs. As a result, different mappings will be
suggestive of different kinds of actions as well as different generated sounds.
In this sense the mapping defines to a large extent the feel of the instrument
(Van Nort and Wanderley 2006).
Perceptual layers
Some have found it helpful when creating and reasoning about mappings to
divide the mapping function into a composition of separate functions, with
the intermediate spaces creating mapping layers.
Wanderley et al. (1998) used an inner layer of abstract parameters, such as
fundamental pitch, vibrato, loudness. Their approach is somewhat motivated
by a desire to provide a common set of ‘universal’ perceptual parameters
than any controller might be expected to control and any generator might be
expected to respond to such as timbre, loudness and pitch (Wanderley 2001a).
This allows a notion of the choice of synthesis algorithm being ‘transparent’
to the user (Hunt and Wanderley 2002).
Other researchers have expanded on this model with extra abstract layers,
sometimes providing alternative means of feedback from these middle layers
(Figure 2.13). This leads to a layer of ‘meaningful’ gestural parameters that
are independent of sound and layer of ‘meaningful’ synthesis parameters inde-
pendent of gesture (Arfib et al. 2003; Hunt et al. 2003). In the end, however,
these layers may become embedded within our notion of the controller or
generator itself.
Dynamic mappings, nondeterminism and states
The first possibility we may notice unaddressed by the mapping model so
far is nondeterminism. This is easily added by adding inputs from a random
source. We may also conceive of a dynamic mapping that changes over time,
and include time as an input component (Figure 2.14).
We may also consider a mapping that dynamically adapts to a user input
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Perceptual
gesture
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gesture
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synthesis
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Generator
Figure 2.13: A mapping with perceptual layers. The over-
all mapping from controller to generator is defined by three
smaller mappings shown here by unmarked rectangles. The
innermost of these defines additional feedback for the player.
Adapted from Arfib et al. (2003).
Controller SoundgeneratorMapping
Random
Time
Figure 2.14: A dynamic non-deterministic mapping.
over time (Arfib et al. 2003). This requires us to revise our model to per-
mit the system to have a state. Fels et al. (2002) describes these as modal
mappings, where the state (or mode) of the system will influence how input
is mapped to output (e.g. a synthesiser keyboard with different buttons al-
lowing different patches to be selected). The state of the system may not
only interpret how input causes output but also how input further affects
the internal state. For example, any mouse and pointer based system relies
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on a model of where the pointer currently is to interpret how mouse move-
ment determines the pointer’s new position. Other systems will rely on more
complex internal models (e.g. Magnusson 2005; Johnston et al. 2009). We
may add this to the model (Figure 2.15). The model now looks similar to
Controller SoundgeneratorMapping
State
Random
Time
Figure 2.15: A dynamic non-deterministic adaptive map-
ping.
system 4 of Cornock and Edmonds’s (1973) classification with the addition
of a controller and sound generator (Section 2.1.2, see Figure 2.2d).
With modal systems, some gestures may have immediately perceptible ef-
fects whereas others may have long-term effects but no immediate ones. Ca-
murri et al. (2004) describes this characteristic as the strategy of a mapping,
ranging from reactive (immediately perceptible) to dialogical (not immedi-
ately perceptible but still determining the output). We saw this distinction
applied with Absolute 4.5 (Section 2.1.2).
Feedback
Feedback refers to information received by the user about the system they
are interacting with. It closes the perceptual loop (Section 2.1.1) and allows
the performer to understand the effect of their input to the system. In the
context of DMI performance, this allows the performer to monitor the sound
produced by the instrument and adjust their actions as necessary to create
the sound they expect (Widmer et al. 2007). In other contexts, it also makes
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learning through exploration possible (e.g. with the Reactable (Jorda` 2003)).
As well as the sound produced by an instrument, feedback may be haptic
(what is felt) and visual (Jorda` 2003). Haptic feedback may then be tactile,
the sense of touch felt by the skin, or kinaesthetic, the resistance felt by joints
and muscles (also called proprioceptive feedback) (Bongers 1994).
Wanderley (2001a) classifies feedback in two dimensions.
Primary/secondary. Secondary feedback is the sound produced by the
instrument. Primary feedback encompasses all other forms such as
visual, auditory (e.g. the noises made by the keys on a clarinet) and
haptic.
Active/passive. Passive feedback arises through the physical characteris-
tics of the system (e.g. the clicking of a switch) whereas active arises
from the output of the system.
The classifications are somewhat ambiguous when generalised beyond the
DMI paradigm. For example, if the instrument is also driving a visuali-
sation, would that be primary or secondary? However, we may perhaps
interpret primary feedback as distinguishing that which is also received by
the audience. This highlights some of the peculiarities of interactive music.
Ordinarily, if our focus is on a single participant, one might argue that this
distinction is somewhat irrelevant, or that all of the feedback is primary as
it is all contributing towards that individual’s experience. However, when
bystanders are present and able to see a portion of the system’s output,
then the participant—intentionally or not—is in the role of a performer and
primary and secondary feedback becomes relevant again.
Haptic feedback is often identified as an important aspect of acoustic
instruments that DMIs often lack (e.g. Dobrian and Koppelman 2006). With
acoustic instruments, the controller tends to be physically involved with the
sound generation. This may provide tactile feedback in the form of acoustic
vibrations as well as the feel of the physical shape of the instrument (Hunt
and Hermann 2004). Some have identified this lack of vibrational feedback as
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a barrier to an instrumentalist forming an intimate relationship with DMIs
and attempted to address this problem through adding force feedback to
DMI controllers (Chafe 1993; Marshall and Wanderley 2006).9 In terms
of the physical shape of DMI controllers, most do indeed offer the same
feedback as acoustic instruments (hands-free systems such as the theremin
being exceptions). However, Jorda` (2005) identifies the slightly more subtle
issue. The physical form of the ‘controls’ on acoustic instruments typically
arises directly from the acoustic process being controlled. Their shape is
therefore communicative of their role in a way that those on generalised
DMI controllers are not.
Whilst primary feedback is typically the means by which a musician eval-
uates the music they are producing, it will only ever be heard after it has
already occurred. It is therefore difficult to perform with an instrument with-
out any secondary feedback (Dobrian and Koppelman 2006). For acoustic
instruments, Jorda` (2005) identifies haptic as most important after auditory
with visual being less important although he does not see this as a reason
that DMIs should not make full use of visuals as a means to communicate
information back to the player (Jorda` 2003).10
This potential for visual feedback he demonstrated in the Reactable (Jorda`
et al. 2005, see also Section 2.2.2), Whilst perhaps essential for systems such
as these where exerting control requires knowledge of the state of an internal
model it may also be shared with the audience to aid their understanding of
how the music is being created (Jorda` 2003). With collaborative instruments,
visual feedback is useful in allowing players to identify their own contribution
(Blaine and Perkis 2000) and its communicative capacity also allows it to aid
learning where input is being interpreted in a manner not be immediately
apparent (e.g. Lyons et al. 2003). However, it is worth considering that there
may be reasons that, once learnt, traditional instruments tend not to rely
9As a pianist who regularly uses an electric piano with headphones, I do not particularly
identify with this need.
10I would argue (again perhaps from a pianist’s perspective) that, once an instrument
has been learnt, performing without any sense of touch would be far more difficult than
performing without being able to hear.
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on visual feedback. For example, communication through both gesture and
eye contact plays a fundamental role in conventional ensemble performance
(Seddon and Biasutti 2009) and may be impeded if the performers cannot
look away from their instruments.
Visual feedback may also be useful within an installation context. For
example, Kobori et al.’s (2006) interactive installation LINE involves a sim-
ple mapping between gesture and a coloured light beams, which then drives
more complex generative sounds. However, in an installation such as this,
the visuals form part of the primary feedback and may detract focus from
what is heard. Castellano et al. (2007b) interviewed users of an installation
where their movement and posture controlled both the a projection and the
rendering of a piece of music. They found that whilst nearly all users felt
control over the visuals, less than half did over the music.
Model limitations
The mapping model promotes a certain approach creating DMIs. We may
identify two main drawbacks to this approach.
Firstly, the mapping model divides instruments into three separate com-
ponents to be studied independently: controllers, generators and mappings
to join them together. Jorda` (2005) criticises this reductionist approach. He
points out that much research has focused on controlling instantly percepti-
ble synthesis parameters rather than more complex musical control processes,
and that these results cannot necessarily be abstracted away from the con-
trollers used in a given study. When things become more complex, creating a
sophisticated controller requires knowledge of how the generator works and a
more holistic approach is needed (Jorda` 2005). The mapping plays a pivotal
role in how the sound is controlled and should not be thought of simply as
the ‘glue’ connecting controller to generator (Van Nort 2009).
Secondly, the model arrives with many preconceptions originating from
conventional instruments. Everything is reasoned in terms of how input is
transformed into output. Information flows from the performer into the in-
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strument into the sound output, with any influence being returned back to
the performer being feedback to aid the performer it achieving their musical
goals. By contrast, Chadabe (2002) considers controlling interactive music
systems in a manner similar to ‘fly-by-wire’ aviation where a computer con-
trols a plane through interpreting high level instructions from the pilot in
the context of the current state of the plane. As we saw above, allowing
the system to be unpredictable, to create ideas or even to automate simple
musical processes requires increasingly more complex modifications to the
mapping model. We soon find ourselves in the problem we identified with
Cornock and Edmonds’s model (Section 2.1.2), where a system is reasoned
about in terms of how it works rather than how it is perceived.
Despite the limitations identified, the mapping model remains useful. Any
system that establishes a perceptual feedback loop requires its use to create
at least something of a mental model of how action leads to results. The
problem arises when a system is considered entirely in terms of an input-
mapping-output model.
The concept of a mapping will be essential in Chapter 4 when we develop
our model of how IMSs are explored. Over the course of this thesis, we
argue the position that mappings as outlined above are less useful in terms
of system specifications and more so when considered in terms of mental
models.
There is no common set of criteria by which to evaluate musical interfaces
(Paradiso and O’Modhrain 2003). Jorda` (2005) points out that there can
be no complete criteria by which one instrument could be described as ‘bet-
ter’ than another as any evaluation will rely on context and personal taste.
However, he argues that there are a number of common criteria by which
a designer might evaluate their success, what Wessel and Wright (2002) de-
scribe as features desired for all instruments.
For the remainder of this section, we will review some of these desirable
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features. Note that most of these have usually been presented as criteria for
instruments. This criteria should not be read as one that we will necessarily
adopt. However, the concepts, as well as the reasoning behind them, are
invaluable as a means to consider IMSs in general.
2.2.8 Expressivity and the emotional pipeline
Expression is commonly used to mean the communication of meaning or
feeling (e.g. Fels et al. 2002). In a musical context, it is a term very much
bound up with the Western concert tradition. The Oxford Dictionary of
Music (Kennedy 1996) defines it as
That part of a composer’s music such as subtle nuances of dy-
namics which he has no full means of committing to paper and
must leave to the artistic perception and insight of the executant.
. . .
This definition is similar to that used by Mion et al. (2010), who see it
as providing material beyond the rational content of a message that may
help its interpretation or make it more pleasant. This leads to the notion
of expression as the emotional aspects of a performance that are beyond
what is scored. A good performer interprets the emotional intentions of
a composer, ‘encodes’ them in their performance through subtle rhythmic,
tempo and dynamic changes. These are heard and then ‘decoded’ by the
listener who then feels the appropriate emotion (Poepel 2005). This line of
reasoning leads to the ‘emotional pipeline’ whereby music is seen as some
kind of carrier signal used to transmit emotions between people.
The limitation of this perspective to scored music is recognised by Do-
brian and Koppelman (2006), who expands upon this definition to include,
for example, improvisatory music as ‘those characteristics of the live perfor-
mance that enhance [the effective conveyance of meaning or feeling] but are
not contained in materials on a notated page or pre-programmed algorithm’.
This is similar to what Jorda` (2005, p. 229) presents as a ‘naive’ definition:
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‘expression is a matter of finding personal ways to transmit one’s own ideas
(not reproducing dated romantic cliche´s or templates.’ An ‘expressive instru-
ment’ is thus one that allows its performer, given enough skill, to transmit
their feelings through music. The instrument does not have anything to ex-
press (because it is a machine (Jorda` 2005)). (Nor, by this argument, should
the instrument be an expression of its designer but we will return to this
topic in Section 2.2.11.)
Gurevich and Trevin˜o (2007) take exception to this communicative model
of musical performance as an hegemonic demand that new musical interfaces
fit within the classical concert tradition. They, alongside others such as Small
(1998) and Clarke (2006), take a more ecological approach to music-making,
focusing on the relationships between composers, performers, listeners as
they exist within specific contexts. They criticise the requirement of music
to have predetermined expressive content, drawing parallels with the visual
arts where, for example, an artist may create a work in response to a material
rather than an emotional complex (Gurevich and Trevin˜o 2007).
Thus, ‘expressivity’ has a diversity of meanings. Within the Western
score-based tradition, it has a particular specific interpretation, and Gurevich
and Trevin˜o (2007) point out that the proposed ecological interpretation does
not necessarily find it at fault. Rather, it acknowledges that it is one of many
potential kinds of musical practice for which a musical instrument might be
created. Likewise, the emotional pipeline model is useful, for example in
the context of automatically rendering MIDI to audio (Livingstone et al.
2007). But as we will explore in Chapter 3, the narrow definitions presented
above unnecessarily restrict some of the performative routes made possible
by NIME research.
Where necessary, we will refer to classical expressivity and ecological ex-
pressivity to clarify whether we are thinking in terms of Dobrian and Kop-
pelman’s or Gurevich and Trevin˜o’s interpretation respectively. Note that
this should not be taken to mean that Dobrian and Koppelman’s interpreta-
tion is limited to classical concert performance. It is also common to other
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performance practices such as rock music (Auslander 1999).
2.2.9 Virtuosity
The border between virtuosity and gimmickry is a matter of con-
vention and taste. (Siegel 2009, p. 200)
A virtuoso is an exceptionally skilled performer (Dobrian and Koppelman
2006). Kennedy (1996) writes that the description may carry an implication
that a virtuoso performance excludes emotional or expressive artistry but this
interpretation is rare within NIME research. Creating an instrument that
will inspire a musician to dedicate the time and effort required to become
a virtuoso is often an implied goal within NIME research (e.g. Wessel and
Wright 2002; Jorda` 2004; Hepting et al. 2005; Arfib et al. 2003).
Dobrian and Koppelman (2006) argues that virtuosity facilitates (classi-
cal) musical expression by freeing the performer from thinking about the basic
functionality of the interface, allowing them to concentrate on listening and
expression. They argue that the lack of virtuosity (i.e. instrument-specific
technical skill) is the “elephant in the corner” of NIME research. Others have
focused on the difficulty of perceiving virtuosity. Paradiso and O’Modhrain
(2003) discuss the ‘non-instrumental’ gestures of many DMIs, challenging
designers to create mappings that allow audiences to ‘smell the digital sweat
as they push their instruments to the edge.’
Fyans and Gurevich (2011) highlight the problem of perceiving a per-
former’s skill without some kind of understanding of their intentions and what
might constitute a mistake. We will return to this issue in Chapter 6. For
now, we conclude that virtuosity is seen as a significant aspect of live perfor-
mance and that there is a general dissatisfaction that DMI performances do
not seem as virtuosic as performances with conventional instruments (Schloss
and Jaffe 1993; Schloss 2003).
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2.2.10 Intimacy, transparency and causality
Moore (1988) defines intimacy as the match between the variety of musically
desirable sounds produced and the psychophysiological capabilities of a prac-
ticed performer. Paramount to this definition the subjective delay in the
perceptual feedback loop between performer and controller. Moore considers
the most intimate of controllers the human voice—a result both of the im-
mediacy of our physical connection and the fact that our ability to control
it is informed by our experience of speaking.
Fels et al. (2002) build on this definition to define transparency as the
quality of a mapping indicative of the psychophysiological distance, in the
minds of the player and the audience, between the input and output of a
device mapping. Fels et al. argue that a stumbling block of DMIs is that, in
part due to the possibilities that arise from the controller/instrument split, it
is not immediately clear how the performer’s actions relate to what is heard.
The issue is confounded by a lack of the common cultural knowledge of their
workings and gestures enjoyed by traditional instruments. Therefore, the
onus falls upon designers to create transparent DMIs.
Note that transparency does not imply that the audience must understand
how to play an instrument or even how it works. The term ‘psychophysio-
logical distance’ is perhaps somewhat difficult to define and others prefer to
consider the perception of a causal link between input and output (Schloss
and Jaffe 1993; Schloss 2003; O’Modhrain 2011). Fyans et al. (2009b) de-
scribe the notion of transparency as simplistic, arguing that the spectator
experience should be considered more in terms of perceiving intention, re-
sults and errors. We will discuss Fyans et al.’s model in more detail in
Section 2.2.14.
Fels et al. (2002) argue that metaphor is a key tool in creating transparent
mappings as it allows both player and audience to draw on familiar knowl-
edge. Gadd and Fels (2002) present MetaMuse, an instrument consisting of a
watering can that controlled a granular synthesiser through ‘pouring’ sound
grains onto different parts of a palette. Other metaphors for control such as
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scrubbing and dipping are presented by Wessel and Wright (2002).
Creating mapping metaphors draws upon what Levitin et al. (2002) de-
scribes as our cognitive maps of how gesture relate to sound, a topic that was
explored in Section 2.2.6. The key lesson to draw from this section is that it
is a consideration for the audience as much as it is for the performer.
2.2.11 Controllability and diversity
Controllability is the degree of influence a (skilled) player has over the sound
produced by their instrument. Wessel and Wright (2002) point out that
control may be at a high level of abstraction, leaving algorithms to fill in
trivial details, but the instrumentalist needs to feel that they are in control,
much in the manner that a conductor might be an orchestra. Wanderley and
Orio (2002) also consider controllability as a subjective measure but distin-
guish between feature controllability—what sounds can be made—and timing
controllability—temporal precision over when these features are realised. Of
course, controllability implies that the performer is able to produce these
finer details in a predictable and reproducible manner. Thus we may distin-
guish output complexity—the range of possible outputs—from controllability
or diversity (Jorda` 2004).
Levitin et al. (2002) investigate this issue by looking at the beginning,
middle and end of a musical event (generalising from the attack, sustain and
decay of a note) and considering what means of control are typically afforded
by different means of creating sound. Jorda` (2004) considers the issue at a
more abstract level, defining three levels of diversity.
Micro-diversity describes performance nuances, variations that could oc-
cur within a given piece without preventing it from being recognisable.
Mid-diversity describes how different two different pieces of music could
be.
Macro-diversity considers the range of musical styles, contexts the instru-
ment could play as well as its ability to assume different musical roles
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and accommodate a variety of musical partners.
Excluding, perhaps, a live coding context, these micro and mid levels of
control need to be available without reprogramming the instrument to really
be considered diversity.
Jorda`’s model is built around the classical model of expressivity, with
micro- and mid-diversities respectively arising from the roles the performer
and composer may take in a traditional concert. It is a powerful means of
regarding the ways in which one interacting with a music system may see
their role and potential opportunities. We may perhaps see it as a subdivi-
sion of the Sound category of Jo and Tanaka’s matrix of musical participant
(Section 2.1.9).
But in terms of ecological expressivity, it is something of a limited am-
bition. Does an instrument that embodies the musical ideals of its designer
not in some sense limit the diversity of music an instrumentalist may create
with it? Tanaka (2006) warns that thinking of instruments in such utilitarian
terms risks turning them into ‘tools’, devoid of distinguishing characteristics
or personality.
2.2.12 Learnability
Within the HCI literature, learnability is defined as the degree to which a
system is easy to learn by the class of users for whom it is intended (Michelsen
et al. 1980). Grossman et al. (2009) argues that there are two important types
of learnability.
Initial learnability: Improvement within the first use of a system.
Extended learnability: Change in performance over time.
With conventional instruments, extended learnability tends to be of more
interest, as it is accepted that a significant amount of time will be needed
to develop proficiency (Lehmann 1997). However, for DMIs, potential play-
ers have less patience than they might for a normal instrument (Dobrian
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and Koppelman 2006; Weir 2012). It is generally accepted that instrumental
mastery should require devotion and effort (e.g. Jorda` 2004). But without
an established instrumental practice demonstrating the worth of the instru-
ment, those which grant a potential player no proficiency during their first
experience (as might be conceivable at a first trumpet lesson) are unlikely
to entice this devotion. This desire for easier early experiences with DMIs
extends beyond pure necessity. Many desire to make instrumental music
making more accessible as well (e.g. Blaine and Perkis 2000).
Our two types of learnability are equivalent to what Wessel and Wright
describe as a low entry fee with no ceiling on virtuosity. Making things easy
for novices often seems to limit the potential for more advanced users, leading
to a ‘toy-like character’ (Wessel and Wright 2002). But Jorda` (2002) argues
that this trade-off is not inevitable (indeed, the Reactable (Section 2.2.2)
might be considered evidence of this claim).
Jorda` (2004) considers our two types of learnability more generally in
terms of the learning curve. He considers the efficiency a player may have
with an instrument as the controllable diversity of musical outputs mediated
by the amount of effort required of the player to produce them. Thus, whilst
the kazoo may offer a greater diversity than the piano in the short term,
improvements in efficiency dry up whereas improvements in the piano’s ef-
ficiency continue to develop (Figure 2.16). We will consider this claim with
a more critical eye in Section 6.1 when we review the necessity of perceiving
skill within a musical performance.
For many public space installations, potential participants may learn how
something works by watching others interact with the work. It can be a social
experience and designers may wish to consider how effective and engaging
the vicarious learning process is (Reeves et al. 2005).
2.2.13 Explorability
Explorability is the degree to which a musical instrument facilitates explo-
ration. Wanderley and Orio define it as a capability of a controller referring
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Figure 2.16: Jorda`’s learning curve estimates of the rela-
tive differences of the increase in relative efficiency over time
between four musical instruments. The kazoo and kalimba
(an instrument with a set of fixed pitch metal prongs that
are plucked by the thumbs) offer easy short term gains. How-
ever, they quickly plateau in contrast to the piano or violin.
Adapted from Jorda` (2004).
to the number of different gestures and gestural nuances it may recognise
(Wanderley and Orio 2002; Wanderley 2001b), what Jorda` (2004) describes
as input complexity.
However, this definition does not quite capture the essence of what we
mean by explorability. As well as permitting a diversity of inputs, we want
an instrument to lead us into experimenting and discover new aspects, to
spark creativity (Gelineck and Serafin 2010). As Machover describes:
While many have also been successful in designing controllers and
interactions that “hook” a novice user, even in distracting, high-
powered public spaces, few have been able to make such systems
“nourishing” as well, capable of encouraging deeper exploration
and continued discovery and creativity. (Machover 2002)
Gelineck and Serafin (2010) argue that for an environment to encourage
exploratory behaviour it must be rich complex and somewhat mysterious
but remain intuitive in order to give the user confidence to continue. Paine
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(2002) makes a similar point. A participant develops a cognitive map of how
it responds. The designer needs to balance confirmation of this map with
scope for discovering new outcomes.
These observations are analogous to the learnability/controllability trade-
off. However, instead of merely seeing the early stages of learning as a burden
that must be overcome, it is seen as a part of the experience in and of itself.
This idea underlies much of the theory that will be developed in Chapter 4.
Learning and exploration are recurring themes throughout this thesis. In
Section 4.1, they will be revisited in a review of some prior work regarding
exploration, play and curiosity.
2.2.14 The view from the audience
Although it has long been acknowledged that it is important to see a per-
former putting in a lot of physical effort (e.g. Waisvisz 1985), one area of
NIME research that is often overlooked is the experience of the audience
(Fyans et al. 2009b). (Exceptions include Fels et al. (2002), discussed in
Section 2.2.10, and Schloss and Jaffe (1993).)
It is often cited that being able to perceive causality between the visual
and auditory aspects of a performance is important (Schloss 2003; Paradiso
and O’Modhrain 2003). Magnusson and Hurtado (2008) argue that audience
understanding of a performer’s activities is a fundamental aspect of musical
performance as performer and audience need to share the same ‘ergonomic
space’. However, others argue for the need to perceive skill in a performance
(Fyans and Gurevich 2011; Schloss and Jaffe 1993).
How interactive music systems are perceived by audiences and partici-
pants is a core theme of this thesis, and we will consider causality and the
reasons it is necessary in more detail in Chapters 3 and 6. Here, however, we
will review some contemporaneous research from Fyans et al. (2009a).
Fyans et al. (2009b) argue that there are five questions a DMI designer
needs to consider for an audience to be able to perceive skill in its perfor-
mance.
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Figure 2.17: Fyans et al.’s model of spectator understanding
of error. Error is perceived by a spectator as a combination of
context, experience, their mental model of the instrument and
their expectations. Reproduced with permission from Fyans
et al. (2009b).
1. Address: How does the spectator know that the performer is directing
communication to the system?
2. Attention: How does the spectator know that the system is responding
to the performer?
3. Action: How does the spectator think the user controls the system?
4. Alignment: How does the spectator know that the system is doing the
right thing?
5. Accident: How does the spectator know when the performer (or the
system) has made a mistake?
99
For example, Fyans et al. (2009b) model of error (question 5) is shown in
Figure 2.17 as a combination of the spectator’s perception of the performer’s
intention, their perception of what was actually performed and their expec-
tations based on their understanding of the instrument, other experiences
and the context of the performance.
In a series of qualitative studies, Fyans et al. (2010; 2011) compared au-
dience responses to four instruments: the violin, the sheng (a Chinese blown
free-reed instrument), the theremin and the ‘Tilt-Synth’. The Tilt-Synth was
a DMI created specifically for the experiment with audience communication
of intentionality in mind. Large obvious physical gestures were combined
with fine-grained control through buttons, (mode-changing) switches, slid-
ers and accelerometers. Both the sheng and the Tilt-Synth were unfamiliar
instruments for all but one of the participants in question. Likewise, both
instruments were performed by musicians unfamiliar with them. Whilst the
sheng was perceived as requiring skill to use, the Tilt-Synth performance
was considered to be lacking in effort: ‘simple to control’ and ‘just pressing
buttons’ were some comments from participants. Fyans and Gurevich (2011)
relate this discrepancy to the disembodied interaction with the Tilt-Synth.
Participants could relate the sheng to their own physical experiences to gauge
how much skill would be required to use it.
In Section 6.1.1, we will reconsider the audience’s perspective and why
many DMIs seem to struggle to gain acceptance in the concert arena. This
will allow us to develop a new framework of Perceived Agency that considers
in more detail interactions between performance context and a spectator’s
understanding of an instrument as well as different types of skill and the
relevance of liveness.
We will be drawing extensively on the above topics when we consider the
interactive music experience throughout this PhD, as well as in Chapters 3
and 6 where we will consider the audience experience of a NIME performance
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in more detail. However, as we have seen, much NIME research has been
undertaken with a focus on the perspective of a performer with a concern
for the sounds one might produce rather than the experience of producing
them.
2.3 Enjoyment
In this section, we will briefly consider some broader research into why some
activities seem more enjoyable than others. We will draw upon this material
primarily in Chapter 4 when seek to understand how aspects of an interactive
music systems can affect how enjoyable it is to explore.
2.3.1 Flow
Flow is a psychological state originally introduced by Csikszentmihalyi (1975,
2002), who described it as ‘optimal experience’. The theory arose out of Csik-
szentmihalyi’s findings that moments in which individuals reported them-
selves as happiest usually involved activities that were both challenging and
required specific expertise, such as sport, playing music or creating art. Csik-
szentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989) collected further evidence correlating this
balance of challenge and skill with more traditional measures of wellbeing in
both the workplace and leisure activities.
The basic theory of flow is that a person’s skills must match the challenge
of the activity that they are pursuing (Csikszentmihalyi 2002). As an activity
develops, its level of challenge should develop in line with the skills of the
individual, creating a ‘flow channel’ of steady improvement in their ability
(Figure 2.18).
Further research identified the need for both skills and challenges to be
above average for the individual, else the result may be apathy rather than
flow (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2002). Subsequent developments led
to more complex models including boredom, relaxation, worry, anxiety, con-
trol and arousal as well (Figure 2.19).
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Figure 2.18: The basic flow channel defines a pathway of
progression where the level of challenge and the level of skill
remain matched. If they are mismatched, anxiety or boredom
can result. Adapted from Csikszentmihalyi (2002).
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Figure 2.19: The eight channel model of the flow state.
Adapted from Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002).
Flow is often described in terms of prerequisites that an activity must
meet to elicit it (the antecedents) and the subjective characteristics of the
experience when an individual is in a flow state (Pearce et al. 2005). Rettie
(2001) describes the antecedents as
• Clear goals,
• Immediate feedback,
• Perceived skills/challenge matched and relatively high
and the characteristics as
• Merging of action and awareness
• Focused concentration
• Sense of potential control
• Loss of self-consciousness
• Time distortion (time passes more quickly)
• Autotelic experience (the activity is felt to be worth doing for its own
sake)
The difference between an antecedent and a characteristic is not always clear.
For example, Murphy et al. (2011) includes concentration as an antecedent
alongside the condition that the individual is free from interruption. We
may also consider whether an individual’s opinions prior to an activity might
influence whether or not it seems autotelic. Furthermore, the need for clear
goals is at odds with reports of flow in more exploratory activities such as
internet browsing (Rettie 2001). Ghani and Deshpande (1994) investigated
flow in those using computers at work and found a sense of being in control
to be more important than perceived skill, with challenge becoming more
important to those with greater autonomy and feedback. They also found a
significant link between flow and exploratory behaviour.
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It is important to note that challenge and skill are perceived qualities.
The individual must believe the task is challenging and that their skills are
appropariately advanced to deal with this challenge.
As we can see, flow can be a rather elusive concept. Research into the flow
experience remains a lively field. Although it will not be forming a part of
the core of our argument, there are three key insights to observe.
Firstly, there is a particular enjoyment in successfully performing activi-
ties that require skill. This notion will arise throughout this thesis, both in
the Emerging Structures model developed in Chapter 4 and the framework
of Perceived Agency introduced in Chapter 6. Flow has been identified as
a contributing factor to motivating children to practise and improve their
musical abilities (O’Neill 1999). Likewise, this argument has been applied
to explain the attraction of increasingly more ‘challenging’ media within our
favourite genres (Sherry 2004).
Second is the fundamental importance of balance underlying flow. This
crops up when we consider how easy instruments are to learn in Section 2.2.12
and in more information theoretic terms when we overview expectation-based
models of musical perception in Section 2.4.3.
Finally, we observe that it is perceived skill that must be balanced with
perceived challenge. This suggests that our beliefs about the extent to which
others may perform with similar aptitude may play a role in user experience.
This idea will be expanded upon in Chapter 6.
2.3.2 Engagement and immersion
Other theories of experience consider engagement and immersion. Douglas
and Hargadon (2000) distinguish between these two terms in the context of
interactive narrative. Immersion is the pleasure of losing ourselves within
the world it constructs, forgetting about the frame, i.e. the mechanics of the
system that allow the user to interact with this world. Engagement, on the
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other hand, is the pleasure of relating the work as a whole to our under-
standing of the genre. Sherry (2004) describes this understanding of a genre
as our knowledge of its formal characteristics. Works that fit neatly into out
understanding of a genre may still give us the ‘easy’ pleasure of immersion
but it is those that challenge us to make sense of them through violating
convention—or our internalised understanding of convention—that may give
us the pleasure of engagement. Although engagement and immersion may
interfere with each other, Douglas and Hargadon propose that when occur-
ring simultaneously, we are being challenged (engaged) but also achieving
our goal (immersion). Thus, we have high challenge and high skill leaving us
with the experience of flow (Douglas and Hargadon 2000).
Brown and Cairns (2004) coded interviews with seven videogame users
following a grounded theory approach to investigate immersion. They devel-
oped categories of three progressive stages that a player descends through
when playing a game.
Engagement is the initial stage where time and effort are willingly invested.
The player is interested but not yet emotionally involved.
Engrossment happens when the player becomes emotionally involved in
the game world. The player is less aware of their surroundings and
stopping play can leave the player feeling emotionally drained.
Total immersion is the sense of being totally detached from reality to the
extent that the game is all that seems to matter. The player feels
present in the game and empathy with the character or team they are
controlling within the game.
In a similar manner, Jennett et al. (2008) distinguish between cognitive
absorption, flow and immersion. They describe immersion as an experience
specific to videogames and find that increased levels of immersion increases
as the time taken for the player to be able to reengage with the non-game
world, measured through task performance.
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As with flow, there are not universally accepted definitions of engagement
or immersion. But there are interesting lessons to learn from the above
research. The language used to describe immersion is similar to that of
Fels’s model of embodiment (Section 2.1.6) and in discussions of transparency
(Section 2.2.10).
To extrapolate research focused entirely on videogames into interactive
music requires caution. However, we should highlight the distinction ob-
served between two key types of pleasure, that from developing an under-
standing of a system and that of acting within the world defined by a system.
These are analogues to different types of exploration, which we will meet in
Chapter 4.
2.3.3 Mutual engagement
Bryan-Kinns et al. describe mutual engagement as the points within a cre-
ative collaboration where people spark together and lose themselves in their
joint action (Bryan-Kinns et al. 2006, 2007). It is similar to Sawyer’s (2006)
notion of group flow except more specifically, there is engagement from a par-
ticipant with both the product of the activity as well as other participants
(Bryan-Kinns and Hamilton 2009).
Although the work of this thesis has been developed with a focus on
individual experience, the topic of mutual engagement is relevant when we
create and evaluate a collaborative IMS in Chapters 7 and 8. We will explore
some of the more social issues surrounding musical creation in Chapter 6.
2.4 Musical perception
In this section, we will briefly outline some current research into how and
why we appreciate music. Although a detailed overview of musical percep-
tion is beyond the scope of this thesis, the results outlined this section are
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fundamental to the development our model of exploration in Chapter 4.
In particular, we focus on two concepts that seek to explain how we
interpret music, why it engages us and how it is able to move us emotionally.
2.4.1 Communication
Livingstone and Thompson (2009) argue that music plays an adaptive role
within human evolution through allowing emotions to be communicated and
consequently mutual understanding and instruction. As a result, within mu-
sic we may hear mimicry of innate human noises such as laughter, crying and
screaming (Moorer 1972). Small (1998) argues that the ritual, sounds and
gestures of music provide for a type of non-sequential implicit communica-
tion that language does not. This serves the purpose of allowing groups of
individuals to establish and communicate their relationships and experiment
in different roles.
Musical Acts
Murray-Rust and Smaill (2011) create a logical model of Musical Acts to
represent how a group of musicians establish a common context through mu-
sical actions. They model a musical performance as the progression through
a directed lattice of states. The position of a state within the lattice is de-
termined by which states it subsumes and which it is subsumed by, with
subsummation determined by the set of constraints imposed by a state. For
example, a state which determines only a root note of C will subsume a state
that determines a chord of C minor (C E[ G), which itself will subsume a
state that determines the chord of C minor 7 (C E[ G B[). At a given point in
time, different agents may be in distinct states and the dynamics of a group
of musical agents are described as a negotiated journey through this state
space. A musical action is then described as the intentional and intelligible
change in state by an agent. Each action of a given agent A playing with
another agent B is given a signature characterised by three relationships:
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how A’s new state relates to B’s state, how A’s old state related to B’s state
and how A’s new state relates to A’s old state.
Murray-Rust and Smaill provide a convincing model of how the com-
munication and exploration of roles described by Small might take place.
Considering a musical act as a process of identifying constraints over the
current and potential future states through interaction is similar in nature to
the model of exploration I will introduce in Chapter 4. Whilst the context
in which their model is formulated is tied closely to jazz improvisation, it
relies on an externally defined set of musical ‘facets’ (e.g. chord, dynamics,
tempo) and corresponding functions within an agent to interpret values of
these facets from what is heard. Doing so abstracts away many subjective
details leaving a general model of the underlying musical processes. How-
ever, in Chapter 6 we will see that across musical practices there are other
processes by which intention is communicated.
The Musical Acts model focuses entirely on how sounds are produced and
interpreted within an existing music theory. It assumes that this theory is
to a large extent available as common knowledge to the players. However, in
Chapters 3 and 4, I will argue that interactive music musical sounds should
be considered concurrently with musical gestures. We will be using the term
musical actions to mean, not just how creating sound may influence a shared
performance context, but in the more literal sense of describing how a gesture
(i.e. an action) creates sound. Furthermore, our scope of enquiry is focused
on non-expert first-time users. Therefore the model of Emerging Structures
to be presented in Chapter 4 may be considered as describing the more
fundamental exploratory act of how an individual may arrive at such a theory
in the first place.
Musical Acts is based on Speech Act Theory (SAT) (Searle 1969; Herzig
and Longin 2002), which reasons about how words are spoken with the in-
tention of changing the state of the world rather than to communicate a
description that may or may not be true. For example, the statement ‘the
door is always open’ interpreted as a direct utterance communicates an as-
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sertion of a fact. However, the statement interpreted as an indirect utterance
may be an act granting an individual permission to enter a building. In
particular, Murray-Rust and Smaill draw upon Herzig and Longin’s (2002)
logic of intention, which is based on the belief-desire-intention framework:
an agent, based on their belief about the state of the world and their desired
final state of the world, forms intentions—actions that the agent has planned
and committed to in order to reach a subgoal state that helps attain their
desired state of the world.
Interestingly, in Murray-Rust and Smaill’s computational implementation
of their model the agents choose actions based on not a desired final state but
the signature of action they would like to perform (i.e. whether their action
subsumes, is subsumed by, alters or deviates from other players’ states).
Once a signature is chosen then musical values are sought to create an action
with this signature. We might therefore argue that the Musical Acts model
as implemented by Murray-Rust and Smaill is more experience-focused than
SAT.
Speech Act Theory will be revisited in Section 9.1.1 as a comparative
example to the theoretical material presented in this thesis.
2.4.2 Representation
There is also evidence of the importance of the representational aspects of
sound: that the auditory building blocks with which we perceive music have
their origins in our ability to perceive and understand our physical environ-
ment (Huron 2006). Hearing involves unconsciously identifying the physical
origins of sound (Van Nort 2009). However, the mimetic hypothesis (Cox
2001) further proposes that when an individual hears a sound they imagine
how it is created. This may potentially happen unconsciously through the
mirror neuron system (Brent 2011). Even for non-causal sounds (those with-
out a physical origin), there is evidence that listeners associate them fairly
consistently with types of gesture (Caramiaux et al. 2011). Indeed, in acous-
matic music where the original origin of a sound remains hidden, Windsor
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(2011) argues that it is the puzzle arising through this inability to identify a
cause that engages a listener.
2.4.3 Expectation
Expectation has been long established as playing a fundamental role in mu-
sical perception (Meyer 1961). Although a detailed analysis is not necessary,
the models we outline here lay crucial groundwork for the Emerging Struc-
tures model of exploration presented in Chapter 4.
The Implication-Realization (I-R) model
Narmour (1990, 1992) proposed with his Implication-Realization (I-R) model
of melodic expectancy that such (unconscious) expectations may arise both
innately and due to cultural exposure (Schellenberg 1997). Narmour’s com-
plex model originates from the two simple axioms
1. Repetition establishes expectancy of a further repetition,
2. Novelty establishes expectancy of further novelty.
These future expectations are described as implications (Narmour 1992).
Where implications are met (realisation) or denied, a sequences of notes may
be closed and subsequently form a part of a larger structural grouping (Cross
1995).
Narmour considers innate implications over a range of melodic features
including interval and register and establishes a number of principles. Im-
plications may arise from innate and universal principles, from within a
work (intra-opus) or from stylistic knowledge (extra-opus) (Pearce and Wig-
gins 2004). Through applying the principles concurrently to different fea-
tures and at different scales—in combination with intra- and extra-opus
implications—potential conflicts and complex implications may arise. Ler-
dahl and Krumhansl (2007) consider expectation, and thus the anticipation
of its realisation, as one of three components of musical tension alongside
dissonance and harmonic instability relative to a tonic.
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Huron’s ‘ITPRA’ model
Later statistical and empirical evidence has suggested that the complex in-
nate principles of the I-R model may themselves be explained as learnt rules
through musical exposure (Pearce and Wiggins 2004). Huron (2006) proposes
that music may elicit emotion through the interactions of different aspects of
the brain’s need to predict its environment. Huron’s model is called ITPRA,
named after the five stages of expectation it describes. Before the event we
have:
1 Imagination: Our continuous expectations regarding our environment.
2 Tension: We may increase our attention and arousal in line with the ex-
pected outcome. Tension describes the period spent in this state prior
to the event.
And then following the event:
3 Prediction response: An unconscious limbic reward or penalty deter-
mined by the accuracy of the prediction
4 Reaction response: Neurologically reflexive response that assumes the
worst case outcome.
5 Appraisal response: A more complex and potentially consciously in-
formed appraisal of the outcome that determines any negative/positive
reinforcements.
The model rests on the assumption that at a low level within our percep-
tual system, predictability and surprise result in positively and negatively
valenced emotion respectively. However, if the reaction or appraisal of a
(negative) surprise is subsequently positive, then there is a contrasting va-
lence which heightens the positive. Under this model, when a composer
builds up to a climax, they are establishing ever-growing anticipation of a
negative outcome which gives the potential to amplify a subsequently positive
outcome.
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Expectations in the model are derived through simple statistical models
and lifelong musical exposure. Huron’s builds on Narmour’s (1990; 1992)
intra- and extra-opus sources of expectation to consider four types.
Schematic: Relating to commonplace musical expectations and stylistic
norms (similar to the formal characteristics of Section 2.3.2).
Veridical: Prior knowledge of the specific work itself.
Dynamic: Expectations formed from hearing the piece until this moment.
Conscious: Consciously established expectations.
Huron’s model has been criticised for muddying the difference between con-
scious and unconscious expectations: although conscious expectations play
little role in his model, many of the conclusions of the model draw on ev-
idence regarding the conscious expectations (Benjamin 2007). However, a
strength of the model is its potential to combine the expectational with the
representational in the prediction and reaction.
Information dynamics
Information dynamics uses the tools of information theory to describe the
evolving expectations present in music. Structure in music is considered a
redundancy in the signal—a pattern that may be used to reduce uncertainty
of the future signal. Representing a musical signal as a sequence of events,
listening is considered in terms of how each event affects the listener’s un-
derstanding of this structure (Dubnov et al. 2011). Therefore, rather than
simply considering entropy (i.e. the information content), information is con-
sidered with respect to a listener’s existing expectations of what they hear.
Dubnov (2006, 2010) models this in terms of the ‘information rate’ which
he defines the mutual information between past events and a current event—
how informative what we are hearing is given the predictions we could have
made from past knowledge.
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However, for Abdallah and Plumbley, the salient question is not ‘how
far has the current event aided our understanding of the present state of
affairs?’ but ‘how far has the current event improved our ability to predict
future events?’ This property they describe as the instantaneous predictive
information rate. Averaging over the signal then provides the average pre-
dictive information rate (APIR). We may then combine expectation of the
next event with previous experience of predictive information to produce the
expected predictive information: how far we expect the next event to improve
our ability to predict future events.
The APIR moves beyond simple measurements of predictability to con-
sider the rate at which redundancy within a signal is becoming perceivable
and thus the rate at which our ability to predict the signal is improving. It is
minimised by both random noise (i.e. a signal that will never be predictable)
and known repetition (i.e. a signal that is already maximally predictable).
In this sense, the APIR is a measurement of the rate at which the structure
of apiece is unfolding.
If we consider a random signal to be ‘too challenging’ to predict and a
predictable one to be ‘too easy’, then the APIR allows us to connect flow (see
Section 2.3.1) with musical perception. Just as flow implies that enjoyable
activities are those in which challenge is optimised for the development of
skill, information dynamics implies that enjoyable music is that in which
unpredictability is optimised for the development of predictive ability.
These balances are both instances of the Wundt curve (Berlyne 1970), an
inverted U-shaped relationship between complexity and what is described by
Berlyne describes as hedonic value (Figure 2.20).
We have seen the perceptual enjoyment derived from listening to music as
a process of establishing implications to be either realised or subsumed into
a yet more complex implication. Huron (2006) sees the listening process as
a continual bolstering of sets of exposure-based models which then vie to
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Figure 2.20: The Wundt Curve relates the complexity of
a stimulus with its hedonic value. Adapted from Berlyne
(1970).
anticipate the next event. The picture painted by Narmour’s (1990; 1992)
I-R model is somewhat less dependent on temporal progression: implications
for the future are presented as missing pieces of a greater structural whole.
With Abdallah and Plumbley’s (2009) model we see something of a parallel
to Csikszentmihalyi’s (2002) theory of flow: the ability to improve is max-
imised by balancing the complexity of the task with the current ability of
the individual.
These parallels are in different domains: the APIR describes our ability to
understand our environment whilst flow considers our ability to act upon it.
In Chapter 4, we will consider how these two domains in terms of exploration
where we are both acting in order to understand and understanding in order
to act.
Uniting our expectational models is the notion of piecing together a struc-
tural whole. It is similar to Minsky’s (1981) theory that hearing music ex-
ercises the same metal capacities as viewing scenery: the eye darts around
in order to establish a consistent model that may accurately predict what
is seen. In music, as in cinema, our access to the full picture is restricted
by the composer (or director). As we consider the perception of interactive
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music in Section 4.2, this analogy of exploring a scene to create a model will
become more prominent.
It has been important to note that underlying our expectation-oriented
models are communicative and representational acts (Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2).
In Chapter 3, we will begin to consider music not just as sound but as ges-
tures creating sound. Small (1998) argues that whilst much of sounds within
music are somewhat arbitrary and abstract, the language of gesture—both as
a means to communicate abstract ideas and to represent the physical world—
remains more representational and culturally invariant. We will see this most
prominently in Section 3.3.1 when we consider the composed instrument as
a joint composition of both gesture and sound.
2.5 Evaluation methods
In this section we will outline the different evaluation methods commonly
used in this and related fields. This will provide the context against which
to compare our own evaluations in Chapters 5 and 8.
Any kind of evaluation of a creative tool will need to determine the context
of use and whose response is of interest. Examples of subjects of interest
include: an audience of a performance, a performer, a participant of an
installation, the creator of a work, a customer or a judge with domain-specific
expertise (O’Modhrain 2011).
Conventional research into Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) has been
concerned with use-case scenarios that focus on performing tasks. This task-
oriented design allows an interface to be evaluated by the efficiency with
which tasks may be performed (e.g. Carroll and Carrithers 1984).
Software may also be evaluated by the experience of the user whilst us-
ing it rather than the outcome of the tasks they perform. This focus is
traditionally more familiar to game designers (e.g. Sykes 2006). However,
as recreational use of computers has increased it become a more prominent
topic within HCI (Wright and McCarthy 2010). This second focus is referred
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to as experience-centred or experiential design.
2.5.1 Formal and informal evaluation
The formality of an evaluation is the extent to which it is conducted and
presented in a rigorous fashion with a structured route from data to results
(Stowell 2010). Formalising an evaluation procedure allows data to be col-
lected and presented in a manner that ensures the conclusions drawn are
supported by evidence beyond a researcher’s personal opinions. As such,
they are important in understanding the extent to which results may be
generalised (Stowell et al. 2009).
Generally, most evaluation within NIME research is informal (Marquez-
Borbon et al. 2011). This may be because the aims of the research are to
produce a particular artistic result and therefore there is little objective cri-
teria against which it may be assessed (what Nic Collins calls ‘playing the
composer card’ (Eigenfeldt 2009)). It may also be due to the time commit-
ment required to conduct formal evaluations. For example, Stowell (2010)
reports that his qualitative analysis took approximately 27–36 hours to anal-
yse per hour of interview in addition to the time required for transcription.
However, informal evaluation increases the potential risk of results that have
been ‘cherry picked’ to support the researcher’s personal agenda, whether in-
tentionally or not. Without an understanding of how the researcher may have
been led to their conclusions by the data, we cannot verify their reliability.
This risk increases when the evaluator is also serving as creator.
Nonetheless, informal evaluation has a useful role to play (Stowell et al.
2008). In particular, informal analysis of qualitative data may be used to help
explain the significance or insignificance of a quantitative result. In this thesis
we conduct a formal quantitative analysis in Chapter 5 and use informal
qualitative analysis to reason about which direction to take subsequently.
We then perform a second formal qualitative analysis in Chapter 8.
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2.5.2 Subjective and objective evaluation
Any method where people are used instead of a tool as means of measurement
is a subjective evaluation (Dix 2004, p. 358). This is common within our
field as we are often interested in understanding experiential or aesthetic
qualities. Subjective evaluations may be criticised on grounds of reliability
as participants’ responses may easily be influenced by factors other than the
one we are testing. To overcome this, we may use an objective measurement
as a more reliable indicator, such as measuring the number of people who
visit an exhibition or a participant’s galvanic skin response. However, one
may then call into question whether what has been measured is actually
indicative of the quality we are trying to measure, giving grounds to criticise
the validity of the results.
2.5.3 Quantitative subjective methods
Quantitative subjective evaluation typically means asking people to fill out
questionnaires to provide a comparative or quantitative answer to a set of
questions about an experience the person has just been involved in (e.g.
Rutherford and Wiggins 2002; Fencott and Bryan-Kinns 2010). However, it
may also ask them to provide a continuous response to a stimulus through
an input device (e.g. Melo and Wiggins 2003). It may be done in the lab
(i.e. a controlled environment) (e.g. Rutherford and Wiggins 2002; Melo
and Wiggins 2003) or in the field (i.e. our determined usage context) (e.g.
Morrison et al. 2007). They are typically asked of a potential participant
(e.g. Fencott and Bryan-Kinns 2010), performer (e.g. Hsu and Sosnick 2009),
audience member (e.g. Rutherford and Wiggins 2002) or an expert judge
(e.g. Wiggins et al. 2009).
Some research uses tests inspired by the Turing Test (Turing 1950), which
tests a machine’s intelligence by the extent to which it may convince a human
that it is also a human (e.g. Ariza 2009; Robertson 2009; Murray-Browne and
Fox 2009). This is arguably also a subjective method.
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2.5.4 Quantitative objective methods
A common objective method used is to ask the user of an interface to perform
a task, for example using a musical interface to recreate a sound, and then
score their performance using a predetermined metric (e.g. Hunt et al. 2003;
Wanderley and Orio 2002; Kiefer et al. 2008). Other approaches include
measuring biometrics such as a subject’s heart rate or galvanic skin response
(an indicator of stress) (Hazlett 2008) and analysing system logs to measure
differences in behaviour (e.g. Fencott and Bryan-Kinns 2010; Bryan-Kinns
et al. 2007).
2.5.5 Qualitative methods
Qualitative methods are always subjective as they rely on the researcher to
decide how to interpret the data (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). In our field,
qualitative data is frequently published without any kind of formal analy-
sis, often as an aid to interpret quantitative data that has undergone more
rigorous analysis. However, rigorous qualitative methods of collecting and
analysing data exist, some of which are outlined below.
The specific method used in any qualitative approach is often quite open.
There is a diversity of methodologies used, ranging from informal opinions
summarising an interview to formalised processes of extracting meaning from
text and verifying their reliability. The onus remains with the researcher to
convince an interested reader of the quality of their analysis by providing
detailed documentation of the procedures they have followed (Yin 1994).
Discourse-based approaches
Qualitative methods often involve collecting written or spoken data directly
from the party of interest. This may be collected after a specific experience
through open-ended questionnaires and interviews or through think aloud
methods where the participant is asked to provide a running commentary as
they use a system (Hoonhout 2008). Video-cued recall is a further technique
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where the participant provides a running commentary of a video recording
of their use (e.g. Costello et al. 2005; Healey et al. 2005).
The resulting discourse may then be coded where the material is organ-
ised into chunks or segments of text followed by the identification of themes
or descriptions (typically around five to seven) (Rossman and Rallis 1998;
Creswell 2008). These provide a foundation from which to form an interpre-
tation.
Discourse analysis (DA) involves a very close reading of the text to iden-
tify specific features of the text such as repertoires (e.g. Inskip 2010), con-
ceptual maps (e.g. Stowell et al. 2009) or rights and obligations (Banister
et al. 1994, ch. 6). DA methods will be covered in more detail in Chapter 8.
Other formal approaches
Observation is the process of watching participants interact with a system
and may be done live or using a video recording. As with discourse, observa-
tion is often accompanied by extensive coding procedures in order to make
sense of what has been observed (e.g. Costello et al. 2005; Healey et al. 2005).
Ethnography is an approach to data collection where a researcher spends a
considerable amount of time alongside a group of individuals recording their
observations. It is usually conducted in the field and studies the culture of
that group as revealed through their actions (Preissle and Grant 2004). It is
particularly useful in understanding how a particular system is used by a set
of users (e.g. Barthet and Dixon 2011) or how an issue such as technology
has an impact within a specific context (e.g. Stowell and Dixon 2011).
‘Autoethnographic’ approaches involve applying ethnographic practices
to the researcher. Examples include Magnusson (2011) who documented his
experience of learning of a new live coding language (see Section 2.2.4), and
Sudnow (2001) who wrote of his experiences learning to play jazz piano.
Grounded theory is an approach where theory is derived from data through
systematic coding. The approach requires the researcher to suspend their
prior knowledge and ‘let the data do the talking’. A more detailed descrip-
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tion is provided by Inskip (2010).
Evaluating the aesthetic and creative experiences
Both creative and aesthetic experiences are inherently subjective (Ho¨o¨k et al.
2003). Not only does mood affect how positively we regard a work, but mood
affects right from the outset the cognitive processes we adopt when perceiving
art (Forgas 1995). Leder et al. (2004) has argued as a result that research into
experimental aesthetics should measure the mood of the participant before
any study and consider it as a factor. Such an approach may be suitable
for investigating aspects of the cognitive process within the psychology of
aesthetics. However, when the goal is to understand the greater impact of
design decisions within interactive systems, we may well argue that it is not
enough to control for individual differences.
A similar argument applies when evaluating the potential of a work to
facilitate a creative experience. Stowell and McLean (2011) argue that artis-
tic creation is a rich and open task. As a result, reduction into individual
measurable components for the sake of evaluation is likely to disrupt the very
essence of the activity. Furthermore, our dependent variable is subjective.
As such, we cannot measure it without risking changing it in some way. This
is especially a problem in the cognitively rich tasks that our domain involves
as interrupting actions interrupts thoughts which may disrupt the experience
(O’Modhrain 2011). Stowell et al. (2009) point out that there is a particular
danger in attempting to use think-aloud methods (see Section 2.5.5) during
musically creative tasks as similar parts of the brain are active in both lan-
guage and music processing. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to assume that
even asking somebody to think about a particular aspect of their experience
will alter it in some way.
We may resort to objective biometric indicators such as galvanic skin
response or piloerection (causing goosebumps) (see Section 2.5.4). However,
whilst potentially reliable indicators of specific experiences, it is limiting to
reduce the complexities of the creative and aesthetic experiences to such
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simplistic measurements. After all, the ‘chills’ associated with piloerection
may correlate with an emotionally poignant musical experience, but they may
also be induced by the sound of fingernails scratching a blackboard (Grewe
et al. 2011).
Each of the above evaluation methods seeks to understand the interaction be-
tween participant and system in some way. Interactive systems designed with
aesthetic or creative outcomes in mind present a particular challenge when
it comes to evaluation. We will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
qualitative research methods in Chapter 8. However, it is worth mentioning
here that as a considerable amount of subjective analysis is performed by
the researcher, it is less suited as a means to verify a preconceived theory.
Its strength lies as a tool to develop a deep understanding of a particular
interaction and how it relates to an individual’s thoughts and behaviour.
2.6 Conclusion
We have covered a diverse range of subjects, primarily from the fields of
NIME and interactive art but also looking at further research into flow and
similar experiences, and musical perception. What appears as a common
theme throughout this material is that learning is enjoyable, whether it is
learning how an instrument or interactive music system (IMS) works, what
it does, what it lets us to do, what it can teach us about ourselves—or
unconscious learning as in our expectation-oriented models of musical per-
ception. Particularly enjoyable seems to be learning that improves our ability
to act—either to express ourselves, to create or simply to master a system.
It is this combined pleasure of learning and creating that we will be working
with throughout this thesis. However, we have also seen that creating a sys-
tem that invites a participant to engage, explore and motivate themselves to
learn is challenging. Making things easy to learn seems to risk offsetting the
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pleasure of doing so. What is it that makes a system continually engaging
and exciting to use—in other words, captivating?
A common goal that is sought to attempt to achieve this appears to be in
moving beyond simply providing control of a system to more complex inter-
actions such as that of a conversation. However, we saw that the objective
descriptions of directions of information flow within systems struggled to re-
ally capture this complexity. Throughout this thesis, we will be tackling this
issue from a subjective standpoint. By this we mean our concern will be not
only what happens but how these happenings are perceived, how they then
affect what the participant does and, ultimately, how this perspective may
inform the way in which we design IMSs.
We have seen that IMSs lie at the intersection of NIME and interactive
art. A key difference in approach that has already become apparent between
these two disciplines is that NIME research has typically focused on making
systems for performance, whereas for interactive art the users are themselves
the audience. This leaves the participant of an IMS in something of a mixed
role between performer and audience member. Ideally, we would like to
combine the best of both of these roles into an IMS.
In the next chapter we outline a practice-led project that will allow us
to examine what it is that makes NIME performances unique to spectate.
This will lead us towards an understanding of how interactive music can be
more than simply music that is interactive, how we might combine the act of
creation with the experiencing of another’s creation and thus how to create
a captivating interactive music experience.
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Chapter 3
Musical interaction as an
expressive medium
In this chapter I demonstrate how musical interaction may be considered an
expressive medium in and of itself. I do so through a consideration of com-
posed instruments, Digital Musical Instruments created as expressive arte-
facts in themselves rather than simply tools to facilitate musical expression. I
explore this issue with the Serendiptichord, a wearable instrument for dancers
I created in collaboration with the artist Di Mainstone. We reflect that as well
as defining a mapping, a composed instrument is an arrangement of musical
interactions into a performance. As such, consideration needs to be given as
to how they are perceived by an audience. We examine two aspects of this in
particular: what the audience knows at the beginning of the performance and
the rate at which a their understanding subsequently develops. We conclude
that an understanding of the role of these aspects within the participatory
context will form an important part of our understanding of a captivating
Interactive Music System.
In this case, there may be numerous ways to characterise the
aim, or multiple complex aims, but nonetheless, the DMI is a
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mediating technology, not an end in itself. After all, instrument
is nothing more than a glorified synonym for tool.
(Linson 2011, p. 422)
Traditional acoustic instruments are never confused with tools.
(Tanaka 2006, p. 272)
In the previous chapter we saw that whilst a Digital Musical Instrument
(DMI) performance involves a performer creating sound through a computer
for the benefit of an audience, the Interactive Music System (IMS) com-
bines these two roles into a single participant. We also saw that whilst the
DMI paradigm dominates research into New Interfaces for Musical Interac-
tion (NIME), the line between what is an instrument and what is a musical
work can become blurred, with some using the term composed instrument
to describe this hybrid state (Section 2.2.2). As an IMS may be seen as a
musical work requiring participation (Section 1.2), we may therefore see it
as being closer to a ‘non-expert composed instrument’ than a ‘non-expert
DMI’.
Drawing a distinction between the composed instrument and the DMI
may seem somewhat abstract. However, in this chapter we will demonstrate
that these two paradigms are in fact quite distinct approaches to creating
performances with practical consequences for how they are designed, per-
formed and perceived. Key to these will be the concept of creating a musical
work out of musical interaction itself rather than purely out of music. In
subsequent chapters, we will then consider how to apply these lessons in the
context of interactive music.
Our approach in this chapter will be through reflective practice. In Sec-
tion 3.2 I will describe an exploratory project in which I collaborated with
an artist to create a musical instrument for dance performance. We will then
use this as a vehicle to explore why a composed instrument performance dif-
fers from that of conventional music. In line with our subjectivist stance (see
Section 1.3), the focus will be on how such an instrument is perceived by an
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audience, how this perception is affected by performance decisions. However,
perhaps paradoxically, to understand what an audience is there to spectate
we need to consider what a designer is trying to present when creating an
instrument.
3.1 The motivations behind DMI research
Following our review in Section 2.2 of some of the wealth of NIME research,
we might consider the desire to make DMIs as ‘good’ as conventional instru-
ments as being a common motivation. From this perspective, creating DMIs
is a conventional engineering problem: success is assessed through poten-
tially reliable indicators, difficult to measure as they may be. As useful and
valid as such approaches are, we will here argue that this approach is not
necessarily the best means of evaluating all musical instruments.
To do so we will consider motivations driving DMI creation in the context
of three categories as follows.
Utilitarian motivations: creating DMIs that may perform better within
an established role.
Utilitarian/artistic motivations: creating DMIs that are functionally suit-
able to achieve a particular artistic aim
Artistic motivations: creating DMIs as an act of personal expression.
Note that these categories are not necessarily intended to be exhaustive or
mutually exclusive. However as we explore below, much of the DMI research
described in Section 2.2 resides primarily within one of the above. We shall
consider them each in turn.
3.1.1 Utilitarian motivations
We describe as a utilitarian motivation a desire to make DMIs that are ‘bet-
ter’ at allowing a general instrumentalist express themselves musically. DMIs
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created for utilitarian motivations are typically evaluated through consid-
eration of conventional musical instruments, identifying features that are
desirable for all instruments (Wessel and Wright 2002; Jorda` 2005) and iden-
tifying objective indicators of these (Wanderley and Orio 2002). Much of
this is driven by a sense that DMIs have not been accepted into the concert
arena by musicians or audiences; this is an issue we will consider this issue
in more detail in Chapter 6. Here we consider what necessitates the need for
DMIs in the first place?
Instrument usability
Expressing oneself through music is an immensely rewarding experience (Nach-
manovitch 1990) but traditional instruments are difficult to learn to play,
often requiring years of practice from an early age (Wessel and Wright 2002).
Making the experience of creating music more accessible is often cited as a
motivation for better DMIs (e.g. Hunt and Wanderley 2002), in particular
the experience of collective music making (e.g. Blaine 2006; Jorda` et al. 2005;
Tanaka 2007). In fact, the implications of the term non-musician that only
some people are sufficiently skilled to be creating music has been identified
as a peculiarity of Western musical conventions (Small 1998). For some, the
ability of DMIs to ‘democratise’ this experience is among their most excit-
ing aspects (Chadabe 2004). Without the physical constraints of acoustic
instruments, DMIs offer primarily two avenues to improve accessibility.
The first is the ‘easy’ musical instrument—such as the intelligent instru-
ments of Section 2.2.4. The idea here is to let the computer take care of
the difficult technical aspects and allow the performer to focus on expressing
themselves. This may be beneficial in a therapeutic context, for example in
special needs education (Challis 2011), or for home entertainment (Chadabe
1997). Such research may also be applicable in an installation context where
a non-specialist audience might engage in a momentary interaction (e.g. Par-
adiso 1999). However, in the context of musical performance, the idea of
removing the need for skill leaves many dissatisfied (O’Modhrain 2011). For
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example, we saw in Section 2.2.9) the argument that virtuosity is a nec-
essary precursor of expressive musical performance. Others, however, have
questioned this presumption (Jorda` 2002).
More common, perhaps, is the desire to make DMIs more learnable but
without limiting their potential for virtuoso use, which was discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.12. However, elsewhere learnability is presented not as necessitating
new DMIs but simply as a necessity of new DMIs: we cannot expect a mu-
sician to devote as significant an amount of time learning an untested and
unknown DMI as they might were they to take up the violin (Wanderley and
Orio 2002).
As we are considering systems created for non-experts (Section 1.2), it will
be necessary to consider the extent to which skill is a necessary component
of expressive musical interaction. We shall do so in Section 6.1.
Instruments for computer music
Other arguments for creating DMIs focus on facilitating the performance of
music that previously could only be composed on computer and rendered
directly to audio. A key area where we see this is in ‘laptop performance,’
where software such as Ableton Live is used to add ‘liveness’ to computer
rendered sound. There is a sense of dissatisfaction that much live computer
music seems to be performed with the computer keyboard (Widmer et al.
2007) or generic MIDI keyboards (Jorda` 2004).
As well as performance of prewritten music, others have sought to expand
the possibilities of improvisation of computer music (e.g. Jorda` 2005; Nicolls
2010; Dudas 2010). Improvisation provides those creating music an experi-
ence distinct from composition or rendition (i.e. performance of an existing
work) (Nachmanovitch 1990).
Considered under the lens of concert expressivity (see Section 2.2.8), the
difference between improvisation and rendition may seem superfluous from
the audience’s perspective. When we consider skill from a more ecological
perspective in Chapter 6, we will explore why improvisation, rendition and a
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tape recording may lead to distinct perceptual experiences for an audience.
However, at this stage in our argument it is only necessary to identify that
there are established utilitarian needs motivating much DMI research.
As we saw this throughout our review of NIME research in Section 2.2,
utilitarian motivations tend to lead to potentially measurable improvements
criteria such as transparency, controllability, diversity, learnability.
3.1.2 Utilitarian/artistic motivations
We consider motivations within the utilitarian/artistic category as those that
still seek to create DMIs as a means to facilitate the performance of expressive
music but without a fixed idea of what this music or its performance context
might involve.
Creating music to play on a new instrument and creating instruments
to play new music are two sides of the same coin. Throughout the devel-
opment of Western music, the development of new music has corresponded
with that of new technology, and vice versa. For example, during the 19th
century extra keys were added to the flute as chromaticism developed; today
new means of continuous control are being developed alongside newly acces-
sible timbral spaces (Kvifte 2011). As such, one may argue that evaluating
DMIs by comparison with traditional instrumental role may unduly disregard
other aesthetic possibilities (e.g. the ‘glitch’ aesthetic (Gurevich and Trevin˜o
2007)).
Any musical instrument has a range of potential sound output. But
inherent in any interface are suggested paths to follow, if not explicit then
implied through ease of access (Rokeby 1998) and the metaphors embedded
within the system (Fiebrink et al. 2010). Correspondingly, a new interface
can trigger new ideas and new ways of thinking (Magnusson 2005; Jorda`
2004).
As well as creating new types of music, DMI research may also be moti-
vated by a desire to create new practices of music making. We saw this, for
example, with Jo and Tanaka’s (2009) matrix of musical participation (Sec-
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tion 2.1.9). Other examples include collaborative music making in shared
virtual spaces (e.g. Fencott and Bryan-Kinns 2010; Bryan-Kinns 2012) or
remote locations (e.g. Tanaka and Bongers 2001) and interactive dance (Sec-
tion 2.2.4).
As instrument design becomes more about exploring new types of music
and music-making, it starts to become an artistic as well as an engineering
process. Whilst the instrument is still a tool that facilitates an artistic out-
come, as the final outcome is ultimately dependent upon aesthetic preference
there is no longer a uniform criteria by which to evaluate success. Imposing
criteria derived from conventional performance practice is effectively limit-
ing the scope of new instruments to existing practice. Ultimately, evaluation
presents difficulties because we do not yet understand the potential artistic
outcome to which the instrument may be of service.
3.1.3 Artistic motivations
Finally, we consider those who create DMIs not merely as a means to fa-
cilitate creative or expressive acts but as an expressive artefact in of itself.
Magnusson (2009, 2010) argues that instruments should be idiosyncratically
tied to their creators, embodying musical ideas to be explored within perfor-
mance. As well as exploring a space of musical ideas, such an approach is
an exploration into how action may create sound (Hamman 1999; Hahn and
Bahn 2002).
We saw this perspective when we considered the composed instrument
(Section 2.2.2) as well as in Chadabe’s (1984) interactive composition (Sec-
tion 2.2.4). However, others have criticised this approach. Jorda` (2004)
argues that ‘too little striking music’ is being created and presents a lack of
original standardised instruments as a lack of ‘serious evolution’. We will
have the opportunity to address Jorda`’s concerns about DMIs in Chapter 6.
At this stage, however, we intend to distinguish instruments that are cre-
ated under this category as composed instruments, whilst those in the above
categories we shall continue to refer to as DMIs.
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When evaluated under the criteria of a conventional instruments, a com-
posed instrument may seem somewhat lacking. However, an artist creating
instruments as a part of their performative practice is unlikely to be aiming
to be conventional. For example, Nicolls (2010) who mixes live electronics
with an acoustic piano is more concerned with the response of an audience
than of how effectively other performers might use her technology. Other ex-
amples of instruments constructed as a part of a single musical work include
Hahn and Bahn’s Pikapika (2002, see also Section 2.2.2) and Machover’s
technologically augmented opera Death and the Powers (Jessop et al. 2011).
In this light, we might see the evaluation of the composed instrument
by how well it performs the role of other instruments as akin to appraising
a stained glass window on the basis of how much light it allows to shine
through. Consideration of utilitarian aspects independently of their artistic
role misses the point of the work.
We have presented something of a spectrum of motivations behind DMI
creation. Our purpose in doing so has been to observe that not all DMIs
are created to serve as a channel of expression. For many, the creation of an
instrument is a part of a greater composition process. This latter category
we are describing as composed instruments, and our use of the term DMI will
henceforth imply instruments that do not fall into this category.
For composed instruments, comparison to other instruments or a univer-
sal set of desirable features does not provide a valid—or particularly useful—
evaluation. This does not mean we are unable to reliably evaluate work, es-
tablish general-purpose design principles or carry lessons forwards. However,
rather than considering instruments used in a single run of performances as
those that ‘failed to make it’, let us instead consider them as individual cre-
ative explorations into musical interaction. We evaluate them not by asking
how many people wanted to buy one? but how involved were the audience?
It has been easier to consider the above distinction between DMIs and
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composed instruments from the position of those designing them because it
is typically designers who publish papers about them both. However, it is
not unreasonable to propose that audiences seeking performances involving
composed instruments are engaged by the workings of the instrument as well
as the music being created with it. Tanaka (2006) argued that listening to
Sensorband (see Section 2.2.2) involved unravelling a puzzle of determining
the difference voices and identities of the instruments. This notion is sup-
ported by a study by Gurevich and Fyans (2011) where some spectators of
a new DMI were observed to be more interested in the instrument than the
music being created upon it.
Having identified the composed instrument as a practice distinct from
DMI design we will now consider what consequences this has on how they
are designed, performed and spectated. In doing so we will seek to identify
how constructing an instrument can itself be thought of as an expressive act
and how we may then apply these ideas in the context of an interactive music
system.
3.2 The Serendiptichord: A wearable instru-
ment for dancers
In this section we describe the Serendiptichord (Murray-Browne et al. 2010,
2011), a wearable musical instrument for contemporary dance performance
which I created in collaboration with the artist Di Mainstone as a part of
this thesis. This will subsequently guide our understanding of the composed
instrument in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Collaborative origins
I was invited to collaborate with Mainstone as part of a commission she re-
ceived to create an interactive sound piece to be shown at the ACM Creativity
& Cognition Conference 2009. The project from conception to debut perfor-
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Figure 3.1: Nicole Johnson of the dance company gloATL
rehearsing with the Serendiptichord at the Woodruff Arts
Center, Atlanta, GA.
mance took place over 12 weeks, with the first six of these conducted online
through videoconferencing. The project developed further with subsequent
performances described below.
Mainstone is an artist who specialises in creating wearable technology,
such as Sharewear (Mainstone 2008), a wearable piece that was created
through designing open-ended modular components and observing how oth-
ers used them. Within the collaboration, Mainstone crafted the physical
components, I created the software and sound design. Together we devel-
oped the concepts underlying the work and the interaction design.
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Figure 3.2: Jennifer Essex wearing the Serendiptichord dur-
ing the production of a short film of the work.
3.2.2 Development
The work was developed as an art-driven rather than technology-driven
project: technology was chosen to realise artistic intentions rather than the
work being created as a means to demonstrate technology (Candy and Ed-
monds 2002; Murray-Browne et al. 2013). Mainstone arrived with ideas from
her previous work referencing exploratory movement and connection within
public space which I related to this research as it currently stood, which refer-
enced narrative, and its role in non-linear interactive sound works. Common
ideas resonated such as narrative, exploration and space but also the instru-
ment itself began to be characterised—unrestrainable, playful and illusive.
A narrative emerged of the relationship between performer and instrument
through stages of discovering the instrument, playfully exploring how it may
connect to her body, becoming gradually more sinister as it begins to possess
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.3: The Serendiptichord. (a) With Di Main-
stone. (b) Heidi Buehler rehearsing with Di Mainstone out-
side Berkeley Art Museum, CA. (c) Heidi Buehler perform-
ing at the ACM Creativity & Cognition Conference 2009. (d)
Displayed at Kinetica Art Fair 2010, London.
and dominate her, reaching a climax whereupon she tears it off herself, and
finally a return to the innocence of before as she resists its attempts to entice
her once more.1
This narrative informed the technical constraints placed upon the instrument—
such as discounting video-based sensing due to its sensitivity to different
environments—how it sounded, how it looked, the anticipated means of
interaction—somewhat dialogical (Figure 2.2.7) and conversational (Section 2.1.3)—
and how the it would be presented to an audience. Throughout, there was
a theme of serendipitous discovery, laying the foundations for an interaction
design that focused on unguided exploration and learning, intuitive but un-
prescriptive. Thus, the Serendiptichord is not just an instrument, but also
the narrative and performance that accompanies it.
3.2.3 Physical form
The instrument is made up of a headpiece module that rests on the shoulders
with a ‘trunk’ that extends over and in front of the head, and two hand-held
modules that may be attached to the headpiece or other parts of the body (see
Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5). With an exterior of only wood and red leather,
but a form inspired by the curvaceous nature of acoustic instruments, it is
shaped to be elusive but enticing—that is, suggestive of its musical nature
but uninformative about how one might go about realising this.
Three-dimensional accelerometers are embedded within each pod, behind
the neck and within the trunk. Data from these is wirelessly communicated
to a laptop where it is smoothed and converted into orientation data before
being mapped to sound.
1Although to date (March 2012) all the dancers that have performed with the Serendip-
tichord have been female, there are no requirements on the gender of the performer. How-
ever, for readability female pronouns are used.
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3.2.4 Mapping
Sound originates from a bank of sound objects, virtual instruments relying
either on sampled or synthesised audio and a distinct rack of audio effects,
each outputting audio in response to trigger events of varying velocity. Each
sound object is assigned to a specific orientation of both the left pod and neck
sensors, collectively referred to as the noisemakers. When the orientations of
both noisemaker sensors reaches a certain distance from the sound object’s
respective assigned orientations, it receives a trigger event. This mapping is
designed to make the mapping intuitive and reactive and thus easily grasped
by both dancer and audience. Drawing on the embodied metaphor (Sec-
tion 2.2.6) of a percussive instrument, the samples are effectively ‘hit’ into
through rotating the noisemakers. This module of the mapping is described
as the percussive mapping model. Further details are provided in Appendix A.
In order to allow both the dancer to introduce more structured dynamics
to their performance and the composer to develop their musical ideas, the
percussive mapping model is augmented with the more dialogical control of
intensity. Sound objects are each associated a distinct continuous intensity
parameter. Each object develops in a unique way when its intensity increases,
as well as becoming louder and warmer.
The right pod sensor is called the intensifier. When it is shaken whilst
the noisemaker orientations are close to that of a sound object, the object’s
intensity value is rapidly increased, which will then decay back to zero over
time. To ensure strong perceptual feedback (see Section 2.1.1) is provided
when the intensifier is shaken, the sound object is triggered each time it is
‘intensified’. In addition, for a few seconds after a sound object is intensified,
its audio is passed through a short delay that passes through a pitch-shifter
before feeding back on itself.
In contrast to the other three sensors, output from the trunk is directly
mapped to the parameters of a frequency shifting effect applied to the master
channel. The trunk typically follows the motion of the dancer’s neck making
it an effective tool to translate expressive movement into expressive sound.
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Figure 3.4: An overview of the mapping used within the
Serendiptichord.
However, its physical construction causes it to gently oscillate after a sudden
movement. The resulting vibrato effect provides a subtle but essential con-
nection between the physical nature of the instrument and the audio output.
As the trunk is visible to the dancer whilst the instrument is being worn,
it also provides her (and the audience) with instantaneous perceptual feed-
back of the system’s sensitivity to motion. Furthermore, through feeling the
trunk follow her movement, the dancer is provided with a constant physical
connection between herself and the instrument.
Both the percussive mapping model and the intensifier mapping draw on
the embodied relationship (Section 2.2.6) between how much physical energy
the instrument receives and how much sound it produces. However, both
triggered sound objects and the intensifier delay effect may take up to a
few seconds to decay to silence. In order to provide the dancer with the
continuous possibility of silencing the instrument to demonstrate control, an
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extra ‘kill switch’ rapidly cuts the master volume when the instrument is still
for more than a second.
An overview of the overall mapping is shown in Figure 3.4.
3.2.5 Performance
The Serendiptichord was premiered at the ACM Creativity & Cognition Con-
ference in Berkeley, California on 29 October 2009 by Heidi Buehler, a con-
temporary dancer who had had around six hours to prepare and rehearse
with the instrument. Following a warm reception, it was subsequently in-
vited for performance at a number of other venues (see Section 1.5.2 for a
full list) including Kinetica Art Fair 2010 where it was reviewed positively
by New Scientist’s CultureLab blog (Austen 2010).
Each performance is improvised over a narrative, which governs not just
what kind of sounds are made but also the character of the dance, the in-
tensity of the show and, crucially, which modules and capabilities of the
instrument are revealed to the audience. Throughout its lifetime, this narra-
tive has evolved and been refined, and the instrument adapted and improved
to better support it, for example through adding the capability to load differ-
ent banks of sound objects as a show progresses via backstage control. The
version presented below is the current state into which it has stabilised.
Performance narrative
A typical performance will last ten minutes. For the first minute, only a dark
box housing the instrument is visible. The dancer performs around the box
as if magnetically drawn to it but also unaware of its contents, creating a
sense of anticipation that something of significance is inside.
Once opened, just the left pod is revealed and the dancer explores how
it relates to the sounds being heard. It is apparent that sounds are caused
through moving this pod although the relationship between movement and
sound remains unclear. The dancer emulates our limited understanding and
explores this relationship. The nearly identical right pod follows and we
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Figure 3.5: Nicole Johnson from the dance group gloATL
with Tim Murray-Browne rehearsing with the Serendipti-
chord at the Woodruff Arts Center, Atlanta, GA.
might expect, as the dancer seemingly does, that it behaves in a similar
fashion. But these expectations are not met: shaking it does nothing at all.
Puzzled, the dancer returns to the left pod and we eventually discover that
shaking it intensifies the sounds triggered by the left hand. The headpiece—
perhaps the most distinctive part of the Serendiptichord—is not revealed
until around a third of the way through the performance. After the headpiece
has been demonstrated on its own, it is used together with the pods.
With each individual aspect of the mapping demonstrated, the limits
and combined capabilities are then explored. The narrative takes a darker
turn as the instrument begins to dominate and overpower the dancer. The
sound and movement grows more chaotic and disturbing before we approach
the climax where the dancer rips the instrument off her. Briefly, there is a
recapitulation as the dancer regains herself and the sounds of the instrument
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returns to the earlier innocence (although audibly disfigured to some extent).
But the dancer resists its allure and packs it back into its box, seals the box
and leaves the stage.
The above narrative not only provides a structure for the dancer to perform
over but also serves to closely control the means by which the audience’s
understanding of the instrument is constructed. In the following section, we
will explore the consequences of this and why it is a construct particular to
the composed instrument rather than the DMI.
3.3 Reflections
As a performance, the Serendiptichord fits within both the interactive dance
paradigm (Section 2.2.4) and that of the composed instrument as described
at the beginning of this chapter. The instrument is entwined within the
described performance. This is reflected in the language of Section 3.2: we
do not talk of the performance of a piece of music with the Serendiptichord
but of the performance of the Serendiptichord. Attempting to evaluate its
capability to fulfil a diversity of different roles as we saw in Section 3.1.1 is
not helpful because that is not its purpose. But there are a number of other
important consequences of this approach beyond evaluation.
3.3.1 Composing in the language of musical interaction
Most Digital Musical Instruments (DMIs) are constructed for the benefit of,
and evaluated by, potential performers (e.g. Hunt et al. 2000, 2003; Poepel
2005; Arfib et al. 2003; Levitin et al. 2002). This is in line with the utilitarian
motivations of Section 3.1.1 where instrument is essentially a tool to allow
performers to create music. The success of the performance depends on their
musical abilities as well as the extent to which the instrument served its
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role. As well as being the key ‘stakeholder’ with an interest in the quality of
the instrument (O’Modhrain 2011), the performer is therefore in a privileged
position to determine the impact of the instrument on the quality of the
performance (Stowell 2010).
However, when the instrument is a part of the artistic contribution of
a performance, the picture is different. As we saw in Section 3.1.3, the
attention of the audience is on the instrument as well as the sound it pro-
duces. Therefore, the instrument designer and the performer are working
together to construct a single performance of music and instrument. They
are both concerned with how an audience perceives the entirety of the per-
formance. Note that although some DMI research has considered the role of
audience perception of an instrument (e.g. Schloss 2003; Fyans et al. 2010;
Hsu and Sosnick 2009), it has typically done so from a utilitarian position:
audience understanding needs to be established to facilitate the expressive
performance of music (Fels et al. 2002). This is in line with a presumption
among DMI creators that they belong in the Western concert tradition where
audience communication has not needed much consideration (Gurevich and
Fyans 2011; Small 1998).
Here, we instead have instrument and sound both as artistic contribu-
tions to a single musical performance. However, it is more than simply a
double presentation. As we saw in Section 2.1.5, designing an interface is
the designing of an experience. When the interface is to be used in perfor-
mance, it is a vicarious experience for the audience. For example, in the
Serendiptichord narrative, the performer emulated a limited understanding
of the instrument, which provided the context for the audience to learn vi-
cariously how it worked. Designing an instrument provides the framework
for interaction to be investigated, explored and questioned (Hamman 1999).
Therefore, performance of a composed instrument is not just the presen-
tation of sounds, but of gestures, mappings—how those gestures relate to
sounds—and interactions—which potential relationships are acted upon by
the performer. In Section 2.4, we saw Small’s (1998) argument that gesture
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is a more representational means of communication than sound. In this way,
the composed instrument fulfils the role envisaged by Chadabe (2004): music
as a medium of ideas as well as abstractions.
A composition is not just a collection of sounds, but a temporal arrange-
ment of those sounds crafted to manipulate a listener’s auditory perception
(Section 2.4). Reasoning about composed instruments in sole terms of the
musical interactions they afford (e.g. Magnusson 2010; Fiebrink et al. 2010;
Schnell and Battier 2002) is akin to reasoning about a musical composi-
tion as an unordered collection of chords. Fundamental to a musical work
is how these individual components are organised and the relationships be-
tween them. In this sense, musical interaction is a medium: it is not enough
to simply choose interactions. You must compose them. In terms of the
Serendiptichord, this means that the mapping, sound design, gestures and
physical form are not enough by themselves: the narrative—both scripted
and improvised—is the recipe that turns these into a musical work.
3.3.2 Perceiving a composed instrument
We saw in the previous section that the designer and performer of a composed
instrument unite to present a single cohesive performance for an audience.
As a result, the measure of success and the focus of development is how this
audience will receive the work. Traditional NIME issues such as learnability
(Section 2.2.12) and controllability (Section 2.2.11) are important, but only
in pragmatic terms of how they affect the experience of the audience. For
example, a number of Serendiptichord performances were with a dancer with-
out previous experience of it and typically no more time than a day would
be available to rehearse. This would be an unreasonable amount of time for
even an experienced musician to learn a new instrument—but not necessar-
ily a new piece. In comparison with NIME research, a focus on performance
outcomes rather than properties of the tools used to realise it is perhaps
closer to that of theatre or the performance art (e.g. Saltz 2001; Siegel 2009;
Reeves et al. 2005).
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In a traditional instrumental concert, there is a ‘pact’ between audi-
ence and performer establishing that what is heard should be attributed
to be performer rather than machinery hidden inside the their instrument
(Siegel 2009). However, in more theatrical contexts it is perfectly reasonable
for technology to be scripted and controlled backstage (Saltz 2001). The
Serendiptichord exploited this ambiguity by framing it as a puzzle. Whilst
the dancer behaved as if she were creating the sounds, the context of the
performance—her dramatic entry and unpacking of the box—implied that
this control may have been an illusion. As additional aspects of the mapping
are presented, further causality between gesture and sound may be perceived
(see Section 2.2.10) eventually solidifying with the introduction of the trunk.
However, an audience that is unsure of what kind of performance they
are spectating may be left unsure what is being exhibited for their appre-
ciation and which parts are simply tools in service to these aspects. If left
unconsidered by a designer, this can create problems—for designers of both
DMIs and composed instruments. In Section 2.3.2, we saw the argument that
engagement with a work relies on an audience’s ability to relate it to their
understanding of the formal characteristics of a genre. A DMI perceived as
a composed instrument may be seen lacking in originality or temporal de-
velopment. Conversely, a composed instrument perceived as a DMI may be
seen as poorly engineered technology impeding a musician’s ability to express
themselves musically.
The expectations of an audience is an important aspect of musical per-
formance that is often overlooked (Widmer et al. 2007), and we will see in
subsequent chapters that this is true of interactive music too. In Chapter 6
we will consider in more detail how general expectations arising due to the
performance context may affect how a work is received. However, we saw
in Section 2.4.3 that evolving expectations play a fundamental role in the
perception of a musical work itself. If, as argued above above, the composed
instrument is most effectively thought of as a composition of musical inter-
actions as well as sounds then the expectations of the audience needs to be
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considered in terms of interaction as well as sound.
For example, the second pod of the Serendiptichord is nearly identical
to the first and presented immediately afterwards. As shaking the first pod
resulted in sound, an expectation is established that the second will behave
likewise. However, this expectation is violated when no sound is heard at all.
We are left with a sense of ambiguity which, following the language of the
Implication-Realization model (Section 2.4.3), we anticipate to be resolved
through a subsequent realisation. In this way, we may see the perception
of a composed instrument as a continually unfolding understanding of the
instrument’s mapping and affordances, as well as how the performer intends
to make use of these. As a result, two aspects of a composed instrument
performance require specific consideration: prior knowledge and continuity.
3.3.3 Prior knowledge
Slowly revealing what the Serendiptichord is forms an integral part of what
makes the performance. Aspects of the instrument are revealed with musical
and gestural ideas together to form the greater composition. The mapping
is not explained in a pre-concert talk any more than the plot of a novel in
the preface. An audience that does not know what to expect, whether they
are supposed to be seeing a musician or a dancer or whether the sound is
prerecorded or live is a gift rather than a hinderance. The hook of the show
is to pique curiosity, raise questions and delay the answers.
In contrast to Fels et al. (2002, see also Section 2.2.10), creating an instan-
taneously transparent instrument is not the goal. Quite the opposite—the
Serendiptichord is deliberately elusive in its design. The sensors are hidden.
Whilst its shape is suggestive of musical instruments, it does not directly
reference any acoustic instrument and so does not indicate visually how it
might be performed nor how it might sound. Even then, it is kept sealed
inside a black box until a good minute after the show has started. Everything
is designed to be opaque, so that it might be communicated in a controlled
way throughout the performance.
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In fact, not everything is designed to be opaque. As we saw above in
Section 3.3.2, an audience may not even consider any interactive technology
is in use within a dance performance. Therefore, while it may not be clear
how gesture creates sound, care is taken to communicate fairly quickly that
there is indeed some meaningful relationship between gesture and sound,
signalling to the audience that this is a problem for them to work out. This
is similar to Edmonds et al.’s (2006) combination of initial and long-term
sustainers in Absolute 4.5 (Section 2.1.4).
The narrative of the Serendiptichord was crafted around discovery and
it took advantage of an audience that knew very little about what was to
come. However, this is not to say that this is a ‘correct’ way of creating a
composed instrument. Rather, the point has been that how an instrument
is perceived is dependent upon the perceiver’s prior knowledge. This is a
necessary consideration when composing an instrument.
Therefore, rather than being considered a static attribute of the instru-
ment, transparency is a subjective aspect of the audience’s perception that
unfolds throughout the performance in a controlled manner. Likewise, com-
municating intention (Section 2.2.14) becomes a tool involved in this process
rather than simply a means to facilitate the appreciation of skill (cf. Fyans
et al. 2010). There are times when communicating a mismatch of intention
and outcome is what is desired, not to allow an error to be perceived but
to violate an expectation and indicate that things are more complex than
they at first seemed. With the Serendiptichord we saw above an example of
this with the introduction of the second pod. The dancer’s response makes
it clear that this is a part of the narrative rather than a fault and the whole
affair is an ambiguity awaiting resolution.
It is important to note that even if nothing of a composed instrument is
communicated prior to a performance, the audience will still have expecta-
tions about what is possible (given current technology) and what the norms
are of musical interaction. As with traditional composition, a composed in-
strument is created and perceived against a set of stylistic norms.
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3.3.4 Continuity
We saw in Section 2.4 that the need to balance of novel and familiar mate-
rial within a musical work is analogous to the flow channel (Section 2.3.1).
Continually matching challenge and skill necessitates an ‘upwards path of
complexity’ (Blaine and Fels 2003) when learning how an interface works
(Section 2.2.12) as well as when engaging with media (Section 2.3.2). It is
therefore reasonable to argue that an engaging composed instrument per-
formance is continually providing predictive information (Section 2.4.3) not
only in terms of what we hear but in terms of how gesture creates what we
hear. For this reason, presentation of a composed instrument needs to be
a continuous process throughout the performance. It is not a precursory
training session to enhance the audience’s appreciation for when we move on
to the ‘proper’ music.
In both a normal instrumental performance and that of a composed in-
strument, we are communicating to the audience a signal out of which in-
creasingly complex structures emerge. Just as there is evidence of a limit to
the ‘cognitive bandwidth’ of an instrumentalist (Levitin et al. 2002), there
is a limit to how much information our audience can process at a given mo-
ment. Even if each aspect of the performance–music, gestures, revealing the
mapping—made sense individually, they may not when combined simply be-
cause their overall complexity exceeds what the audience can make sense of.
Many artists of composed instruments understand this intuitively. For exam-
ple, Nicolls (2010) points out that a performance with complex technology
should be balanced with more direct or simplified musical substance.
This notion of complexity is subjective to a given audience and refers
to parts of the performance which are novel and to which they are paying
attention. For example, the microphone introduced a number of complexities
within performance (Lockheart 2003) but its role is now firmly established
within the formal characteristics of many modern genres and so it does not
increase the overall complexity of a performance.
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3.3.5 The double bind of Digital Musical Instruments
The above observations have consequences for those designing DMIs that
are not composed instruments. With an audience unfamiliar with the DMI,
there is a lot for them to pick up. Many composing for DMIs recognise this
and create music specifically to teach the audience about the workings of
the instrument (e.g. Schedel 2002), perhaps then moving onto more complex
musical ideas. Two issues arise.
Gurevich and Fyans (2011) reported spectators of a new musical instru-
ment stating that their attention shifted during the performance from the
instrument to the music. This is similar to Rokeby’s (1998) argument that
we stop sensing something once it has been identified. The audience jump
from an completely unguided attempt to form a mental model of how the
instrument works into an entirely different medium of being taken on a mu-
sical journey by the composer. As well as the potential disjunction between
two different targets of attention, the audience is being asked to expend a
considerable amount of ‘work’ in the early stages of a performance before the
aesthetically rewarding material of interest may appear.
The second problem arises with repeated viewing. As mentioned above,
complexity is a subjective aspect of perception. If the first part of every
performance is there to communicate the instrument, then the first part
is always the same. Seeing the instrument perform time and time again,
possibly different performers playing pieces by different composers but each
constructed to have this ‘tutorial introduction’ becomes equivalent to each
piece opening with a tired cliche´.
Therefore there arises a conflict between the utilitarian motives that see
the instrument as a tool for expression and the artistic motives that see the
instrument as an act of expression. The tool is created to be assimilated,
forgotten—to let the music do the talking. The instrument as creative ex-
pression captures some of the limelight away from what is being heard. The
tool is successful when it is ubiquitous, a formal characteristic of the genre.
Until that moment it struggles because the audience is going to be figuring
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out how it works instead of what the music is about. The instrument as
expression seeks to be idiosyncratic, original. It may fit in with some in-
strumental conventions to provide some conceptual landmarks from which
the audience may base their understanding but ultimately it is there to grab
their attention and lead them on a journey of discovering how sound and
gesture relate.
In Chapter 6, we will see that this double bind has implications for the
perception of skill as well as complexity.
3.4 Conclusion
Different designers of Digital Musical Instruments (DMIs) have differing mo-
tivations. Although less acknowledged, we have argued that many DMIs are
created for artistic instead of utilitarian purposes. This has consequences
in design and performance and we have argued that trying to do both can
lead to problems. DMIs created for artistic expression we have considered as
composed instruments.
Musical interaction is an expressive medium in and of itself. Whilst a
composition may be considered as ‘organised sound’ (Vare`se and Alcopley
1968), a composed instrument may be considered ‘organised musical inter-
action’. Therefore, as well as choosing interactions, the order and manner in
which they are presented to an audience is as much a part of the composed
instrument as the mapping that defines what interactions are possible.
However, this does not mean that we are left with only aesthetic taste
to guide the design and performance of composed instruments. Just as con-
ventional music needs ‘good’ instruments and an understanding of how they
work, those creating composed instruments can benefit from an understand-
ing of the role perception plays in their reception. Drawing on models of
musical perception, we have argued that careful consideration needs to be
given what an audience expects—both in the general sense with regards to
the performance context and within the performance itself. Key to this has
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been a consideration of how structures—information that allows the audience
to understand and predict what will happen—emerge.
This chapter has been concerned with performance rather than interac-
tive music. However, I have argued that an Interactive Music System (IMS)
may be considered as a participatory composed instrument. By considering
how musical interaction may function as an expressive medium within per-
formance, we may now consider how the above lessons may apply within the
interactive domain. In the next chapter, I introduce a more formal definition
of emerging structures in order to model how a participant explores an IMS.
Later on in Chapter 6, we will then consider in more detail issues of per-
ceiving skill and the effects of expectations established by the performance
context.
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Chapter 4
Emerging Structures: A model
of exploration
In this chapter we take our idea from the previous chapter of composed in-
struments with emerging structures of musical interaction from performance
into the interactive domain. To do so, I outline a few theories from the wider
field of research into how and why individuals explore and play. Combining
these with the previously outlined theories of musical perception, I present a
new model that more formally defines what we mean by emerging structures
and how they may characterise exploration. With the model, we may then
more closely examine scenarios where a participant terminates their interac-
tion. This leads us to the proposal that captivating interaction requires the
participant to be continuously improving their understanding and potential
for action—and expectant of further improvements.
In the previous chapter, we saw that a new musical instrument that presents
a novel means of creating sound may be seen as as much a part of the artistic
content of a performance as the music. We are presenting not only musical
ideas, but an original interpretation of how gesture may create music, an
approach we described as the composed instrument. We argued that instead
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of having a ‘demonstration period’ to the music, the development of the
mapping may be more effective as a part of the musical work itself. In this
way, rather than composing the exposition, development and recapitulation
of what is merely audible, we are also composing musical interaction. Music
becomes a medium of action creating sound rather than solely a medium of
sound.
In this chapter we will apply these ideas to interactive music, exploring
how we might create systems where both sound and mapping are continually
developing. We should be clear that our motivation is not to bring the
thrill of music-making to non-musicians (cf. Blaine and Fels 2003). In line
with Tanaka (2006), interactive music is created by a composer as a crafted
experience of musical interaction.
What might such an experience entail? If a composed instrument embod-
ies a diversity of musical ideas simply through its construction and mapping
then we might think of interactive music as transforming this from a system
explored by a performer for an audience to a system for an audience to ex-
plore by themselves. It is a composition of not only sound but of how actions
creates sound, a relationship to be experienced by the audience actively.
However, whilst performing with the composed instrument allowed us
to carefully control the order and manner in which this exploration took
place, letting the audience take control presents difficulties. Benford and
Giannachi (2008) describes this issue in terms of a participant’s trajectory, the
‘journey’ taken as they explore a system. The imagined canonical trajectory
of the designer is often rather different from the actual trajectory of the user
(Benford et al. 2009). In particular, Rokeby (2011) observed that people at
interactive installations are often focused on ‘working it out’ and not really
experiencing it as the artist had in mind.
So what goes wrong when things become interactive? Why do we end
up with interactions of 5–10 seconds when the audience is left to explore
on their own devices (Section 1.1) but seem to be able to engage audiences
for significantly longer when they are watching somebody else explore the
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system? Why does the audience apparently choose to ‘figure it out’ and
get quickly bored once they have done so, but gain vicarious pleasure from
watching another person drag out the exploration?
To answer these questions, we develop in this chapter a model of emerging
structures (ES) that will allow us to reason about how individuals go about
exploring an interactive system. From here we may consider how to make
interactive music more like music and less like a puzzle to be ‘worked out’. We
propose that through doing so the experience will be made more captivating.
The model presented in this chapter is fairly abstract in nature. However,
the understanding it provides us will allow us to form a more practical design
principle in the next chapter.
4.1 Theories of exploration, play and curios-
ity
Before we can develop the model, we need to review some existing research
into how we explore and what motivates us to do so. In particular, we would
like to clarify what exactly the distinction is between ‘figuring something out’
and ‘exploring something’. This will allow us to untangle why the former may
lead to a less than captivating experience.
4.1.1 Investigative and diversive exploration
Costello (2009) considers this distinction in terms of play, for which she
adopts Zimmerman’s (2004) definition of free movement within a more rigid
structure. Drawing together a range of theories, she concludes that play in-
volves oscillating between two types of behaviour, investigative exploration
(‘what does this object do?’) and diversive exploration (‘what can I do with
this object?’).1 We will be relying on this distinction a number of times in
1Costello’s terms are adopted from Hutt (1985), which are based on Berlyne’s (1966)
distinction between specific and diversive exploration.
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this chapter. For Costello, investigative exploration is the establishment of
Zimmerman’s rigid structure in which diversive exploration (free movement)
may take place. The pleasure of play is to be had in diversive exploration.
Boredom then triggers a return to investigative exploration (Costello 2007).
We may also hypothesise that a serendipitous discovery could cause this tran-
sition. However, far from being a state of low arousal, boredom arises because
a learning process has reduced the perceived complexity of the present activ-
ity (Rauterberg 1995). Through this desire for greater complexity to relieve
understimulation, it plays a fundamental role in establishing curiosity (van
Aart et al. 2010).
In this way, exploration is seen as an oscillating process between inves-
tigative and diversive exploration, with the desire to apply the fruits of our
labour motivating a transition from the former to the latter, and boredom
with what we can do motivating a transition back to investigative exploration.
However, boredom (along with confusion) also seems to be a common reason
given by those who fail to engage with systems (e.g. Costello 2009, p. 140).
So what goes wrong?
4.1.2 Exhausting the (perceived) possibilities
Insight into why boredom might trigger differing responses arises in Gurevich
et al.’s (2010) study investigating highly constrained musical interfaces (see
Section 2.2.2).
Gurevich et al. identified a spectrum of exploratory approach to describe
their participants’ behaviour. They describe at one extreme of this spec-
trum participants following a vertical approach as identifying a single play-
ing technique and attempting to exhaust its entire potential until something
new emerged, whilst at the other end those following a horizontal approach
are described as attempting to find as many playing techniques and musical
possibilities as possible (Gurevich et al. 2010).
We might respectively see the horizontal and vertical approaches as be-
ing predominantly investigative and diversive. Somewhat paradoxically the
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participants most likely to report that they had ‘exhausted the possibilities’
of the instrument were those in the middle of the spectrum, with those on
either end believing that there was more to discover. However, what did
correlate with this notion was the participant’s perception of their own skill
with the instrument. Those who saw more possibilities perceived themselves
as less skilful. It seems that it is this believed potential for further mastery
that inspired some participants to continue—as before, either through un-
covering new inputs or through developing a deeper understanding of those
that have been explored. This is similar to the theory of flow (Section 2.3.1),
except rather than simply balancing challenge and skill, here we see that it
is the ability to identify challenges and the possibility of skill development
that maintains interest.
A participant disengaging due to a sense of having exhausted the possi-
bilities of what they could do was also noted by Costello et al. (2005), who
observed that right before this moment, participants repeated actions that
they had previously performed at their most intense period of engagement
(see Section 2.1.6).
The problem appears not to be that some are simply more curious than
others but that some are able to see more possibilities to investigate. In order
to understand why these individual differences arise—and therefore how we
may compensate for them—we turn finally to some research in cognitive
psychology that investigates what motivates us to explore.
4.1.3 Curiosity
Loewenstein (1994) describes curiosity as the desire to close a perceived
knowledge gap under his Feeling-Of-Knowing hypothesis. The ‘magnitude’
of this gap is determined by how close an individual feels they are to the
knowledge. In a series of studies, Loewenstein found that as the feeling-
of-knowledge gets closer (towards, e.g., the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon),
curiosity increases. Crucial is the sense that there is something new to be
found out. A sense of certainty reduces curiosity (Loewenstein 1994).
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Litman and Jimerson (2004) expand on this with their Interest/Deprivation
categorisation, which identifies two types of curiosity. Curiosity as a feeling
of deprivation (CFD) is caused by a perceived knowledge gap. Curiosity
as a feeling of interest (CFI), on the other hand, is associated with a more
hedonic, pleasure-seeking and aesthetic interest. Because CFD reflects an
unsatisfied need, it is argued to be a more intense desire than CFI (Litman
2005). However, further studies suggest that CFI stimulates more positive
affect, diversive exploration and mastery-oriented learning. CFD is focused
on reducing uncertainty and is more closely associated with performance-
oriented goals, i.e. goals in which an outcome may be deemed a success of
failure. In particular, satisfying CFD leads to a sense of closure, i.e. a ter-
mination of the curiosity (Litman 2008). As the feeling-of-knowledge gets
closer and the anticipation of an answer draws near, tension increases. If the
answer is not then forthcoming, frustration results.
Litman (2008, 2010) has highlighted the role that individual differences
may play in determining which type of curiosity predominates; in particular,
an individual’s tolerance for ambiguity (which reduces the need for closure).
However, the interest/deprivation distinction demonstrates how participants
who are primarily motivating in ‘solving’ an installation might have some-
thing of a shorter and less hedonic experience than those with less specific
goals.
4.1.4 Artificial curiosity
Curiosity has been modelled as a means to guide the autonomous exploratory
learning of robots, a field described as ‘developmental robotics’ due to its
inspiration from the developmental processes of early childhood.
Oudeyer et al. (2007) model curiosity as a drive that allows learning
to be maximised. Their model, Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity, is defined in
terms of the sensorimotor context—a robot’s sensory input of its environment
and estimation of the state of its actuators (Vetter and Wolpert 2000)—and
actions that the robot may perform across three layers. The first layer is a
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classic machine learning system that predicts a change in context based on
an action-context pair, the second a meta-machine learner that predicts the
error of the first layer over action-context pairs. In the third layer, actions
are chosen by a knowledge-gain assessor that draws upon the second layer
to maximize the decrease in the mean error of the first layer over the entire
history of sensorimotor contexts.
Schmidhuber (2009, 2010) also considers a computational model of cu-
riosity. Rather than minimising predicted error over situated action-context
pairs, his model seeks to maximise the compressibility of the history of obser-
vations. Compressibility is determined as a subjective measure determined
by both the abilities of the agent and their prior observation history. Under
this model, an agent in the absence of external rewards will focus attention
on areas that are expected to potentially yield further improvements in com-
pression over prior observations. Such improvements will be found through
partially novel observations that highlight structural similarities across these
observations, which Schmidhuber (2009) argues lead to the Wundt curve
peak (see Section 2.4.3).
The two models are similar as compressibility is implied by predictability.
However, with a single parameter being maximised, neither seem to satisfac-
torily encapsulate what causes the individual differences identified in the
previous section. We may note that Litman’s (2010) evidence for individual
differences within the Interest/Deprivation categorisation was collected from
adults whereas the models here were inspired by the developmental processes
within early childhood.
Whilst the above approaches place a value on forming an understanding
of the effect of one’s actions, they do not place a value on the efficacy of these
actions in allowing the agent to affect and manipulate their environment. In
the language of Section 4.1.1, we might describe their focus as being solely
investigative rather than diversive. However, in recent work by Baranes and
Oudeyer (2012) exploration is guided in terms of a task space rather than
the sensorimotor space. Their Self-Adaptive Goal Generation architecture
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maximises an agent’s competency rather than its knowledge by forming goals
within a task space. In this manner, their curiosity drive focuses the agent
more towards discovering how to perform multiple tasks rather than multiple
ways to perform the same task.
The model we present in this chapter will consider both knowledge and
competency. Our work is motivated more by the desire to describe the ex-
ploration of interactive music by an adult and its aesthetic and motivational
consequences, rather than the development of basic sensorimotor abilities by
a robot or child. For this reason, the Emerging Structures model presented
later in this chapter draws on language more oriented around the musical-
perceptual models described in Section 2.4.3 rather than that from the field
of artificial curiosity.
We have seen a range of theories in this section approaching the question of
how and why we explore, each addressing the topic from a different angle.
Along the way we have defined investigative and diversive exploration (Sec-
tion 4.1.1), horizontal and vertical exploration (Section 4.1.2) and curiosity
as a feeling of deprivation (CFD) or interest (CFI) (Section 4.1.3). We might
argue that those ‘figuring out’ the system are performing investigative explo-
ration rather than diversive, motivated by a perceived knowledge gap rather
than an interest in what they might do with it. Once the system has been
worked out, it offers little to discover and thus the possibilities are exhausted.
However, although Gurevich et al. (2010) demonstrated that constraints
may spark a diversity of approaches, we have not established the role that
the design of the system plays in encouraging specific types of exploration.
In particular, how might a system lead a participant into the perception that
there is no more to discover?
Whilst the above theories all seem to provide a piece of the puzzle, it can
be difficult to see how they relate with each other. For example, we saw that
investigative and diversive exploration were perhaps related to horizontal and
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vertical. But without a common means of expressing these observations it
is difficult to see exactly how, and what consequences we might draw from
this. In the next section, we present the Emerging Structures (ES) model of
exploration. It is a descriptive model that will allow us to unite the above
theories and address notions of perceived possibilities with more rigour. With
this model, we will then be able to derive a number of predictions in Sections
4.4 and 4.6, some of which we will carry further within this thesis.
4.2 Emerging Structures: A model of explo-
ration
In Section 2.4.3, we saw theories of musical perception in which a listener
seeks to construct a predictive model by which to perceive structural con-
sistencies in what is heard. The composer then crafts the expectation, an-
ticipation, affirmations and surprises into their music in a manner that both
allows and manipulates a continuous expansion of this model. We then saw
in Chapter 3 how with the composed instrument this model might be ap-
plied to interactions with sound as well as to sound itself. In this section, we
develop a new model of how we explore Interactive Music Systems (IMSs)
based around the notion of emerging structures (ES). Our approach extends
the expectation-based model of perception into the field of interactive music.
As we shall see, making things interactive presents a unique challenge.
The choice of the term structure within the model draws upon Minsky’s
(1981) analogy of conceptually constructing a representation of a physical
scene from what we see (see Section 2.4.3). We will be applying this perspec-
tive to a participant piecing together the mapping of an IMS based on its
behaviour. As with Minsky’s analogy, we are developing an understanding
of something that (in its simplest form) is static through a dynamic process.
In Minsky’s case this was a scene through seeing; in ours it is a mapping
through interacting.
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4.2.1 Mental models of mappings
We saw in Figure 2.1.1 that users of a system establish a mental model of
how it works. A key component of this is the perceived mapping, the user’s
expectations about what outputs may result from a given input. As argued
in Section 1.3, as we are focusing on the experience of interacting with an
IMS then it is these perceived attributes of a system that are of importance
rather than what is ‘actually’ going on. Throughout Chapter 2, we saw
that although interactive systems were often discussed objectively in terms
of their behaviour, these were often implanted with subjective notions of
how we perceive the system. For example, Cornock and Edmonds’s (1973)
described a category of systems that included an invisible agent modifying the
original specifications of a work (Section 2.1.2). We make sense of a system
by constructing a perceived mapping of what we can do with a system. When
an earlier perceived mapping changes, it makes sense to think of a module
within the system modifying its behaviour. However, on purely objective
terms, every response of the system has been in accordance with the mapping
of input to output programmed within it.
In the emerging structures (ES) model, we will consider mappings as
perceived entities: expectations the system has established with the partic-
ipant about how their input will affect its output. The perceived mapping
is the participant’s working estimate of the system mapping. Therefore, the
only limitation of the complexity of a mental model lies with the cognitive
abilities of the subject. Their model of the mapping may be dynamic and
non-linear. It will be informed by the system’s prior behaviour as well as any
other sources of information the participant may have, for example experi-
ence with similar systems in the past, instructions for use provided by the
artist or having witnessed another participant use the system.
Note that a mental model may be dynamic in the sense that it is changing
over the course of an interaction as well as being a model of a dynamic
mapping. For clarity we will describe
• the mental model as the participant’s cognitive representation of the
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Perceived mapping
Participant Behaviour System
System
mapping
(hidden)
Mental model
Figure 4.1: The participant’s mental model estimates a per-
ceived mapping. This is determined only by the behaviour of
the system, which is itself determined by the system mapping.
system,
• the behaviour of the system as the input and output of the system that
is perceived by the participant,
• the perceived mapping as the expected behaviour of the system as rep-
resented by the participant’s mental model, and
• the system mapping as the programmed rules of what output results
from an input and so determining the behaviour of the system.
For example, a participant may have an unchanging understanding of a sys-
tem with a dynamically evolving system mapping. In this situation, the
mental model would be static whilst the perceived mapping would be dy-
namic. These four definitions are illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Fundamental to what follows is the distinction between perceived and
system mappings. From the participant’s perspective, the system mapping
remains invisible. Even if the participant is the programmer of the system
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mapping, what they are left with is their understanding of its behaviour—the
perceived mapping.
Our focus will be on how the behaviour of the system constructs a per-
ceived mapping during their interaction. As acknowledged above, a partic-
ipant may also learn from other sources. However, we will consider this as
prior knowledge that was formed before the participant interacts with the
system. We will consider only interactions where the participant has no
prior knowledge of this particular system, although further extensions to the
model may include these aspects.
Note that we are always considering a mapping to be a perceptual quality
of the system that may be constructed by its behaviour. The system mapping
is only relevant insofar as it affects the behaviour of the system.
An input may be any gesture of the participant that is sensed by the
system. As our focus is on perceived mappings rather than system mappings,
we will not need to be more specific than this. Different participants using
different systems will have different notions of specificity as to what an input
is (e.g. moving quickly, pushing a button, standing in a particular location).
However we consider the time a gesture is performed as encapsulated by
the notion of an input. A button pressed at a specific moment may lead to
expectations about what will happen when that button is pressed at a later
moment but that later press would be considered a different input.
4.2.2 Consistency
As a participant interacts with a system, we will describe the behaviour of
the system as being perceptually consistent at a given moment and input if
its output is as predicted by the mental model the user has established up
until this point. The participant is an individual from a set of potential par-
ticipants with different ways of thinking. A behaviour may appear consistent
to one participant but not to another. It will at times be useful to think of
an ‘ideal’ participant with a maximal ability to construct an accurate men-
tal model based on the behaviour of the system. Behaviour that would be
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considered consistent to this ideal participant we will refer to as potentially
consistent.
Note that a mapping may incorporate non-determinism and still be per-
ceived as consistent provided the behaviour of the system is within the range
of outputs the user’s mental model predicts (what O’Modhrain (2011) de-
scribes as ‘reliably unpredictable’). Consistency is therefore a distinct con-
cept from predictability or controllability.
4.2.3 Structures: The units of a mental model
An advantage of distinguishing between the system mapping and the par-
ticipant’s mental model is that we may now examine the nature of how the
perceived mapping is arrived at. One of the key conclusions from the pre-
vious chapter was that controlling what aspects of the system are revealed
when is instrumental in how engaging a system is.
To do so, we define the certainty of the perceived mapping as its perceived
ability to predict the future behaviour of the system. We have said that the
complexity of a perceived mapping is limited only by the cognitive abilities of
the participant. As such we shall not attempt to define how such a mapping is
represented by a mental model. However, it is fair to assume that consistent
behaviour has the potential to improve the participant’s perceived ability
to predict future behaviour. It will therefore be helpful to reason in terms
of ‘pieces of knowledge’ that when added to the participant’s mental model
increase the certainty of the perceived mapping. We will refer to such pieces
as structures and the event of their addition to the mental model as their
emergence. We may think of the emergence of a structure as the recognition
of a pattern that may be extrapolated to predict the outcome of future inputs.
In information theoretic terms, the emergence of a structure is equivalent to
the observation of a redundancy within a signal.
As before, we may imagine some participants recognising patterns that
others do not. Therefore, we may think of a potential structure as a structure
that would emerge for the ‘ideal participant’. For a given moment, we may
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then define a maximal potential mental model as the set of all potential
structures.
If the behaviour of the system is inconsistent with the predictions of the
perceived mapping then certainty may decrease and we may also imagine a
structure being disregarded as erroneous. However, if the participant believes
that the system mapping is consistent then this may be received as a challenge
to find a greater structure—a structure that reduces the overall uncertainty
in spite of the earlier loss.
The above describes the basic frame of the ES model: the participant
constructs a mental model that defines a perceived mapping allowing them
to predict the behaviour of the system. As the behaviour of the system is
observed, structures are added and removed to the model with the respective
effect of increasing or decreasing the uncertainty in their model. We may
therefore form a basic notion of exploring a system as a process of providing
inputs that produce behaviour that aids this process.
4.2.4 Size, uncertainty and capacity
However, in Section 4.1.2 we saw two distinct ways in which a participant
may improve their ability to use a system: horizontal and vertical inputs
which we may think of respectively as finding new inputs or learning more
about the found inputs. From this we may see that of the inputs that may
potentially affect the behaviour of the system, the participant may only be
aware of a subset, which we refer to as the exposed inputs. Note that an input
may be exposed without being performed. Exposing a gesture as an input
simply means forming a belief that it will influence the system’s output.
When a previously unexposed input is exposed, the perceived mapping
will need to be amended to accommodate it. Therefore, as well as thinking of
the uncertainty of the perceived mapping, we may think of its size. Together,
the size and certainty of the perceived mapping determine the control the
participant has over the output, which we will describe as the perceived
mapping’s capacity for action (or capacity for short).
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In this way, we may think of horizontal exploration as seeking to increase
the size of the perceived mapping and vertical exploration as seeking to in-
crease its certainty. Both of these, however, increase the capacity for action.
But we described these two approaches as being the extremes of a spectrum
rather than distinct modes of operation. In order to identify this continuum,
we need to be able to quantify structures in terms of the extent to which
they decrease uncertainty and the range of inputs over which they do so.
Therefore we define a structure as being more global if it reduces the total
uncertainty over a larger set of inputs and as being more deep if it reduces
more uncertainty over an equivalently sized set of inputs. Correspondingly,
we may talk of structures as being local or shallow. Structures that are deeper
or more global both lead to a greater increase in the capacity. We may there-
fore combine these measures and consider the strength of a structure as the
extent to which it increases the capacity.
4.2.5 The perceived potential for further exploration
At this stage, we may argue that exploration is driven by the desire to increase
the participant’s capacity for action. However, in the box instrument study
(Section 4.1.2), the indication from those who felt they had nothing more to
gain from the instrument was not that this desire had stopped but that they
had exhausted the possibilities to do so. This suggests that what turns this
desire into motivation is a sense of potential—the expectation that potential
structures or unexposed inputs are available.
The former of these two is analogous to the expected predictive information
rate that we saw in Section 2.4.3). However, rather than being a single
measure, such an expectation is formed over a subset of the exposed inputs.
We shall describe it as an implication. The event in which expected predictive
information arrives we will describe as a realisation, the case where this
expectation is not met as a denial.
The other way in which the participant may expect their capacity to
be increased is by discovering unexposed inputs. We describe this as their
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encounter entropy (a term borrowed from Arfib et al. (2003)).
Combining the encounter entropy with the implications that are open
over the exposed input space defines the total expected increase in capacity
that may be obtained, which we will describe as the anticipated capacity.
This completes the definition of the Emerging Structures model of explo-
ration. At present, it simply describes an interaction rather than offering di-
rectly testable predictions. However, it provides a unifying language in which
to apply some of the aforementioned research of Section 4.1 and Chapter 2,
which we will do so in Section 4.4.
4.2.6 Summary
The Emerging Structures (ES) model
A structure is defined as a unit of knowledge that facilitates the pre-
diction of the output that arises over a set of inputs. The size of this
set of inputs determines how global the structure is; the strength of the
prediction determines how deep it is. Through perceiving the behaviour
of the system, structures emerge to form the participant’s mental model.
The mental model defines the following.
The exposed input space: a set of inputs which the participant be-
lieves may result in output
A perceived mapping: a probability distribution of outputs given an
exposed input. From the perceived mapping we derive
Uncertainty: the uncertainty of the outputs averaged over the ex-
posed input space.
Encounter entropy: the participant’s estimation of the extent to which
unexposed inputs remain.
A set of implications: expectations of a reduction in uncertainty that
will arise if a specific input is performed. Implications remain open
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whilst this expectation exists. Once closed they have been realised
if the expected reduction happened or denied if it is not.
From this we may derive the following.
The capacity for action: the extent to which the participant may re-
liably produce outputs. This is a combination of the size and un-
certainty of the exposed inputs.
The expected capacity gain: the participant’s estimate of how much
further their capacity may increase. This is derived by combining
encounter entropy and the total expected reductions in uncertainty
defined by the implication set.
4.3 Example: An interactive sound installa-
tion
Before we proceed to apply the above model to understand the different
experiences that may arise through interacting with an Interactive Music
System (IMS), we will first provide an imagined example to illustrate how
the different aspects of the model work together. Our imaginary participant
will be called Alice.
This example is simply to aid an understanding of how the above defi-
nitions relate to practical aspects of an interaction with an IMS. After we
have derived some predictions in Section 4.4, we will provide a more concrete
example in Section 4.7 when we apply the model to understand the audience
experience of the Serendiptichord.
Alice enters a room within a gallery unaware that it contains an IMS. At this stage
the perceived mapping is empty and encounter entropy is negligible.
She is made aware by reading a description on the wall that an IMS is installed
within the room but there are no details of how it works. At this stage, as she has
exposed no inputs the perceived mapping is empty but as she expects to do so
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encounter entropy is now high. With no instructions, Alice’s expectation of what
gestures might be an input are only guided by prior knowledge of similar systems
and what she can see in the room. There are no buttons but there are cameras
installed in the corners.
Alice tries random gestures: walking through the room, stamping her foot.
Eventually she hears something after waving her arm above her head. The de-
scription that an IMS was installed led Alice to believe that there would be at
least one input that would create an output. However, having found one she is
now less sure if there may be further unexposed inputs. Therefore encounter en-
tropy is now slightly lower. Alice suspects that repeating this input will cause the
same output and that similar (but as yet unperformed) hand waves might cause
similar but distinct sounds. However, having only provided this input once, Alice
is now in a position to find out more about it through experimentation. This is
an implication—the expectation of predictive information associated with a set of
inputs (in this case, hand waves).
Alice tries similar hand waves through which she discovers that the height of
her hand determines the pitch of the sound and the speed its the amplitude. This
discovery is described in the model as the emergence of a structure. The addition
of this structure to her mental model increases the certainty of Alice’s perceived
mapping. As a result, we would describe the implication as having been realised.
By chance, she claps their hands together whilst doing so and hears a bell
ringing. This implies that there may well be further inputs to the system increasing
encounter entropy. Exposing this input means that her perceived mapping has
grown in size. The particular input is likely to be associated with moderate
certainty within her mapping as she has only provided it once. As a result the
overall certainty of her mapping may have decreased but as the previous structures
remain in her mental model, her capacity for action has only increased. Once
again, exposing this input has created the implication that further structures may
emerge through exploring similar inputs.
Alice repeats this gesture expecting to realise this implication as she did before.
However she instead hears something completely unexpected—a clap of thunder.
She was expecting to have increased her certainty over this area of the input space
but instead it has decreased. She suspects that the output may be determined
by some attribute of the clap (i.e. clapping is actually a set of inputs rather than
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a single input). Although this was a surprise, the implication remains open as
there is still the perception that a potential structure exists. She tries a few more
times and hears each time a different sound. At this stage, although there remains
uncertainty over the exact output associated with the input, she does not believe
that it will become any clearer. The implication has thus been denied. As such
there is no longer the belief of further structures and she therefore accepts that
this is the limit of her control over this aspect of the system.
In fact, the choice of sound is not random at all, but determined by the
velocity of the hands when they clap passed through a complex system mapping
to select a sample. However, Alice never knows this so it is effectively random
from her perspective. This is an example of a potential structure that is rarely
established—perhaps only by participants with prior knowledge of it (e.g. the
designer).
Alice returns to using their arms and wanders around the room swinging them
about, losing herself as she finds more subtleties (i.e. deeper structures) to this
particular input: it turns out that suddenly stopping the arms whilst swinging
causes an interesting timbral effect. However, despite providing a few more ran-
dom gestures along the way—swinging her arms by her hips, lifting a leg up—no
further unexposed inputs become apparent and so encounter entropy drops.
She is now starting to create a piece of music with her arms and goes to add
the random noise associated with a clap, only to find that now nothing happens
when they clap. This is perceived as inconsistent: although she had little certainty
over what would be heard when clapping, it was at least established that she would
hear something. She tries a few more times and in different ways but still with no
luck, although the arm swinging still works as before.
Alice is now slightly confused. Her capacity for action has dropped by this loss
in the little certainty she had regarding the clap. She wanders around the room
attempting to recreate the clapping sound and eventually does so—it turns out
that it only created a sound because she was stood in a specific location within
the room. At this stage the clapping inconsistency has been resolved by a greater
structure: the recognition that the location in the room distinguishes between
otherwise identical inputs. Although Alice’s capacity for action is back to where
it was previously, this recognition brings with it an increase in encounter entropy.
All of the random but unsuccessful attempts at exposing inputs may have simply
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been unsuccessful due to Alice’s location in the room.
Alice again tries different random gestures in different parts of the room but
does not find anything new. Encounter entropy drops again.
She returns to exploring the clap and arm swinging movements, trying to
create an original sound with them. Eventually though, she finds that she is
not finding anything new. With low encounter entropy and a levelling out of
uncertainty over the exposed inputs, there is no longer any perceived potential to
increase her capacity for action. She decides that she has had all of the fun that
she shall with this particular installation and leaves.
4.4 What makes for captivating interaction?
In this section, we will consider how the ES model may assist us in under-
standing what makes for a captivating interaction with an IMS by drawing
together the above theories of playful exploration (Section 4.1) with the mod-
els of musical perception described in Section 2.4.3.
4.4.1 Anticipation
We use the term anticipation to describe the expectation of a desired event.
Within the ES model, we only use the term to describe events regarding
the state of the mental model, such as the emergence of a structure or the
exposure of an input.
The choice of the terms implication, realisation and closure in the model
are intended to draw a parallel with the Implication-Realization (I-R) model
(Section 2.4.3). As in the I-R model, implications are expectations regarding
the outcome of a future event that have been established by prior events.
Implications create anticipation of their closure which causes tension while
they remain open. With the ES model it is the participant who determines
when this event might happen. Therefore, we may propose
Prediction 1 Delaying a participant from performing the input necessary to
close an implication creates anticipation of (implying desire for) its closure.
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4.4.2 Sustaining interaction
Before considering what it means for an interaction to be captivating, we
may ask the more basic question of what determines whether they continue
to interact at all. In other words, what causes an interaction to be sustained?
The Feeling-of-Knowledge hypothesis (Section 4.1.3) argued that the closer
the perceived ‘knowledge gap’, which in the ES model corresponds to the con-
fidence of the expected decrease in uncertainty, the greater the motivation
to acquire it. Therefore, we may propose
Prediction 2 Participants will be motivated to provide inputs that close the
strongest implications (i.e. inputs with the highest expected reduction in un-
certainty).
Investigative and diversive exploration (Section 4.1.1) were described as
respectively identifying what an object does and what it allows the partici-
pant to do. In the ES model, investigative exploration relates to the seeking
of unexposed inputs; diversive to the seeking of structures over the exposed
input space. We saw in Section 4.1.1 the proposal that exploration involves
oscillating between these two states with boredom triggering a switch from
diversive to investigative. However, we also saw that boredom with diver-
sive exploration may cause the participant to disengage instead (recall from
Section 2.1.6 that disengagement describes the period in which the partici-
pant terminates their interaction). Combining this with Prediction 2 we may
propose
Prediction 3 There is a minimum strength necessary of an implication for
the participant to be motivated to close it.
We may argue, in line with the observations of Section 4.1.2, that the deter-
miner of which of these two possibilities arises is their perception of whether
they are likely to be successful in finding unexposed inputs—i.e. encounter
entropy. This gives us
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Prediction 4 If the participant is not motivated to close any implications
then they will either seek to discover unexposed inputs (investigative explo-
ration) if encounter entropy is sufficiently high, or terminate their interaction
(disengagement) if it is not.
Combining Predictions 3 and 4, we may reason that the common deter-
miner of whether a participant continues is the expected capacity gain which
combines both encounter entropy and the overall strength of the implication
set. Therefore, we may assume that this capacity gain is anticipated by the
participant,
Prediction 5 Participants are motivated to continue using a system by an-
ticipation of capacity gain.
leading to
Prediction 6 Systems whose behaviour creates anticipation of capacity gain
in the participant will tend to sustain interaction more than those that do not.
As well as being realised, implications can be closed through denial if
the anticipated reduction in uncertainty does not arrive but expectation of
it doing so subsides. Therefore, boredom may arise both through a sense
that all potential structures have emerged or that no potential structures
will emerge. This latter case we may relate to Costello’s (2009) observations
of participants who found themselves unable to understand a work and dis-
engaged frustrated and confused. From this we may argue that the denial of
an implication causes frustration in the participant. Furthermore, an inter-
action in which implications tend to be denied rather than realised may lead
the participant to infer that future implications will also be denied. This
reduces the expectation of reductions in uncertainty and consequently any
anticipated gains in capacity. From this we propose
Prediction 7 As the total strength of the implications that have been denied
increases in proportion to that of those that have been realised, a participant
will become more likely to disengage due to frustrated confusion.
171
Prediction 8 Systems whose behaviour creates implications but tend to deny
rather than realise them will tend to trigger disengagement due to frustrated
confusion.
In other words, a participant who believed they will be able to understand
a system but subsequently finds no structures emerge during the interaction
will give up frustrated and confused.
These two types of disengagement, due to a lack of open implications or
due to an overabundance of denials are both situations where the system’s
behaviour has failed to create anticipation of capacity gain. They are analo-
gous to the two conditions minimising the average predictive information rate
(Section 2.4.3)—completely predictable and completely random—as well as
the cases described by the two sides of the flow channel (Section 2.3.1)—too
easy and too difficult.
4.4.3 Engaging interaction
As suggested by the CFD/CFI distinction (Section 4.1.3), a system that
sustains interaction by provoking curiosity may not necessarily enjoyable or
engaging. Costello (2009) argue (as does Hutt (1985)) that investigative ex-
ploration is the ‘work’ that allows the pleasure of diversive exploration to
happen. In this way, we may see investigative exploration as the ‘accumula-
tion’ of implications in order to experience the pleasure of realising them in
diversive exploration. From this we may argue
Prediction 9 Participants tend to be more engaged when structures are
emerging.
from which we may propose
Prediction 10 An interaction in which structures are continually emerging
will be more engaging than one in which they are not.
These predictions are similar to that of the information dynamics model
of musical perception (Section 2.4.3): we are engaged by information that
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aids our ability to predict the future. However, we are defining a model of
action as well as perception. Recall Costello’s description of the motivation
behind diversive exploration: what can I do with this object? Likewise, in
the theory of flow (Section 2.3.1), it was the steady improvement of ability
that provided enjoyment. For this reason, we argue that Prediction 9 is a
special case of a more general preference for an increase in the capacity for
action:
Prediction 11 Participants tend to be more engaged when their capacity for
action is increasing.
From this we propose
Prediction 12 An interaction in which the capacity for action is continually
increasing will be more engaging than one in which it is not.
4.4.4 Captivating interaction
Predictions 6 and 12 provide two ways in which the process of constructing
a mental model may affect the experience of a participant: actual capacity
gain determining how engaging a system is, and anticipated capacity gain
determining its ability to command the participant’s attention and provoke
continued use. Combining these two measures we define a captivating expe-
rience as being both engaging and demanding of continued attention. From
this we derive
Prediction 13 A system whose behaviour causes continual gains of capacity
and anticipation of further gains will be more captivating than one that does
not.
This is the key prediction of the ES model. In general terms, interacting with
a system will be captivating if the participant is continually improving in their
ability to do things—either through finding new inputs or through improving
their command over those they have already found—and anticipating further
improvements. In these terms it is similar to the theory of flow (Section 2.3.1)
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although more specific in how an improvement in ability arrives and with a
greater focus on anticipated improvements as well as actual ones.
Whilst this prediction is difficult to test directly as capacity and anticipa-
tion are defined subjectively, in Section 4.6 we will consider how differences
in systems and participants affect these factors, which will allow us to derive
a more readily testable design principle in the next chapter. First, however,
we will consider a concrete example illustrating these predictions.
4.5 Example: The keyboard synthesiser
Whilst the example of Section 4.6 demonstrated how the ES model may be
applied to an interactive sound installation, it may also be applied to other
types of IMS such as a musical instrument. Here, we will provide a simple
example of a keyboard synthesiser. In this example, our participant will be
called Bob and we will assume he is using for the first time a simple keyboard
with a number of unmarked buttons that select different output voices.
Bob has experience of the piano but none of a keyboard synthesiser. Therefore he
begins the interaction with the prior expectation that keys are mapped to pitch in
the familiar manner and that pressing harder leads to louder notes. As he begins
playing, these expectations are met. He then observes some unmarked buttons
on the keyboard. These are exposed inputs; Bob expects them to influence the
keyboard’s output but is uncertain how they will do so. The creates an implication
over these inputs: the expectation that uncertainty will decrease if a specific input
is performed.
The ES model predicts that whilst this implication remains open it creates
anticipation of an increase in Bob’s capacity for action, which makes it more
likely that the interaction will be sustained. In other words, having made this
observation Bob is more likely to continue using the keyboard than had he not.
Now, suppose Bob presses a button but there is no perceivable consequence to
the output of the keyboard. The implication is realised because uncertainty over
inputs involving the button has decreased. However, Bob’s perceived capacity
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for action remains unaltered. We may also propose that Bob’s estimation of the
likelihood of the other buttons also having no perceivable consequence increases.
Whilst this forms a further implication (Bob can easily verify if this hypothesis is
correct), the expected capacity gain arising from the buttons decreases as they
no longer offer the potential to increase the range of outputs he may produce.
Therefore, the ES model predicts that whilst Bob will be engaged whilst exploring
these buttons (and indeed likely driven to try them all to make certain that they
are of no consequence), they will not increase the probability that his interaction
is sustained.
Consider on the other hand a scenario where the button changes the output
sound of the keyboard from a piano to a church organ, an instrument whose
functioning is also familiar to Bob. As he subsequently plays the keyboard the
uncertainty raised when the button was exposed quickly reduces. With this new
sound, how the exposed inputs may now be combined to produce new outputs
creates implications driving Bob to continue exploring. Here, capacity increases
not through the exposure of inputs but through the emergence of structures, and
the expectation that this will continue to happen. The ES model predicts that as
a result of these two conditions, Bob will be more likely both to be engaged and
to sustain the interaction, respectively—the combination of which we defined as
captivation.
At this stage, Bob has formed the expectation that each button on the key-
board will lead to it functioning like a keyboard but sounding like a different fa-
miliar instrument. This creates an implication: Bob expects that by pressing the
untried button followed by a single key on the keyboard, uncertainty over a large
range of inputs—how the remainder of the keys function under that input—will
be reduced. However, on pressing a second button instead of hearing a different
instrumental timbre Bob instead find that the pitch associated with each key now
follows a 19 note equally tempered scale rather than the familiar 12. This is an
example of an implication being denied : the expectation of a decrease in uncer-
tainty has been lost without the decrease being realised. The model predicts that
for Bob to now be engaged by this unfamiliar scale, structures need to emerge
through his ability to predict the output of inputs and so exert reliable control
over the output. If structures are not emerging, the ES model predicts that Bob
is unlikely to be engaged although his interaction is more likely to be sustained
175
if he expects structures to emerge in the future. Alternatively, Bob may find
structures emerging quickly but foresee a limit to the extent to which this will
continue. Here, our model predicts that he will be engaged but his interaction is
unlikely to be sustained—we might imagine the 19 tone scale being written off
as a ‘gimmick’. Finally, suppose that Bob finds no structures emerging and also
does not anticipate any ever emerging. In this case, the model predicts he will
not be engaged and nor will their interaction be sustained.
This example illustrates the wide scope of IMSs that may be considered
by the model, and how it may be used to form predictions based on a hy-
pothetical interaction trajectory. It has also highlighted some of the limits
of the model. The output of the system is considered as a uniform space
leaving no scope for Bob to value some sounds more than others. Likewise,
irrespective of prior knowledge, some types of gestural input may simply be
more pleasing to Bob than others. At present these factors are not consid-
ered with the ES model. However, they remain important considerations for
those designing IMSs and could be incorporated within future developments.
4.6 Exploratory behaviour
Having established in Section 4.4 the need to maintain both anticipated and
realised increases in the participant’s capacity for action, we now consider
how differences in the participant’s behaviour affect these two measures.
A spectrum between horizontal and vertical exploration was described in
Section 4.1.2 as defined by two respective extremes of participants seeking
out the largest number of ‘playing techniques’ and participants seeking to
maximise what they could do with a minimal number of techniques. In
terms of the ES model, horizontal exploration relates to seeking out as many
shallow structures as possible through exposing inputs. Implications remain
open with the possibility of deeper potential structures to be established
over these inputs (and potentially a high encounter entropy too). Vertical
exploration involves neglecting implications to establish deeper structures
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over that which has already been explored. As unexposed inputs have not
been actively sought, we may argue that encounter entropy remains high.
However, we may also argue that finding a great potential in one area of the
input space creates expectation that similar potential is to be found over the
remainder. In terms of the ES model this gives us
Prediction 14 The emergence of deep structures over an area of the input
space creates implications of similarly deep structures over the remainder of
the input space.
As implications anticipate their closure (Prediction 1), Prediction 14 implies
that a participant who limits their exploration to a subset of the exposed
input space establishes high anticipation of capacity gain.
Combining this with Prediction 6 gives us
Prediction 15 A participant who limits their exploration to a small subset
of the exposed input space with potential deep structures will tend to sustain
interaction more than a participant who does not.
What both horizontal and vertical approcahes have in common is that
the participant is that the most easily attained increases in certainty are ne-
glected. Always seeking to close implications and minimise uncertainty, as
suggested by Prediction 2, does not lead to a continuing sense of potential
from the system. This is in line with predictions from the CFD/CFI cate-
gorisation (Section 4.1.3) which suggested that curiosity driven by a feeling
of being deprived specific knowledge (CFD) leads to a sense of closure rather
than further curiosity. From this we may propose
Prediction 16 For a fixed system, participants who seek to close implica-
tions without creating new implications will have a lower anticipation of ca-
pacity gain (i.e. a greater sense of the possibilities being exhausted).
which, given Prediction 5 that anticipated capacity gain sustains interaction,
we may tentatively suggest
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Prediction 17 For a fixed system, participants who prioritise minimising
uncertainty will terminate their interaction more quickly than participants
who prioritise maximising capacity.
and as a result
Prediction 18 For a fixed system, participants who prioritise minimising
uncertainty will terminate their interaction with a lower capacity than par-
ticipants who prioritise maximising capacity.
Predictions 17 and 18 formalises the concern at the beginning of this chapter
that those seeking to ‘figure out’ the system will do so and become bored
without getting a sense of the potential of the system.
Why do these differences in participant behaviour arise? Litman (2010)
argues that tolerance for uncertainty is a personality trait. Rather than
instantly seeking answers, further questions are generated. However, with a
better understanding of how it limits a participant from learning about the
full potential the system offers them we are now in a position to do something
about it.
At present, the predictions remain abstract. In the next chapter, we will
derive a testable design principle from Prediction 15. However, before we do
so, we will demonstrate how the ES model may be applied to understand the
audience experience of the Serendiptichord—as well as a more subtle issue
regarding anticipation that the model presently does not consider.
4.7 Example: The emerging structures of the
Serendiptichord
We argued in Section 3.3.1 that spectating the Serendiptichord was a pro-
cess of vicarious exploration. In this way, the Serendiptichord performance
may be seen as a participant interacting with an IMS but with us controlling
the behaviour of both so as to provide an ‘idealised’ exploration. There-
fore, whilst the ES model is being developed to understand unscripted IMS
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performances, the Serendiptichord performance narrative (Section 3.2.5) is
useful in illustrating how it characterises many of these aspects of an ‘ideal’
interactive music experience.
The Serendiptichord performance provides the audience with no prior
knowledge. Before the instrument even makes an appearance, the dancer
works to create a sense that there is something of interest within the box.
This creates encounter entropy—we in the audience do not have any ideas
of what is going to happen, but we anticipate that something of interest will
happen. The use of the box allows encounter entropy to retained throughout
the performance as it leaves open the possibilities that there are further
physical components yet to be introduced which may then provide unexposed
inputs.
The first inputs that are provided are simple movements to demonstrate
that there is a mapping to perceive. It is necessary to be explicit here to due
to the context. This creates implications that there are structures to emerge
about how movement creates sound. These implications are realised as the
dancer explores simple movements with the pod.
As the second pod is removed from the box, encounter entropy is main-
tained (or possibly increased) by the reinforced possibility that further parts
of the instrument are to be introduced. The second pod is a mirror image of
the first one creating an expectation that it will behave the same. However,
as it is yet to do so this remains an implication. When the dancer shakes it in
a similar manner as she did the first, nothing is heard and so this implication
is not realised but remains open.
This surprise will have increased uncertainty in the perceived mapping
creating a sense of tension—not only is the implication being sustained but
the audience’s expectation of a successful outcome (i.e. an increase in the
dancer’s capacity for action) has decreased. This tension is resolved and the
implication realised when the two pods are used together and the greater
structure emerges that the modules of the instrument interact in how they
produce an output.
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Throughout all of this, many of the finer details of the perceived map-
ping have remained unclear and the question of to what extent the dancer
(and thus we) are really controlling the instrument remains only partially
answered. Uncertainty over this issue is uncertainty over the entire exposed
input space. Therefore it is a limitation of the dancer’s capacity to act and
anticipation of its answer is an implication. This (in my opinion) is realised
when the trunk of the headpiece appears on the stage with its direct and
reactive mapping.
We should point out that the ES model has been strongly informed by
reflecting on the Serendiptichord so the above description is not really a
validation but rather an illustration of how it may serve to understand the
way in which musical interaction may construct a work in itself.
There is considerably more to the experience of spectating the Serendip-
tichord than is captured by the above analysis. We are not proposing that
the model is a means to evaluate the success of a work. Rather, as we will
demonstrate in the next chapter, we intend it to provide insight into one way
in which a system may be designed to create a captivating experience.
4.8 The difficulty with interactivity
Thus far we have identified the need of a system to ensure the participants are
expecting and attaining further gains in their capacity for action. However,
the description of the Serendiptichord narrative has demonstrated a more
subtle issue relating to anticipation—that of delayed gratification.
The participants of a non-expert IMS are presumably not trained com-
posers. Pearce and Wiggins (2002) present a model of composing that in-
volves creating a conceptual model of a listener’s perception around which
appropriate degree of expectedness, ambiguity and surprise may be crafted.
To do so, the composition task is transformed from being ill-defined into
being well-defined by establishing specific constraints within which to work
(Pearce and Wiggins 2002). As composers become more experienced they
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are able to pay more consideration to the greater structure of their work,
managing constraints at both the local and global level (Colley et al. 1992).
Establishing a constraint across a work provides a redundancy within the
work which is a potential structure. With interactive music, the ‘composer’
is the listener. We cannot particularly imagine them able to manage their
own expectations and plan themselves surprises.2
Recall the argument from Huron’s ITPRA model (2006, see also Sec-
tion 2.4.3) that sustained expectation heightens arousal, amplifying the emo-
tional response of its conclusion. We may therefore propose
Prediction 19 The longer the anticipation of an equivalent increase in ca-
pacity, the more engaging it will be when it appears.
This suggests that it is not enough to ensure the participant retains an an-
ticipation of capacity gain but that specific implications are sustained over
time.
Sustaining anticipation is key to establishing patterns of tension and re-
lease within music. Whether or not the participant is aiming to minimise
uncertainty or maximise capacity, the kind of delayed gratification that lies at
the root establishing anticipation is unlikely to play a part. Even if the partic-
ipant did explore until they had a maximal mental model of the system, per-
formance is quite different from demonstration. We could have demonstrated
the Serendiptichord in less than a minute. Instead we drew it out, raising
questions and delaying their answers and thus heightening the arousal—i.e.
excitement—of their arrival. We may thus propose
Prediction 20 A participant will be more engaged by a system if implica-
tions are sustained, i.e. the closure of implications are delayed.
With an interactive system, the user holds both the questions and the
means to answer them. There is little reason to expect them to delay their
2We are conflating the act of composing with that of improvising here. However,
improvisation is as much a skill as composing requiring an intimate familiarity with both
instrument and the style of music we are performing (Johnson-Laird 1988; Nachmanovitch
1990).
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discovery any longer than necessary. Thus, as well as providing steadily
paced emergence of structures, an IMS needs to establish establish sustained
anticipation, i.e. implications of structures regarding specific inputs but with-
out an immediately available answer. This provides us with a more readily
applicable consequence of Prediction 20:
Prediction 21 A participant will be more engaged by a system if they are
made aware of inputs that will only be performable in the future.
In addition to Prediction 15, this will form a part of the design principle we
test in the next chapter.
4.9 Discussion
The Emerging Structures (ES) model describes the process taken by an in-
dividual exploring an IMS for the first time, focusing on aspects of an ex-
perience that arise through an increasing capacity to act. As mentioned fol-
lowing the example of Section 4.5, there most certainly will be other factors
and processes involved in making a captivating interactive music experience.
However, building on theories of musical appreciation and exploratory play,
we have argued in this chapter that this process of forming an understanding
of how a system works and how a participant may act through that system
is a fundamental determinant of the participant’s enjoyment. The predic-
tions of Section 4.4 form a necessary precondition rather than a complete
and sufficient formula.
The requirements identified by the model remain general. As such we
have not specified any objective requirements of which IMSs it may be appli-
cable to beyond the general definition provided in Section 2.2.3. One might
question whether it is too general; for example, would it identify a funda-
mental difference between the two different experiences of interacting with
an IMS and that of participating in an audience of a (not very good) human
band? Whilst the ES model does not analyse what distinguishes these two
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experiences, it does not ignore the fact that such crucial distinctions will
exist. The learning processes described within the model are defined with
respect to both the prior knowledge of the participant and their cognitive
abilities. Not only will an individual approaching either of these two expe-
riences establish wildly different expectations about how the ‘system’ will
behave; they will have differing mental faculties to draw upon in trying to
understand them.
As a result, the analytical and predictive strength of the model is reliant
upon the extent to which prior expectations and cognitive ability may be
estimated and generalised across the participants of interest. In the sound
installation example of Section 4.3 and the Serendiptichord example of Sec-
tion 4.7 we were able to do so by considering IMSs that may be assumed to
be completely unfamiliar to a typical participant. In the keyboard example
of Section 4.5, we considered an IMS likely to be familiar to most participants
but proposed a participant with specific (and unlikely) prior expectations.
The processes described by the model remain important in scenarios where
prior expectations or cognitive ability cannot be reasonably assumed, how-
ever forming specific predictions in these scenarios is unlikely to be practical.
We have been able to reason about such a broad range of IMSs by consid-
ering a participant’s understanding of the system in terms of mapping. As
we saw in Section 2.2.7, concerns have been raised that analysing IMSs en-
tirely in terms of mapping may be too reductionist. However, the perceived
mapping that we are considering is not simply a pairing of input signals to
output signals, but a probability distribution predicting the output of a sys-
tem in response to the inputs a participant is aware of (see Section 4.2.1).
This distribution, as well as what may be considered an input or an output,
is defined by the participant’s mental model.
Whilst the ES model does not specifically model complex musical thoughts,
arising from either participant or IMS, it places no limitations on the repre-
sentations that may form the participant’s mental model or their complexity.
Rather, it rests on the assumption that these representations exist, that they
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allow the participant to reduce their uncertainty over the output of the sys-
tem given the inputs that they know, and that they develop over the course
of an interaction based on the behaviour of the system as perceived by the
participant in conjunction with their existing knowledge. As the perceived
behaviour may be considered simply as concurrent sequences of inputs and
outputs, the perceived mapping—a probability distribution over a space of
outputs conditioned over a space of inputs—is the common medium through
which a mental model is tested and improved. For this reason it remains the
most suitable terms in which to define the model.
4.9.1 Quantifying Emerging Structures
Whilst defining the ES model in terms of subjective attributes is in line
with the experience-oriented approach described in Section 1.3, quantifying
the predictive power of the model is made more difficult as a result. How-
ever, the model is strongly rooted in ideas from information theory and its
application as discussed in Section 2.4.3. This provides the possibility of cre-
ating a computational approximation of the model. For example, we could
model the exploratory behaviour of a participant using machine learning tools
from which we may estimate uncertainty, encounter entropy, implications (ex-
pected decreases in uncertainty), capacity for action (channel capacity). In
this thesis, such an approach is left as future work (see Section 10.1.4).
4.10 Conclusion
In this section I have presented a new model of how a participant explores an
Interactive Music System (IMS) for the first time: the Emerging Structures
(ES) model. The ES model provides a common language that unites theories
of exploratory behaviour in interactive art (Section 4.1) and those of musical
perception (Section 2.4.3) to understand better the experience of interactive
music. This has allowed a number of predictions to be made about how the
behaviour of participant and system affect the participant’s experience. We
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will be drawing on a selection of these as we progress in this thesis.
In the expectation-based models of Section 2.4.3, listening is motivated
by our perceived potential to increase our ability to predict our environment.
Here, exploration is motivated by our perceived potential to increase our
ability to predictably manipulate our environment. With interactive music,
we are doing as well as listening. We have argued that as well as involving
unconscious learning, participating with an IMS is a more conscious process
than non-interactive. In contrast with the aforementioned models, receiv-
ing continuous information from an IMS requires conscious involvement and
decision making from the participant. Therefore we have placed a greater
emphasis on understanding what motivates us to continue to be active in
exploring such a system. In line with this, we have identified the perceived
potential to improve our capacity to act, either through exposing new inputs
or increasing our certainty over those that have been exposed. However,
whilst interacting with a system may be a more conscious activity than sim-
ply listening to music, unconscious expectations remain important. We saw
this in Chapter 2 with the prevalence of embodied knowledge (Section 2.2.6)
and perhaps more dramatically with an increase in task performance with
more complex mappings (Section 2.2.7). What was more complex to reason
about was not necessarily more complex to control.
Placing the participant in control has raised unique difficulties not found
in non-interactive media. As well as the potential for the participant not
to discover aspects of the system, the composer no longer has the means to
delay this discovery. This limits the potential to sustain specific anticipations
and their potential to increase the pleasure of a resolution through focusing
attention and heightening arousal (see Section 2.4.3).
The model presented here has allowed us to form the prediction that an
interactive music experience will be made captivating through continually
increasing the participant’s perceived capacity for action and maintaining
their expectation that further increases will emerge. Whilst we suggest that
this is a difficult prediction to test directly, we have proposed that a system
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may be made more captivating if it encourages more vertical exploration—
that is, if it leads to participants focusing on a subset of the input space in
a way that maintains implications over the remainder of the exposed inputs.
In the next chapter, we will derive a practical and general-purpose design
principle from this and put it to the test.
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Chapter 5
Emerging structures in practice
In this chapter I apply the abstract predictions of Chapter 4 to derive a sim-
ple design in which subsets of the input space are initially unperformable
but gradually ‘unlock’ over the course of the participant’s interaction. I im-
plement this within a pair of simple Interactive Music Systems (IMSs) that
provides control over a generative rhythmic loop system and evaluate it in a
controlled user study. No significant effects are found. Through an analysis
of the interaction logs and an informal analysis of additional qualitative data
that was collected I argue that the lack of significance was down to differ-
ent expectations among participants of what is an appropriate design for an
IMS. In particular, a number of participants suggested that the manner in
which constraints were implemented appeared ‘unjustified’. This leads us to
conclude that better tools are needed in order to reason about how participant
expectations interact with how an IMS is perceived.
In the previous chapter I introduced an abstract model of how a participant
explores a system, what engages them and what motivates them to continue.
The model gave rise to a number of predictions. In this chapter, I derive
from a number of these predictions a general design principle which we call
incremental constraint unlocking.
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5.1 Incremental constraint unlocking
We will be working primarily to apply the following two predictions from
Chapter 4.
Prediction 15. A participant who limits their exploration to a small subset
of the exposed input space with potential deep structures will tend to
sustain interaction more than a participant who does not.
Prediction 20. A participant will be more engaged by a system if they are
made aware of inputs that will only be performable in the future.
Recall also that we defined a captivating interaction as one that was both
sustaining and engaging (Section 4.4.4).
These two predictions are complementary and suggest that we will in-
crease the chances of creating a captivating experience if we
1. Constrain the performable inputs to a subset,
2. Create implications of the remainder of defined inputs, and
3. Make the participant expectant that they will become available in the
future.
In effect the proposal is that by constraining the inputs that the par-
ticipants may access they will explore with more focus, which will increase
their perception of the system’s potential. This will establish anticipation of
realising this potential on the remainder of the input space when it becomes
available, which will both enhance their appreciation of this functionality
when it arrives and keep them engaged in the meantime.
Note, however, that these inputs do have to become available at some
point. Not only is the participant unlikely to sustain their anticipation if the
system never delivers the functionality they are expecting, but there is also a
limit the potential depth that they are likely to perceive over the input space
that is available.
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Therefore, the approach we shall take is to construct a large system map-
ping but constrain the inputs the participant may perform to a small subset
early on. Gradually through the course of their interaction, further inputs
will become performable and so the size of this subset will grow.
Limiting the user to a enlarging subset of our interaction space is equiv-
alent to restricting them from a diminishing subset. We will refer to the
points within the restricted set as constraints, and the event where a point
is removed from the set of constraints as unlocking. Through a process of in-
cremental unlocking new inputs become available and hence potential struc-
tures.
However, the above points 2 and 3 require the locked inputs to be exposed
and expectation of their unlocking established. Rather than hiding any feed-
back relating to unperformable inputs from the interface, their functionality
and unavailability needs to be communicated.
5.1.1 Relationship with videogames
Incremental constraint unlocking is similar to the notion of levels in video-
games. We reviewed music games in Section 2.2.5 but it is worth highlighting
here how the vision of interactive music described over the previous two
chapters compares with that of a game.
Games are a consumed experience. Although a player may take pride
in their own mastery of a game, at no point is the player expected to take
responsibility and ‘use the game’ as a means to help them have fun. The game
is simply the source of the fun. In contrast, whilst a musical instrument may
facilitate musical expression, it is not supposed to be its origin (Jorda` 2004).
Interactive music is also a consumed experience. Although we will likely wish
to provide our user with a degree of creative freedom, responsibility for the
quality of experience ultimately lies with the system.
We have observed that unrestrained exploration can make for a less en-
joyable interactive music experience. Similar observations have been made
of videogames (e.g. Clanton 1998; Rollings and Adams 2003). As with in-
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teractive music, efficiency is not the aim of the game designer. There is a
need to establish anticipation: sustained expectations of both surprises and
affirmations. However, a fundamental difference arises between games and
interactive music with regards as to how this is done.
In games implications are sustained through setting challenges that the
player must overcome through application of their mental model. Progress is
determined by the player’s performance allowing the emergence of structures
to be paced according to their abilities. Having clear goals and reliable
objective indicators of their accomplishment is an important criteria of good
game design (Clanton 1998; Murphy et al. 2011). Even when the player does
not know what they must do to advance within a game, there is still a clear
challenge created by the implicit goal—find out what to do!
But with interactive music, goals are created by the participant rather
than the designer. Indeed, we saw in the previous chapter that even inter-
preting there to be a goal of ‘working out’ the system may detract from a
participant’s experience. Our goals are often implicit and subjective: create
a desirable musical outcome, explore the system, have an immersive experi-
ence. To some extent we may devise objective indicators of some of these
(e.g. the proportion of potential inputs that have been received) but we then
risk the possibility of establishing objectively-defined goals of ‘overcoming’
the system and our participant adapting their behaviour to fit within its
(inevitably) imperfect indicators.
5.1.2 Timing
The question of when we unlock the constraints remains unanswered. Predic-
tion 10 proposed that the participant will be more engaged if structures are
continually emerging. This suggests that the optimal moment to unlock the
constraints are at the point when the rate at which uncertainty is decreasing
drops below a threshold. However, structures exist in the participant’s men-
tal model so we are unable to determine when this is. We could attempt to
estimate it through defining some objective indicator over their behaviour,
190
but as we saw in Section 5.1.1, this then runs the risk of establishing an
objective goal that the participant seeks to satisfy as opposed to maximising
their capacity for action.
For these reasons, we will leave the question open and, for now at least,
opt for a simple timer-based solution. In Chapter 7, I will propose a more
refined approach.
5.1.3 Summary
Incremental constraint unlocking
The input space is partitioned into two sets: ‘constrained’ and ‘uncon-
strained’. Constrained inputs are unperformable. At regular moments
through the interaction, constrained inputs are unlocked—i.e. removed
from the constrained set into the unconstrained set.
The interface is constructed to create implications of the output asso-
ciated with constrained inputs, as well as establishing expectation in the
participant that the constrained inputs will become unlocked.
5.2 Evaluation criteria
There are a number of aspects of a participant’s experience that may be af-
fected by the design principle. These were chosen to be those most frequently
sought within the NIME community. They are as follows.
Transparency (T) is how intuitive the connection between the input and
output of the system feels to the participant (Section 2.2.10). In terms
of emerging structures (Section 4.2) we may see this as the average
degree of certainty within the participant’s perceived mapping over the
course of the interaction.
Learnability (L) is how quickly the user feels they are learning to use the
system (Section 2.2.12). We may see this as an estimation of the average
rate at which structures emerged.
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Diversity (D) is the perceived range of potential musical outputs of the
system (Section 2.2.11), which we may associate with their belief of
the potential capacity of the system.
Autonomy (A) is the extent to which the participant feels that they are
responsible for the output of the system.
Quality of output (Q) is the participant’s opinion of how good the music
produced during their use of the system is.
Fun (F) is how much the participant enjoys using the system.
Engagement (E) is how focused and interested the participant is while
using the system.
Therefore, drawing on our proposals of Chapter 4, we predict the following
effects.
• Transparency, Engagement are the key criteria in which we would ex-
pect to see an increase.
• Learnability we would also expect to see an increase in given the argu-
ment that vertical exploration promotes deeper exploration (see Sec-
tion 4.6).
• Fun and Quality of output we might tentatively hope for an increase,
drawing on our observations of investigative and diversive exploration
(Section 4.1.1) and the problem of anticipation within interactive sys-
tems (Section 4.8) respectively.
• Diversity and Autonomy are two topics which we feel may be affected by
our design principle. Although incremental constraint unlocking quite
clearly reduces the objective diversity of outputs and the control granted
participants, we do not know whether the participant will perceive as
such.
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The above measurements are clearly not independent. For example, we
would expect transparency and learnability to be related. We will investigate
correlations between our hypotheses in Section 5.5.1.
5.3 Method
5.3.1 Methodological issues
Empirical evaluation of such a design principle presents a particular chal-
lenge. When measuring factors such as transparency, learnability and en-
gagement, we would expect a user’s experience to vary with repeated use
of the software leading to a unacceptably large ordering effect. This would
suggest a study design of non-repeated measures is necessary to prevent an
ordering effect between the two conditions.1 However, due to individual dif-
ferences among participants’ taste and technical background a large amount
variation is to be expected among how participants respond to musical stim-
ulus as well as software requiring a creative input. This high variance means
that within a non-repeated measures design, a substantial number of partic-
ipants would be needed to achieve significance. For example, Gonzales et al.
(2009) found a sound installation was significantly more enjoyable with an
interactive component than without (p < 0.01) in a non-repeated measures
study which recruited 142 participants. As the difference between our two
conditions is not quite as dramatic as adding or removing interaction, we
may anticipate that in our case effects would be less consistent, requiring
more participants than this. Such a large number of participants was not
practical at this stage in the research.
With a repeated measures design, variance within the sample is less of
a problem as we are only comparing each individual’s change in response.
Therefore, this design was chosen. However, in order to address the above
1Under a non-repeated measures design, each participant is recorded under a single
condition with data compared between subjects. In a repeated measures design, data is
collected from a participant under all conditions and compared within subjects.
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concerns regarding ordering, the following specialised study design was cre-
ated in collaboration with Prof. Rosemary Bailey, a statistician with exper-
tise in designing experiments that compare qualitative treatments on difficult
to measure effects (Bailey 2008).
5.3.2 Study design
Two interactive music systems, α and β (described below), were developed
to be as similar as possible in functionality whilst being different enough in
design to minimise the effect that using one would have on a subsequent
experience of the other. Participants would then experience one system with
incremental constraint unlocking (condition A), and one without (condition
B). In order to be able to measure and mitigate any ordering effect, as well
as any bias caused by differences between the systems, each combination
and ordering of conditions and systems was used. That is, system α under
condition A followed by system β under condition B; αB followed by βA;
βA followed by αB; and βB followed by αA. For brevity, we will refer to a
system with incremental constraint unlocking as a constrained system.
Any effects as described by the hypotheses were measured by means of a
questionnaire, described below.
Prior to using each system, participants were given a brief overview
demonstrating which interactions were available within the interface (i.e.
which interface elements were buttons and what could be dragged). The ef-
fects of these actions were not explained beyond the fact that nothing would
be heard until an ‘on’ button was pressed and the functionality of the ‘snap-
shot’ feature (explained below). In order to limit the possibility that par-
ticipants thought that the constrained system was functioning incorrectly,
where a system was constrained this fact was explained during the overview.
Following both conditions, participants were given the questionnaire to fill
out, followed by a short structured interview.
Further data was collected by the system which logged all interactions
including mouse movements and button presses and releases.
194
5.3.3 Participants
Twenty-four participants were recruited for the study via a department-wide
email. They were paid £7.50 for approximately an hour’s involvement. Most
were students within the university’s School of Electronic Engineering and
Computer Science.
A pilot study indicated that the musical experience of participants may
affect the efficacy of constraint unlocking so this was also included as a con-
trolled factor. Participants were recruited via email and asked to answer
a number of multiple choice questions regarding their musical experience,
which was used to provide each with a musical score (see Appendix B.1).
Potential participants were then divided into two near equally sized groups
of musically experienced and musically inexperienced. An equal number was
selected from each, who were then randomly allocated into four equally sized
groups corresponding to the four system/condition combinations described
above.
5.3.4 Questionnaire
To avoid the inconsistency that may arise with self-reported quantitative
data (e.g. the Likert scale (Jamieson 2004)), participants were asked only
to provide comparisons between the sessions. The questionnaire presented
a series of statements, for each of which the participant was asked to select
whether the statement most applied to the first session or second session as
well as provide a brief explanation. For each hypothesis, four statements
were included—two worded positively and two negatively giving 28 in total.
Each statement could either support or oppose its respective hypothesis (or
be left blank) giving an integer score between −4 and +4 which was then
scaled to the range [−1, 1]. Although only providing nine possible values
for each hypothesis, this method provides interval data allowing parametric
significance tests to be used.
A list of the statements alongside their respective hypotheses is provided
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in Appendix B.2.
5.3.5 Interviews
The short structured interview was intended to allow participants to respond
more openly to the answers they provided in the questionnaire, as well as
to reveal the purpose of the study and probe their opinions of incremental
constraint unlocking more specifically.
The following questions were asked in the interview:
• Which session did you prefer?
• Why was that?
• In which session did you put more effort into creating a musical struc-
ture?
• In the first/second session the interface was constrained initially. How
did this affect your experience?
• Did you feel a sense of anticipation for the locked features?
• Did the unlocking give your piece more structure?
5.3.6 Two interactive music systems
In order to achieve the aim of creating systems that had similar functionality
whilst being different to use, two interfaces were developed that both con-
trolled a common underlying generative algorithm: the Manhattan Rhythm
Machine (MRM), which was then used to control two different sets of MIDI
instruments. The MRM is a deterministic and continuous mapping from
four-dimensional space to a monophonic rhythm with varying note veloci-
ties. These four dimensions were named based on their effect on the output
as number of notes, edginess, compression and volume. A further
discrete parameter controlled the length of these sequences (either 4, 8, 16
or 32 semiquavers).
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The algorithm was used to control five instruments: hi-hat, snare hit,
snare rim-shot, kick drum and a bass synth following a simple sequence of
pitch values. At the start of each session, each instrument was initialised to
a distinct state that was standardised across all sessions. Each instrument
could be switched on or off and the state of the entire system could be saved
or loaded into six ‘snapshot’ slots.
The same set of constraints were used in both interfaces. Denoting the
continuous parameters of each instrument as (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ [0, 1]4, then
these were as follows.
• The bass synth is disabled and for all instruments x1 and x3 are locked
to their original (instrument-specific) value until bar 33.
• The snare drum is locked and for all instruments sequence lengths are
fixed to their original value, x1 is restricted to values within 0.3 of its
original value until bar 65.
• For all instruments the value of x1 is restricted to values within 0.7 of
its original value until bar 97.
When incremental constraint unlocking were in operation, a message was
shown for eight bars prior to an unlocking informing the participant of what
was going to be unlocked, and eight bars following an unlocking informing
them of what had been unlocked. The interfaces were both designed to
make it clear when items were locked showing either the word ‘LOCKED’
or a picture of a padlock over the relevant feature. Figure 5.1 shows both
interfaces used with and without constraint unlocking.
Participants were given seven minutes (208 bars) to use each interface.
For the final 30 seconds of each session a message was displayed asking them
to wrap up their piece of music.
5.3.7 Log file analysis
The log file for each session was analysed to determine the rate at which it
was explored. Two quantitative measures were created.
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(a) Interface α without constraint unlocking. (b) Interface α with constraint unlocking.
(c) Interface β without constraint unlocking. (d) Interface β with constraint unlocking.
Figure 5.1: The two interfaces used within the study shown
under both experimental conditions.
Duration until maximal feature set used
For the first we considered the point at which a maximal set of ‘features’
were used by the participant. The following were identified as features.
1. Turning on an instrument (one feature for each instrument),
2. Modifying the (individually controlled) x3 or x4 parameter of any in-
strument by 0.1 or greater2 (two features),
3. Changing the sequence length of any instrument (one feature),
4. Moving any instrument within one of the four quadrants of the two-
dimensional space defined by x1 and x2 (as these parameters are always
controlled by a two-dimensional slider) (one feature for each quadrant),
5. Saving and loading a snapshot (two features).
Not all features as defined above were used in every session. Therefore we
considered the length of time until a maximal set of features was used, i.e.
the point when all features that were going to be used, were used.
Time spent in novel states
Considering the state space of the system as a multi-dimensional vector space,
we may then consider how participants explored it by analysing their path
through this vector space.
With five instruments, each with four continuous parameters and two
discrete parameters, the space of the system may be represented by a 30-
dimensional vector, with 20 components varying continuously in [0, 1], five
components (on/off switches) varying in {0, 1} and five components (sequence
lengths) varying in {4, 8, 16, 32}. With continuous parameters, it is unlikely
2Recall that our continuous parameters are all defined over the range [0, 1].
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that many states will be occur more than once3 but by quantising the con-
tinuous parameters we may gauge how long participants are spending within
a particular area of the state space. Lengthier stays would suggest a deeper
and more focused exploration.
Each continuous parameter was quantised into four bins giving a space
with a total of 255 discrete states. State vectors were then recorded at mo-
ments where the (underlying continuous) state changed alongside the time
spent in that state.
We define a quantised state as being novel if it has not been visited
before. From this we may consider what proportion of time is spent in novel
states, and what proportion in states that had been previously visited (after
quantisation). We refer to this measure as the time spent in novel states.
5.4 Hypotheses
Seven hypotheses corresponding to the above evaluation criteria (Section 5.2)
were tested in this study: Participants using a system with incremental con-
straint unlocking implemented will perceive
(T) an increase in transparency,
(L) an increase in learnability,
(D) a change in diversity,
(A) a change in autonomy,
(Q) an increase in quality of output,
(F) an increase in fun,
(E) an increase in engagement.
3Technically in a continuous space we would expect the probability of the same state
occurring more than once to be zero. However, as our input was determined by the pixel
position of the mouse cursor on the screen, the parameters are only a discrete approxima-
tion of continuous state and hence repetition is possible.
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Each statement the participant responds to in the questionnaire ranks the
sessions. We have an equal number of positive and negative statements for
each hypothesis. Therefore under the null hypothesis for each of the above
alternative hypotheses we would expect a score of zero.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Quantitative data
Overview
All measurements taken as described in Section 5.3.4 were scaled to the range
[−1, 1]. Table 5.1 shows the unpartitioned results recorded.
Table 5.1: An overview of the questionnaire data without
any partitioning of participants. Note that as each datapoint
could only take nine possible values, some numbers are iden-
tical.
Hypothesis Min Max Mean
Standard
deviation
Transparency -1. 1. -0.042 0.77
Learnability -1. 0.75 -0.010 0.48
Diversity -1. 1. -0.10 0.57
Autonomy -1. 1. -0.10 0.67
Quality -1. 1. -0.10 0.80
Fun -1. 1. -0.042 0.71
Engagement -1. 1. -0.042 0.62
The mean of each measurement is shown in Figure 5.2 with a 95 per
cent confidence interval calculated using a one-sampled t-test. This simple
overview gives a sense of the variance of the data but does not take into
consideration the other controlled factors as the ANOVA does below.
201
Five participants (all in the non-experienced group) recorded a negative
score for the constrained system on all seven measurements. One (also in the
non-experienced group) recorded a positive score on all seven measurements.
Figure 5.2: The mean value recorded in the questionnaires
for each hypothesis, shown with a 95 per cent confidence in-
terval. The value of zero is expected by the corresponding
null hypotheses.
ANOVA of questionnaire data
The questionnaire data collected from participants was analysed using a
first-order ANOVA,4 which considered the effect of the dependent variable
4ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA) is a statistical test that determines the likelihood
of two samples being drawn from the same population by considering how much their
variances differ from each other.
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(whether or not the system was constrained) and the other controlled fac-
tors (the order in which the dependent variable was presented to the partic-
ipant, which interface was used in the constrained condition and whether or
not the participant was in the musically experienced group). No significant
results were found at p < 0.05.
Following this, a second order ANOVA was used, which also considered
interactions between the controlled factors (e.g. whether experienced partic-
ipants were more likely to show an ordering effect). No significant results
were found at p < 0.05. Table 5.2 shows the F-ratios and p values found in
this analysis.
Typically, we may interpret an F-ratio above 1 as indicating that with
an increased number of participants we may well find a significant result. As
can be seen, for our main experimental condition, constrained, none of the
F-ratios are above 1 suggesting that the number of participants is unlikely
to have been the cause for this lack of significance.
Relationships between the hypotheses
As observed in Section 5.2, there are likely to be dependencies between the
hypotheses. Identifying these provide a useful means to consider the trade-
offs and mutual dependence of different design decisions that may be taken
when building such a system. A correlation matrix showing the Pearson
correlation coefficient between each pair of hypotheses is shown in Figure 5.3.
Transparency and Learnability are highly correlated as would be ex-
pected. Most of the remaining hypotheses show a moderate correlation,
with the exception of Diversity with Transparency and Learnability which
is to be expected as the greater the range of outputs, the more complex a
system is to learn.
It is of interest that the relationship between Fun and Diversity is con-
siderably stronger than that between Fun and Learnability, indicating that
the anticipated capacity of the system perceived by a participant may be
more important to their enjoyment than the rate they felt able to attain
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Table 5.2: Results of a second order ANOVA over the ques-
tionnaire data.
Hypothesis Factor F-ratio p Hypothesis Factor F-ratio p
Transparency
constrained 0.067 0.80
Learnability
constrained 0.0095 0.92
interface 1.7 0.21 interface 1.6 0.22
order 0.067 0.80 order 0.24 0.63
experience 2.4 0.14 experience 0.47 0.50
interface & order 0.60 0.45 interface & order 0.77 0.39
order & experience 0.067 0.80 order & experience 0.0095 0.92
interface & experience 1.1 0.31 interface & experience 0.24 0.63
Diversity
constrained 0.87 0.36
Autonomy
constrained 0.50 0.49
interface 2.2 0.15 interface 0.079 0.78
order 0.31 0.58 order 0.18 0.68
experience 0.31 0.58 experience 0.32 0.58
interface & order 3.5 0.79 interface & order 0.32 0.58
order & experience 0.31 0.58 order & experience 0.71 0.41
interface & experience 2.2 0.15 interface & experience 1.6 0.22
Quality
constrained 0.33 0.58
Fun
constrained 0.085 0.77
interface 0.64 0.44 interface 0.34 0.57
order 1.1 0.32 order 2.1 0.16
experience 0.33 0.58 experience 0.085 0.77
interface & order 0.18 0.74 interface & order 0.34 0.57
order & experience 0.18 0.74 order & experience 0.34 0.57
interface & experience 0.18 0.74 interface & experience 4.2 0.057
Engagement
constrained 0.0095 0.92
interface 1.6 0.22
order 0.24 0.63
experience 0.47 0.50
interface & order 0.77 0.39
order & experience 0.0095 0.92
interface & experience 0.24 0.63
Transparency (T)
Learnability (L)
Diversity (D)
Autonomy (A)
Quality (Q)
Fun (F)
Engagement (E)
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Figure 5.3: The correlation coefficient between each pair of
hypotheses.
it. The opposite trend is shown when comparing Engagement to Diversity
and Learnability. This offers mild support for our prediction that it is re-
alised rather than anticipated capacity gain that makes interaction engaging
(Section 4.4.3).
Principal Component Analysis
7
7
Figure 5.4: The questionnaire data projected onto its princi-
pal components and the proportion of the variance explained
by each principal component.
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As we saw in Section 5.5.1, the data collected had a large degree of vari-
ance. Whilst looking at correlations between our hypotheses measurements
is of interest to see how different factors relate, it is useful to get a feel for
how they combine to create this variance. A principal component analysis
(PCA) was performed to identify the likely number of independent dimen-
sions within the questionnaire data. The result of this analysis is shown in
Figure 5.4. Recall that the questionnaires measured how far an aspect of
user experienced changed between the conditions. The principal components
are best understood as aspects of the individual participants that affected
their response to constraint unlocking.
With 89 per cent of the variance explained by the first two principal
components, it is reasonable to assume that the underlying variable we are
measuring is two-dimensional with the remainder of the variance caused by
measurement error. Figure 5.5 shows how much of each hypothesis measure-
ment makes up these first two principal components. From this, we see that
the first component, representing the majority of the variance, appears to be
a general ‘goodness’ score that affects each aspect of our evaluation criteria
in a consistent way. Thus, we may interpret 62 per cent of our variance as
originating from an unexplained trait among our participants that influence
how well participants respond overall to a constrained system.
The second dimension indicates that a trait may determine the extent
to which a participant’s answers demonstrated a tradeoff between Trans-
parency/Learnability and Diversity/Fun. Seventeen per cent of the variance
is explained by how participants responded to this conflict but, interestingly,
Autonomy, Quality and Engagement did not seem to be affected by it. A
second order ANOVA on the projected data found that which interface was
constrained had a significant effect (p < 0.05, F = 4.46, df = 17, 1) on
how participants responded within this second component with those higher
responses from those for whom β was constrained.
An F-Test found that the musical experience of a participant had a sig-
nificant effect on how they responded within the first principal component
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Figure 5.5: The transformation matrix mapping the ques-
tionnaire data to the first two principal components. Note
that the overall sign of each row of the matrix is arbitrary.
(p < 0.05, F = 2.94, df = 11, 11).
5.5.2 Qualitative data
Qualitative data was collected in this study both through the interview as
well as space provided by each statement asking participants to explain their
choice. Participants provided answers for 60 per cent of the statements.
This data was analysed informally in order to better understand the
causes behind the quantitative results of the study.
Selected questionnaire explanations
We will select here a few explanations to explore further how a few individuals
responded to constraint unlocking. We will consider the participants who
responded in the extreme ends of the spectrum as well as a participant from
the middle. Participants are referred to by the letter P and the number they
were assigned in the study.
P24 who used β constrained followed by α unconstrained, responded the
least positively to the constrained system, giving the unconstrained system
a higher score on the evaluation criteria 89 per cent of the time. The most
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prominent theme in their explanations is the simplicity of second system.
Regarding the first these included: ‘was not getting the desired settings due
to the complexity,’ ‘too many different windows made it complex.’ Regarding
the second: ‘single structure, not too many complications,’ ‘it was easy to
use and has more options.’
P40 (α unconstrained then β constrained) responded the most positively
to the constrained system, giving it a higher score 96 per cent of the time.
Their explanations mainly refer to the range of options available. Referring
to the second session, these included ‘more options regarding mixing were
available and minute things could be changed,’ it ‘was according to my taste,’
it had ‘a good broad range.’ Referring to the first session their comments
included ‘could not understand initially how everything is working.’
P23 (α unconstrained then β constrained) gave the constrained system a
higher score 50 per cent of the time, which is very close to the median. In
general, their explanations focus on differences between the interfaces with
β’s more conventional view aiding transparency (‘more of a channel strip
approach which I am used to’) but being less engaging (‘The look is familiar
so less concentration was needed’) whilst commenting on the novelty of α
(‘More interesting than B’). However, they did refer to constraint unlocking
as having a positive impact on one engagement statement: ‘Being forced to
deal with only 2 instruments at a time helped me to focus.’
Following the above observation that the second principal component of
our data seems to show a response to the Transparency/Diversity trade-off,
it is of interest to see the explanations that participants at the extremes of
this measure gave.
P04 (α constrained then β unconstrained) gave the lowest response on this
component indicating that they perceived higher Diversity/Fun and lower
Transparency/Learnability with the constrained system. They responded
slightly in favour of constraints, rating that system more favourably 61 per
cent of the time. Their explanations refer a number of times to the effect of
the constraints on their exploration of the first system: ‘having things unlock
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throughout made me explore each one more,’ ‘the nature of the first inter-
face encourages playful exploration,’ ‘I didn’t feel like I’d exhausted all the
possibilities, ‘fun to figure out.’ That the second system was unconstrained
did not seem to hinder its ease of use (‘I probably had more control’), but
did seem to decrease its perceived diversity: ‘It wasn’t long before I felt I was
just going round in circles.’ Although their explanations suggest a positive
experience with the constrained system as it encouraged a deeper (and ini-
tially narrower) exploration, overall they reported it as slightly less involving
as they were ‘sort of waiting for things to become available.’
P15 (β constrained then α unconstrained), who responded positively to
the constrained system 34 per cent of the time gave the highest response
on this component. Again, most statements referred to the diversity of the
systems: the second had ‘a greater variety of sounds,’ ‘more scope for varia-
tion,’ ‘more surprises’ and was ‘more interesting.’ Again, lower learnability
and transparency was not a problem: they enjoyed themselves less in the
first session because it was ‘not as unpredictable’ whereas in the second they
reported feeling slightly more creative ‘once I got the “hang” of it.’
Summary of interview responses
Of the 24 participants, 9 responded that they preferred the constrained ses-
sion and 12 the non-constrained session. Similarly, 9 responded that the
constraints had a positive effect and 10 that they had a negative effect. Of
the 9 that were positive about the constraints, 4 mentioned that they added
some kind of structural aspect to the piece. Of the 10 that reported a nega-
tive effect, 5 found them annoying because they prevented them from doing
what they wanted and 4 found that they made the interface more confusing.
Of the participants who found the constraints annoying, the general con-
sensus was that they were an ‘imposition’ that seemed like an artificial impo-
sition by the system’s designer. In contrast, one participant who appreciated
the constraints mentioned that he was a regular videogame player so he was
quite happy to work with these kinds of limitations.
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Figure 5.6: The mean length of time in seconds until a
maximal feature set was used in sessions with constraint un-
locking against sessions without constraint unlocking. In a
session with constraint unlocking, all features as defined here
would become available after 130 seconds. Error bars indicate
the standard error.
5.5.3 Log file analysis
Duration until maximal feature set used
With exploration measured by the duration until a maximal feature set was
used (see Section 5.3.7), we found a clear increase when constraint unlocking
was being used, as shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.7 shows the same measurement, but with the data partitioned
by whether participants were in the experienced group or not. We find that
the experienced participants showed a smaller increase between the sessions.
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Figure 5.7: The mean length of time in seconds until a max-
imal feature set was used in sessions with constraint unlocking
against sessions without constraint unlocking. Sessions have
been partitioned by whether or not the participant was in the
musically experienced group. Error bars indicate standard
error.
This measure of exploration suggests that, for inexperienced participants
at least, the implementation of constraint unlocking may have decreased the
rate at which participants explored.
Time spent in novel states
Figure 5.8 shows the correlation between an increase in the length of time
spent in previously unvisited states and the questionnaire data. The connec-
tion is generally moderately weak (and not statistically significant) except for
a negative correlation with Diversity (D) (r = −0.45, p < 0.05). Participants
who spent more time in novel states—i.e. explored broader—perceived there
to be a narrower range of possibilities.
Hypotheses
T L D A Q F E
Figure 5.8: The correlation coefficient of the questionnaire
data against an increase in the amount of time spent in a novel
state (after quantisation). Underlined values are significant
at p < 0.05.
5.6 Discussion
Whilst the study did not reject any of its null hypotheses, further analysis
of both the log files and questionnaire data yielded a number of interesting
findings.
The variance among the responses participants gave is high. This has
been supported by informal analysis of the qualitative data which suggests
that incremental constraint unlocking did have a noticeable effect for most
participants. However, depending on the individual, this effect went in either
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direction preventing this from showing within the aggregated quantitative
data.
Performing a principal component analysis allowed us to identify the most
prominent ways in which these individual differences showed. We found a
primary component which led to a universally positive or negative response
to constraint unlocking. Interestingly, however, the second component ex-
plaining 17 per cent of the variance within the data suggests a trait that
determines how a participant responds to a potential trade-off between easy
to understand and learn and diverse in potential outputs and fun but inde-
pendent of how engaged or in control they felt.
Analysis of the log data indicates that the design principle succeeded in
slowing down exploration. This is not surprising given that our method of
measuring exploratory rate is directly related to how we implemented the
constraints. However, it is worth noting that features remained locked long
enough to actually slow our participants. More interestingly, the effect was
more pronounced among non-musicians, suggesting that those with musical
experience tend to explore slower anyway.
We also observed that those who spent more time in novel states reported
the diversity of the system as lower. At first this may seem somewhat coun-
terintuitive, however recall that diversity is the perception of the potential
range of the system. Therefore, we may conclude that the perception of the
potential of the system depends more on what remains unexplored rather
than what has already been tried. In terms of the Emerging Structures (ES)
model, it is the anticipation of future gains in capacity rather than realised
gains that determines the perception of the system’s potential. This is in
line with our argument that anticipation is key to avoiding the perception of
‘exhausted possibilities’ and sustaining interaction (Section 4.4.2).
One reason for the lack of significant effects observed may be that whilst
this implementation of constraint unlocking did reduce the rate at which par-
ticipants could provide inputs, it did not correspondingly reduce the com-
plexity of the behaviour of the system. For example, the implementation
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of constraints did not hide any aspects of the interface. As a result, whilst
the participants were only exploring a limited area of the input space, the
potential structures that were available with which to construct a mapping
may not have been reduced. The behaviour of the system may then have
remained too complex for the participant to perceive sufficient structures
within its behaviour to create any implications (i.e. anticipated reductions
in uncertainty). In other words, they are overwhelmed, become frustrated
by slow progress and do not anticipate this improving when the constraints
unlock.
An alternative possibility is that the total system mapping was not com-
plex enough. Recall that Prediction 15 (Prediction 4.6) required potential
deep structures over the subset of the input space that the participant was
exploring. It may be that the constraints did encourage more focused ex-
ploration but that this did not yield any benefits. In other words, they are
underwhelmed.
However, whilst the unvarying complexity of the systems remain a possi-
ble confounding factors, the variance of the responses to constraint unlocking
is suggestive of a factor among the participants themselves that determined
their response. In particular, half of those who disliked the constraints re-
ported them as ‘annoying’ and there was a sense that the designer was unjus-
tified in imposing them upon them. This viewpoint is perhaps understand-
able but problematic if we wish encourage a particular type of interaction.
What does it mean for an aspect of the design to be ‘unjustified’? If the
participant has no prior experience of a system, why does limiting certain
inputs seem an imposition? Would it still have seemed the case if we had
not marked the constrained aspects of the interface as ‘LOCKED’?
Participant preconceptions of what a system ‘should’ be like were not
considered within the ES model. Therefore, in the next chapter we will
outline the second key theoretical component of this thesis, a framework of
Perceived Agency. This will allow is to more rigorously analyse what it means
to perceive constraint unlocking as an imposition from a third party. More
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crucially, it will allow us to identify how the expectations of the participant
of what the system is for may affect their experience of interacting with it.
An empirical study such as this is designed to be robust against mistak-
enly reporting a positive result. Where statistical significance has not been
found, we must rely on other means to determine whether the cause was
a faulty premise, this specific implementation of that premise or a deeper
methodological problem. We have explored the first of these two items here.
However, there are also issues with methodology specific to studies involving
creative or aesthetically-driven systems. These will be discussed in detail
later on in Section 8.1
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Chapter 6
Perceiving agency
In this chapter we address the question of why the previous implementation
of constraint unlocking may have been perceived as ‘unjustified’ imposition
by the participants. To answer this we consider what kind of performative
freedom is necessary within a musical act and correspondingly whether skill
needs to be demonstrated. I argue that, for Digital Musical Instruments at
least, skill is a necessary component. To better understand the relationship
between skill, freedom and how these are perceived, I present a new framework
of Perceived Agency and use it to explore how different contexts of perfor-
mative and participatory music require skill to be demonstrated in different
ways. We conclude that although there are a diversity of norms of perceived
agency, unexpected deviation from this norm may be interpreted as dishonest,
inauthentic or—as in our case—an unjustified imposition.
In the previous chapter we found that many participants described the con-
strained interaction design as unjustified or an imposition on what they could
do. But this was not the case with all the participants. Some were content
to work within the constraints. In this chapter we will seek to develop a
more rigorous understanding of what it means for an aspect of an Interactive
Music System (IMS) to be unjustified and why this was only perceived to be
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the case by a number of the participants.
There are also a number of questions throughout this thesis that have
remained unanswered. The IMSs of this thesis are for non-experts. However,
in Chapter 3 we saw the possibility that demonstrating skill might be a
necessary component of musical expression. If that is the case then will our
participants inevitably not be able to express themselves with an IMS? If they
can express themselves, do they need to be creative in doing so? Perhaps
more importantly, do they need to feel creative? Do the answers to these
questions depend on the particular ambitions of the IMS designer or are there
general principles that may answer them? Does the participant need to be
aware of the answers? It is through addressing these questions that we will
gain a greater understanding of what a participant feels a system ‘should’ do
and therefore why its behaviour may be perceived as an imposition rather
than a feature or quirk.
Within the context of participatory music, questions such as these regard-
ing the role of the user remain unanswered (Leong et al. 2011). Therefore to
address them, we will once again examine Digital Musical Instrument (DMI)
performance. DMIs offer a particular insight into this issue due to the exten-
sive research done on attempting to make them as acceptable to musicians
and audiences as acoustic instruments. It is, in fact, through considering the
diversity of different roles a DMI can play that we identified in Chapter 3
that we may demonstrate the significance of perceiving skill.
Following a discussion of skill in DMIs, I will present a new framework
that refines the notion of skill by considering different types—creative, tech-
nical and expressive, different ways in which skill may be demonstrated—
prepared or live, and different individuals who may be skilful within a per-
formance or interaction. Most importantly, however, it will allow us to un-
derstand more clearly how a performance or interaction context is perceived
to grant agency—the freedom and responsibility to realise these skills, and
what consequences this may have when a performance is thought to deviate
from these norms.
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With this framework of perceived agency, we will then be able to clarify
what it means for constraints within an IMS to be unjustified and hence
determine how this problem may be overcome. First, however, we will expand
on our above question: is skill necessary for musical expression?
6.1 Is skill necessary for musical expression?
This is a very exciting time for music. With the advent of com-
puters, many of music’s past restrictions can begin to fall away,
so that it becomes possible for more people to make more sat-
isfying music, more enjoyably and easily, regardless of physical
coordination or theoretical study, of keyboard skills or fluency
with notation. This doesn’t imply a dilution of musical quality.
On the contrary, it frees us to go further, and raises the base-
level at which music making begins. It lets us focus more clearly
on aesthetic content, on feeling and movement in sound, on the
density or direction of experience, on sensuality, structure, and
shape—so that we can concentrate better on what each of us loves
in music that lies beyond the low level of how to make notes, at
which music making far too often bogs down. . . . For those who
have wanted to do music but have lacked the background, com-
puter intelligence may make it possible. (Spiegel 1988, p. 3)
There is a notion hidden in the above quotation, taken from the manual to
Spiegel’s Music Mouse software, that there is pleasure to be had in creating
music without being particularly involved in how it turns out. Perhaps there
is creative pleasure in hearing music that aligns with your ‘intent’. Maybe
just the sensation of being in control, or knowing that this experience is
unique to you makes hearing music more rewarding. Or is the real enjoyment
had simply through marvelling at the system, at the cleverness of its creator
to have conceived of a musical world for us to explore?
219
Jorda` (2002) pondered a similar question in the context of learning mu-
sical instruments, arguing that expressiveness does not necessary imply dif-
ficulty. We saw Jorda`’s (2004) model of the learning curve in Section 2.2.12
comparing the piano, violin, kalimba and kazoo. The kazoo may facilitate
greater complexity early on but its expressive potential quickly levels out.
Jorda`’s model attempts to be neutral of musical genre or taste. But can
we really assess the expressive potential of an instrument independently of
the thoughts, ideas, prejudices and potential interpretations of those in the
audience? Is he really justified in considering the output complexity of the
piano to be vastly in excess of the kazoo? The piano may be polyphonic,
but the kazoo carries micro, mid, and macro diversity when it comes to
pitch, dynamic and timbral variation in (Jorda`’s own assessment of the key
instrumental possibilities). The learning curve model relies on an assumption
that how expressive one may be with a musical instrument is independent of
how much time and effort has gone into mastering it. But is a kazoo virtuoso
quite so inconceivable? Or is the kazoo a victim of Rokeby’s operational
cliche´s (Section 2.1.5), its lowly status on the musical instrument playing
field caused by its low entry fee (both in time and money)?
Jorda`’s consideration of an instrument’s possibilities independently of
genre or performance context relies on our classical notion of expressivity
(see Section 2.2.8)—and it is certainly a useful model within that context.
This way of thinking is perhaps most apparent in Dobrian and Koppelman’s
consideration of virtuosity as being a necessary precursor of musical expres-
sion as ‘the mind has more freedom to concentrate consciously on listening
and expression’ (Dobrian and Koppelman 2006, p. 279, see also Section 2.2.9).
In other words, we enjoy watching virtuosi because they sound (and perhaps
look) better. It is a reasonable enough notion but perhaps we are not entirely
honest with ourselves if we imagine other factors do not enter into our as-
sessment. Wiggins (2009) has argued that music is a psychological construct
and therefore cannot be understood without considering perception. With
an ecological consideration of expressivity, we must question the extent to
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which the expression of a performance is determined by the attitudes and
expectations of those listening as well as the sound it produces. More bluntly,
is anyone interested in listening to music that anyone could have made?
To answer this question, we return to consider the role of DMIs.
6.1.1 Why don’t people like watching DMIs?
In Section 3.1 we identified that a large body of research into DMIs is mo-
tivated by a sense of frustration that they have not been accepted into the
concert arena. Such research often assumes that DMIs, if created properly,
might be able to fulfil the role of traditional instruments within a performance
context (see Section 2.2.2). However, this does not seem to be happening to
much extent, as much of the continuing research reviewed in Section 2.2
attests. The turntables are often cited as the most recently successful instru-
ment (e.g. Jorda` 2004) but these, of course, are not a DMI. What is it about
digital that seems to put people off?
The use of computers is of course prevalent in musical production, for
example the sequencer, sampler, software synthesisers. But they have failed
to make a comparable impact on live instrumental performance (see Sec-
tion 2.2.2). Is it really that hard to create a digital instrument that compares
to an acoustic or even electronic instrument? Let us consider some of the
criticisms that DMIs often face.
Expressive capabilities. They cannot create suitably diverse or expressive
sounds (Sections 2.2.8 and 2.2.11).
Usability. The desired sounds are not accessed easily enough (Sections
2.2.11 and 2.2.12).
Virtuosity. Nobody takes the time to master them (Section 2.2.9).
Visual aspects. The gestures that arise when performing them are lacking
in expression (Section 2.2.14).
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Transparency. It is necessary to understand the relationship between ges-
ture and sound in order to appreciate what is being expressed (Sec-
tion 2.2.10).
Learnability is certainly an important issue to address with DMIs. How-
ever, given the considerable time and difficulty is necessary to learn non-
digital instruments (even recent additions such as the turntables) it is not a
convincing cause for their limited uptake.
There may well be a case that many DMIs lack visually, sonically, or how
these two correlate. But if all that mattered was what we saw and heard then
why do we bother with the interactivity? Why not automate the expressive
aspects and rely entirely on ancillary gestures, i.e. ‘lip sync’ to a perfectly
crafted recording? Such fakery would certainly not go down well with the
audience. For example, as Schloss (2003) writes,
Tape music may have been boring to watch, but it was honest
. . . Some pieces performed nowadays claim to be interactive, but
in reality they are simply not finished yet. So the performance
involves the “baby-sitting” and “knob-twiddling” we might see on
stage that is so unsatisfying to watch. At least with tape music,
we can concentrate on the music; there is nothing else to worry
about. (Schloss 2003, p. 240)
How can a performance be dishonest? Intuitively, we feel that we know the
answer: a musician pretends to perform live but secretly everything that
is heard is prerecorded. For example, the scandal of pop stars lip-synching
to a dubbed vocal track (Auslander 1999). But what is so dishonest about
knob-twiddling that, as Schloss suggests, might make it worse than having
no performer at all?
Perceiving causality between the actions of the performer and what is
heard was discussed alongside transparency in Section 2.2.10. We then ar-
gued in Section 3.3.5 that the need to establish transparency was a hurdle
for DMIs as it shifted audience focus from the music to understanding the
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workings of the instrument. But causality is a more explicit requirement. We
saw in Section 2.2.14 the argument that perceiving skill is crucial to enjoying
a musical performance. It seems that, above the purely phenomenological
experience of spectating music, we need to believe that what we hear is really
being created in front of our eyes.
Fyans and Gurevich (2011) highlighted how unfamiliarity with an instru-
ment (and its associated practice) makes assessing the skill of the performer
difficult, with participants resorting to cues from the performers such as
confident facial expressions and how embodied their relationship with the
instrument appeared (see Section 2.2.14). But there remained a prejudice
against the DMI, the Tilt-Synth. Rich sounds were heard but simple inter-
action observed. Any skill is thus interpreted as an intellectual rather than
instrumental activity, ‘mere button-pressing’.
6.1.2 Acoustic instrument counterexamples and the
double standards of audiences
It would seem that, however impressive the sight or sound of a musical per-
formance may be, we need to see the physical labour that has gone into it,
evidence that it is the cause of what we hear. The reasons underlying this
seem to arise perhaps from an underlying bias in our perceptual system to-
wards the physical world and a need for evidence of the effort and skill of the
performer.
Meeting this criteria may be necessary for a successful DMI performance.
But is it necessary for any musical performance? Let us consider a few
counterexamples.
The pipe organ
The church organ has been identified previously as grounds for hope for DMI
researchers by Hunt and Wanderley (2002) as—whilst the sound does arise
from a physical origin—its nature is completely unrelated to the controller.
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There is no energy continuum. Organs have been electrified since the early
20th century (Sefl 2006). Prior to this, another person (the bellows operator)
would provide the energy.
Compared to many DMIs, the church organ does not provide much expres-
sive subtlety. Where control is given over the volume, it is on a ‘per-channel’
(i.e. per-manual1) basis and controlled via a pedalboard. Neither timbre nor
pitch may be continuously altered. Perhaps most shockingly of all (for DMI
designers at least) is the latency, which can be up to 200 ms on a large organ
(Miller 1968) and vary with the pitch of each note—20 times the amount
Wessel and Wright (2002) feel acceptable for a DMI. It is exceptionally diffi-
cult to play. The instrument is modal, with rows of stops available to select
the timbre of the different manuals. However, the impact of this on audience
transparency may well be quite immaterial as the organist is often hidden
away in a box, both player and controller completely unseen by the audience
for the duration of a recital.
Whilst the organ is perhaps not the most popular instrument, its place as
an instrument has never been called into question in the manner many DMIs
have been. But the church organ serves a specific purpose. It allows a single
musician to fill an enormous space with rich music for a religious ceremony.
They were created not for audiences, but for congregations. We have been
left with a legacy of organ music and a tradition of organists to perform it.
Perhaps, given its religious history, it is an unfair counterexample.
The trumpet
Let us consider the trumpet. Seeing a virtuoso trumpet player certainly is
impressive. But is the trumpet really transparent to the audience? As an
audience member, we can see the effort of blowing hard but beyond that all
we see is the movement of three valves. The crucial aspect of control taking
place between the lips and mouthpiece remains invisible.
The gestures that we see do not provide evidence of causality. But of
1Church organs often include a number of stepped keyboards referred to as manuals.
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course, we know that there is causality. How else could there be sound
eminating from the instrument?
Is this the embodied knowledge of the audience? Creating even a note on
the trumpet is difficult without some instruction. And we might imagine such
an attempt would make one more appreciative of the difficulty in playing the
trumpet. But I would argue that it seems somewhat farfetched to suggest
that without such an experience, our ability to discern a skilful trumpeter
still relies on an embodied knowledge of the means by which a trumpet works.
The piano
The piano is perhaps one of the most popular recital instruments. Pianists fly
all over the world to perform. However, in the standard concert hall setup,
often half of the audience cannot see the pianist’s hands or the keyboard.
They may perhaps see some of the larger ancillary gestures, and the pianist’s
face. Whilst some people may try to get tickets on the left side of the house,
those on the right are unlikely to suggest that they have been robbed of the
live music experience.
It would seem that, important though it is for a DMI to demonstrate causal-
ity, we are more generous with non-digital instruments.
6.1.3 ‘Instrumentality’
Auslander (2002) argues that the use of the word live to mean not recorded
did not appear, as one might expect, at the same time as recording technology
but with the radio. It was only with the radio that the difference between
live and recorded media became indistinguishable to the audience and the
need to be explicit arose. An aspect of communication that people felt was
important—simultaneity—was no longer evident in the medium and thus
new practices emerged to make it evident—in this case explicitly stating
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when a broadcast was live.
In a similar manner, I argue that instrumentality, the degree to which a
DMI may be played in the manner of an instrument (see e.g. Cadoz 2009;
Gurevich and Fyans 2011), was not something that needed to be considered
with acoustic instruments. There was never any question as to whether a
technology was an instrument as that was all that it could be.
Instruments exist primarily to create sound. Perhaps some designers con-
sidered how a performer might look when they played but this was surely
a minor consideration. As we have seen, instrumental performance is about
much more than sound. Otherwise, we would simply stay at home and listen
to the recording. But, as Small (1998) points out, the fact that we can now
listen to recordings has affected what we consider important in performance.
Causality is important, but before the technology arose to reproduce
sound, it did not need to be explicit. With acoustic instruments, it does
not need to be made apparent as it is self-evident. The button accordion
player is not criticised for ‘mere button-pressing’. Likewise, if an accom-
plished pianist hears after a performance that they make playing the piano
look ‘effortless’, this is likely to be received as a compliment rather than a
suggestion that they have chosen too easy an instrument. But now we have
instruments that can make performance ‘easy’, removing the difficulties that
were necessary to putting expression into a performance. It has become
painfully apparent that musical performance is about more than hearing ex-
pressive music created in real time. We need to believe that creating it is
difficult.
6.1.4 DMIs and the potential for automation
We saw in Section 2.2.9 Dobrian and Koppelman’s suggestion that the ele-
phant in the room of NIME performance is a lack of virtuosity. But an even
bigger elephant is the fact that any sound coming out of a laptop could have
been produced identically by a recording. In fact, sometimes recordings are
involved. We simply do not know because there is not an established norm of
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how much automation is appropriate within a DMI performance. As a result,
there is a loss of the concert ‘pact’ that allows unworried trust that what is
being seen is genuinely the work of a skilled performer (see Section 3.3.2).
DMIs range from generic, open tools to highly idiosyncratic ‘signatures’
of a composer charged with their musical ideas (Magnusson and Hurtado
2008). By contrast, traditional instruments have clearly established (and
mutually understood) boundaries (Schloss 2003). Magnusson (2010) argued
that it is at the limits of an instrument that creativity happens. But if we
in the audience do not know what those limits are then we are not sharing
in the significance of what is happening.
We do not know the limits of what we are hearing is because there are
no limits to what we can hear from an arbitrary DMI. The limits we are
interested in are how much of a performance can be created live, and that
is why evidence of causality is crucial. Without this, a sense of wonder is
tainted with a suspicion of how real everything is—something we were able
to exploit with the Serendiptichord (Section 3.3.2).
Schloss and Jaffe (1993) provide an example of the theatrical juggling
troupe the Flying Karamazov Brothers embedding wireless MIDI transmit-
ters in their helmets which they would trigger through juggling. But the
audience simply assumed they were syncing to a recording. Schloss and Jaffe
see this as reaching the threshold of ‘magic’. Reeves et al. (2005) described
magical interaction as that where the effects are revealed but the manipula-
tions that caused them hidden (Section 2.1.7); Schloss (2003, p. 242) takes
a similar meaning when he says ‘Magic in a performance is good. Too much
magic is fatal! (Boring)’. But magic denies rational explanation and is far
from boring. When the sound has passed through a laptop there is always
a rational explanation. Once digital is involved, effects due to invisible ma-
nipulations are generally assumed to be automation, not magic. It only be-
comes magical when no reasonable manipulation can be imagined. Without
the concert pact (see Section 3.3.2), trust in interactivity must be either re-
quested through explanatory talks or programme notes (e.g. Paradiso 1999)
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or earned through a demonstration that would be implausible if scripted (e.g.
Saltz 2001). Hence the need for visible instrumentality in DMIs.
6.2 Skill and authority in live music
We have established thus far that it becomes harder to convince an audience
of a skilful performance as technology capable of automation is introduced.
Why do we need to convince them in the first place?
Understanding of authorship, intention and stylistic relevance plays a
fundamental role in aesthetic appreciation (Leder et al. 2004). As Cascone
(2003) argues, the demonstration of musical skill provides the performer with
the authority to be listened to.
The need for musical authority is sometimes cast under a cynical light
(e.g. Auslander 1999), especially if we adopt the viewpoint of classical expres-
sivity that we are here exclusively for a sensory experience. However, under
more ecological considerations of musical performance (see Section 2.2.8), an
understanding of origin may well play a fundamental part of the musical ex-
perience. As one respondent of Lindstro¨m et al.’s (2003) questionnaires on
music students’ attitudes wrote: ‘expressivity comes from within your soul’.
It is surely not that unreasonable for our listener to wish to know whose soul
that might be.
Placing a significance on the origin of music is in line with the communica-
tive aspects of musical perception (Section 2.4.2)—but also the expectation-
oriented models (Section 2.4.3). Listening to music is an active process.
Musical authority can establish the expectation that what we will hear is
worth the effort of listening to with an open mind.
Many DMI performances are a single individual’s work as instrument
creator, composer and performer (Magnusson 2010). The problem is not that
anybody doubts the performer’s authorship of what is heard. But creating
music live presents a particular challenge: there are no second chances and
there is no time to stop and think. To give Clarke’s (2006) example, listening
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to the soloist of Sibelius’s violin concerto would be a very different experience
if we thought they were improvising.
The problem with ‘mere button pressing’ is specific to DMIs: we cannot
tell if we are hearing something that was prepared earlier. Therefore the
performer cannot demonstrate the skill necessary to establish authority. This
is a problem of audience familiarity as the degree to which the performer is
presently involved is more apparent with an understanding of the mapping.
However, it is not a problem that acoustic instruments (or indeed, electronic
instruments) have to deal with.
Live music holds a special place for many music fans but we often seem
to have difficulty expressing quite why. We are not suggesting that watching
a visible demonstration of skill is the sole reason. However, in the familiar
performance context where an audience has arrived to listen to a performer,
the musical authority of the performer plays a role in appreciating the music
that they create. A demonstration of musical ability is one means by which
this authority may be established. (Other means may include, for example,
a positive review from critics and friends.)
6.2.1 Technique, expression and creativity
There are undoubtedly a large number of skills demonstrated in musical
performance. However, there are three in particular that will be relevant for
the framework we develop below: technical, expressive and creative. These
will allow us to demonstrate the different expectations provided by different
performance contexts.
We saw in Section 2.1.8, Sheridan’s (2006) distinction between technical
and interpretive (i.e. expressive) behaviour in performance. This distinction
has also been drawn in music by Godlovitch (1998). Auslander (2005) further
argues that a fundamental difference between human and machine performers
is that humans have both technical and interpretive skills whereas machines
have only the former. Similarly, Lindstro¨m et al.’s (2003) aforementioned
study found expressivity is commonly considered to distinguish great musi-
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cians. Technique is good, but not enough. This distinction is also mentioned
by Schloss (2003, p. 242): ‘people who perform should be performers’.
However, both technical and expressive performance require material to
perform. So that we might draw a distinction between improvisation and
recital we will also consider creative skill—the ability to come up with original
material. Creativity has been demonstrated by Eisenberg and Thompson
(2003) as forming an important part of how individuals evaluate improvised
music.
How does this relate to interactive music? In our previous study, we
found some participants apparently frustrated by their inability to draw on
their own skills. At the same time, others interpreted the system in a different
manner and were content to explore it as a demonstration of another person’s
musical ideas. If, as I am suggesting, the demonstration of skill is necessary
in a musical act then it is important to understand how an IMS may facilitate
this. To do so, we need to understand what kind of skills are necessary, who
may provide them (e.g. the participant, the system) and how this may be
demonstrated to the participant.
In the following section, I will introduce the concept of agency, which will
provide a more specific means to understand what it means to demonstrate
skill. Following this, I will introduce a framework of Perceived Agency that
will allows us to formally categorise the different types of skill, how they are
demonstrated and to whom they are attributed.
6.3 Agency: The freedom to demonstrate skill
I argued above that the demonstration of skill is an important part of musical
performance in need to consideration. In this section, we will meet the con-
cept of perceived performative agency as the perceived bounds within which
that skill may be demonstrated. We will then be able to distinguish different
performance contexts based on the different types of performance agencies
they infer and identify how problems may arise if this is not perceived to
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be the case. From there, we may then consider the consequences for the
interactive domain.
First, however, we will formally define what we mean by ‘agency’.
6.3.1 Formal definition
Agency describes the ability of a person to take actions, have initiative and
influence outcome (Tanaka 2006). It arises in a number of fields including
artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, moral philosophy and cultural
theory with slightly different formulations. An individual acting with agency
is described as an agent.
We will build on Bandura’s (2001) definition of personal agency from
social cognitive theory. A human is acting with personal agency when the
following is satisfied.
Intentionality. Intentions are plans of actions with predictions about their
outcomes. Plans need not be specified in full and the agent is proac-
tively committed to bringing them about.
Forethought. The agent is able to create representations of future events
that inform planning. Anticipated events may be then be established
as goals. Forethought includes representing conditional relationships
between environmental events and how actions will affect these out-
comes.
Self-reactiveness. The agent motivates and regulates themselves. Having
established a plan, they cannot simply sit back and await the outcome
but must be able to be involved throughout in order to regulate its
execution.
Self-reflectiveness. The agent is able to reflect not only on events and
actions but on their own functioning. A belief in one’s own efficacy
is fundamental to agency. Without a belief that one has the power to
produce desired effects, there is little incentive to act regardless of goals
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or motivation.
(Bandura 2001)
Note that choosing overall goals is not necessary. We may have no choice
about whether we need to eat, but may still establish goals in order to satisfy
this overall need. From this we may arrive at a notion of degrees of agency
or, more specifically, defined parameters within which an agent acts.
6.3.2 The importance of agency
Agency is a key issue to consider with Interactive Music Systems. How
much freedom (and hence, responsibility) do we grant our user? Are we
providing a context for them to discover their ‘creative side’? Or are we
simply constructing an experience for them to participate in?
Whilst recent years have seen much debate on the role of copyright in
today’s world, the importance given to correctly attributing work remains as
high as ever. Originality—by which we mean uniqueness—is important to
musicians (Magnusson and Hurtado 2008). But it is crucial that originality
is identified to arise from a musician. Thus, a digital tool that seems to
impose another’s ideas of how music should be made is seen as an unwelcome
limitation (a loss of originality) (Magnusson and Hurtado 2008). However,
the commonly understood limitations of a musical instrument provide the
structure in which a musician may develop their own style (Wallis et al.
2011; Gurevich et al. 2009).
6.3.3 Perceived performative agency
Our motivation for considering agency arises from an audience being able
to attribute whose demonstration of skill has contributed to a performance.
However, we will tend to avoid the terms authorship or attribution as we wish
to emphasise that perceived agency is something that is perceived intuitively
and subjectively rather than socially negotiated or explicitly declared. An
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individual may declare themselves ‘in control’ and there may be an accepted
author. We are considering how far this is felt to be true by an audience.
Agency has previously been considered within the context of Digital Mu-
sic Systems (DMSs) by Tanaka (2006) in terms of a participant’s sense of
their own actions within the music produced through their interactions with
a DMS or within an ensemble. However, the framework presented here ex-
tends this notion through considering agency over different aspects of a per-
formance, the differing ways and roles in which it may be realised and how
it is conferred by a performance context.
Informally, we may think of performative agency as being attributed to
those who are responsible for making a performance event what it is. We
define the perceived performative agency of an agent over an aspect of a
performative event as the degree to which the aspect of the event is perceived
to have resulted from the agent acting with agency, where agency is as defined
in Section 6.3.1. For brevity, we will use the term perceived agency to mean
perceived performative agency.
Similar to Tanaka’s formulation, perceived agency is entirely a subjective
phenomenon of the perceiver. There is not a single objective agency of which
a spectator may have an ‘inaccurate’ subjective interpretation. For simplicity,
we will often refer to agency rather than perceived agency. However, by this
we are always referring to the representation that an individual has imposed
upon the performative event.
An individual infers from a performance context norms of who should be
exercising agency, how and in which role. For example, a classical recital does
not usually grant the performer agency over which notes are to be performed.
However it does grant them agency to perform the given notes through their
own technical expertise. Note that it is not possible for an agent to ‘refuse’
agency inferred by the performance context. Granting agency is akin to
specifying a set of available actions from which the agent may then choose.
It is both the provision of freedom and the assignment of responsibility.
Therefore, in order to perceive the agency of another individual it is nec-
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essary to perceive that their actions have been chosen rather than determined
by other factors, which in turn requires the perception that there were other
actions available. In this way, the perception of agency requires an under-
standing of what could have been done but was not. We saw a similar notion
in Section 6.1.4: without an understanding of the limits of a DMI, we cannot
perceive when they are being approached by the performer.
The condition of self-reactiveness (see Section 6.3.1) means that once an
outcome has been fixed, then the performer is no longer exercising agency.
A process that was prepared and begun earlier involved agency but it only
involves agency to the extent that the agent is involved in its execution.
Thus agency is exercised over a period of time. This notion will allow us to
distinguish below between live and preparatory agency.
6.4 A framework of Perceived Agency
We are now ready to present the framework of Perceived Agency. The frame-
work is not intended to be a theory of origin that intends to explain why we
enjoy live music. Rather, it is presented as a tool to identify how individual
roles are inferred and acted upon by different performance contexts, as we
shall demonstrate below. It is through examining how musical performances
are perceived that we may understand how problems might arise within new
performance and participatory contexts.
Although we will consider three types of performative agency, correspond-
ing to the three musical skills discussed in Section 6.2.1, this is not to suggest
that the demonstration of other skills is not important within music. For
example, we might also consider passion, leadership or ensemble communi-
cation. However, as we shall see in the below applications of the framework,
these three arise naturally when comparing different contexts of performance.
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6.4.1 Types of agency
We consider three types of distinct contribution in which agency may be
perceived at a performative event: technical, expressive and creative, which
we denote as T, E and C respectively.
Note that we are not claiming that these are necessarily distinct ingredi-
ents that form a musical work (indeed creativity may well arise from technical
ability). However, based on the literature reviewed in Section 6.2.1, we ar-
gue that these aspects may commonly be perceived as distinct qualities in
a performance. The extent to which they are perceived independently may
vary across individuals.
Technical agency (T)
Technical agency (T) is exercised with the application of skill, both technical
and abstract, to realise an outcome. The skill may be embodied or abstract.
T might also be described as executive agency.
T may be considered loosely associated with virtuosity (Section 2.2.9).
However, we may also imagine a performer to be described as ‘technically
accomplished but lacking in emotion or imagination’ to mean that T was
perceivably demonstrated but not our other types of agency outlined below.
(It is beyond the scope of the framework, but we might also imagine a
sporting performance as consisting mostly of T.)
Expressive agency (E)
We define expressive agency (E) as the ability to feel, communicate and inter-
pret emotion. This includes interpreting the sentiment of a score, realising it
through expressive performance. We may consider demonstrable emotional
intelligence as a part of E. It also includes having emotion to communicate.
In Section 6.2.1 (as well as Section 2.2.8) we touched upon arguments
about whether machines can feel or express emotions. This is not a debate
we need worry ourselves with. Agency is imposed upon a performance by the
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perceiver (see Section 6.3.3). An important consequence of this, however, is
that thinking a performance is being rendered by a machine may reduce the
potential to perceive expression.
Performances without a perceivable demonstration of expressive agency
might be described as ‘mechanistic’, ‘lifeless’, or ‘soulless’. Recall, however,
that agency may be exercised within an externally defined goal. Musicians
in a symphony orchestra may not determine the expressive content of what
they perform but still exercise E in interpreting the conductor’s expression,
understanding it and then realising it in their performance (cf. Small 1998).
Creative agency (C)
Creative agency (C) is the ability to think up original (and good) content. We
may also describe it as having imagination or vision. The actual realisation
of these ideas rests with E and T. A demonstration of C without E or T
might be described as ‘good ideas but poor execution’.
6.4.2 Live and preparatory agency
We define a type of agency as being perceived live if this period of time
is concurrent with the performance and preparatory (abbreviated as prep)
if it took place before the performance. Agency may be perceived as both
preparatory and live. For example, an awareness of the amount of rehearsing
that has gone into a recital may be perceived as both live and preparatory
technical agency.
It is my position that an assumption that live creation is a more skilful
equivalent of prepared creation is somewhat simplistic.2 However, this is
not dealt with by the framework because agency is imposed subjectively
on a performance by the perceiver. Therefore, discussions of what kinds of
skills are more important or difficult remain subjective to the individual.
2For example, Johnson-Laird (1988) argues that composition and improvisors are dis-
tinct skills evidenced by the existence of improvisors who cannot compose and composers
who cannot improvise.
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However, the framework does highlight how different performance contexts
imply different norms about whether live or preparatory agency is to take
place. We might therefore speculate that individuals choosing to attend a
particular performance context will place a greater value on the types of
agency its norms imply.
We shall notate the preparedness of agency type A as A(live), A(prep) or
A(live, prep) for live, preparatory or both, respectively, where A may be one
of T, C or E as defined in Section 6.4.1.
6.4.3 Agent roles
A musical performance will often be perceived as arising through the actions
of a number of agents. We categorise these into three roles of the listener,
performer and other contributors corresponding respectively. These are anal-
ogous to the grammatical notions of first, second and third person that might
be used if the perceiver were conversing with the performer and will therefore
be denoted 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The framework describes how one indi-
vidual perceives agency of an event. This perceiver is therefore considered in
the first person (‘I’). The focus of the perceiver’s attention is considered in
the second person (‘you’) as they might in a conversation. Others are then
considered as third parties (‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’, ‘they’) We will discuss second and
third person agency first before moving onto the special case of first person
agency.
You: performers (2)
Within this framework, performers are those that are visible and in receipt of
attention by the audience. They therefore correspond to the second person
(‘you’) and are denoted 2.
Note that although we might consider unseen parties (e.g. the sound and
lighting technicians) as ‘performing’, unless they are the focus of attention
(e.g. on stage) then they would not be considered as performers within this
framework. Performers are often easily identified as those on a stage.
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They: non-visible contributors (3)
Non-visible contributors may include the composer, director, choreographer,
producer, curator and those backstage such as a sound technician. They
correspond to the third person (‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’ or ‘they’) and are this role is
therefore denoted 3. Even if, say, the composer were present in the audience,
we would still consider them a non-visible contributor.
I: the audience member or participant (1)
First person agency is primarily how far the audience member is instrumental
in bringing about their experience. The audience member is the individual
around whose subjective perception the framework is considered. Therefore,
they correspond to the first person (‘I’ or ‘we’) and are denoted 1.
We may imagine our T, C and E types of agency playing a part in this,
for example as follows.
Technical agency: I am clever for being able to appreciate this.
Creative agency: The beauty of this touches me in a personal way (i.e.
others may not see the beauty in this).
Expressive agency: I connect with this work on a personal emotional level.
Whilst we argued above that listening to music is an active cognitive
process (Section 6.2), we may also consider perceived first person agency as
the degree to which the listener feels ownership over the experience. By
this we mean how unique the connection between listener and performance
is (in contrast to other people). It is arguable in such a case whether the
formal requirements of agency defined in Section 6.3.1 are met in this case.
A performance may have been arrived at by chance rather than by intention
but still feel strongly personal and unique. Therefore, we will refer to this
case of personal uniqueness as a ‘looser’ definition of first person agency.
The company of others affects the experience of listening to music and
we might imagine our framework extending to consider the shared experience
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of the audience (‘we’). In this case, the uniqueness would apply within the
group (‘we are making this experience what it is’). However, a consideration
of the means by which musical events binds groups of individuals together is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.5 Perceiving agency in established perfor-
mance contexts
In order to demonstrate the important role that attributing agency plays in
the aesthetic experience, we will in this section apply the framework to es-
tablished performance practices. As we shall see, whilst there is considerable
variety in the types of agency exercised, the importance of perceiving agency
remains constant. Technology that impedes this process has the potential to
negatively affect a performance. Therefore, agency is as much an engineering
issue as it is artistic or cultural.
Our motivation is to identify potential problems with new musical con-
texts and not to make value judgements on existing practice. The framework
is based on observation of existing performance practices. Therefore, to ap-
ply it as a means to then assess the value of these practices is somewhat
misguided.
It is important to note that the framework does not describe the musical
quality of any aspect—i.e. how good it sounds—nor how much skill might
be required. The perception of agency may inform the extent to which a
particular performance is perceived as skilful, but the manner in which it
does so remains subjective to the individual spectator.
In particular, there is a danger when considering agency to conclude that
the amount of agency attributed to a performer is somehow indicative of their
talent or that performers without a particular type of agency are somehow
‘subservient’ (e.g. Small 1998). It is possible that the raw musical signal
produced through live improvisation would not be judged as ‘accomplished’
as one that was composed and performed. Or vice versa. But with a greater
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appreciation of the role of perceiving agency we may see that drawing such
a comparison without considering both performance context and the listener
is not particularly valid or useful.
6.5.1 Classical concert
A classical musician will typically demonstrate live and preparatory technical
and expressive agency: 2T(live, prep) and 2E(live, prep). We may expect
a recital musician or conductor to have more E than an ensemble musician,
although orchestral musicians still demonstrate E as they are required to
interpret expressive instructions into expressive performance. Classical mu-
sicians usually perform music composed by another and therefore are not
typically attributed creative agency (C) whilst performing. However, on oc-
casion we may imagine the perception of C(prep) for an especially creative
interpretation of a work (e.g. Glenn Gould’s performances of Bach’s Well-
Tempered Clavier).
The composer (3) has C, T and E all as preparatory agency. Here, C
is the imagination to come up with musical ideas, T is the skill in scoring
those ideas and E is the ability to embody expressive content in the work.
We may also imagine the perception of 3E being enhanced through a belief
in the passion of the composer.
The listener (1) may also feel that their experience and understanding
of the genre is contributing to their experience, providing T(live). They
may also feel they are being creative in their appreciation (C) and personal
connection to the expressive content of the music (E). We may imagine there
being a greater amount of live 1E if the listener feels themselves forming of
affirming a personal connection with the musician, composer or sentiment of
the music whilst listening.
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6.5.2 Jazz improvisation
With improvised jazz, the performer (2) is expected to exercise C(live). This
then allows for a great deal of T(live) and E(live) to be attributed. In contrast
to classical music, the composer (when we are hearing a ‘standard’) is less
prominent, thus for 3 we have less C, T or E.
The use of standards within jazz allows for a clear distinction to be made
between 2C and 3C. We may also observe musical ideas being passed between
players within an ensemble providing evidence of C(live) rather than C(prep).
As with classical music, the jazz listener may feel a personal level of
intellectual and creative input goes into appreciating what they hear. How-
ever, with the perception of 2E being live to a greater extent than classical
(and significantly less 3E), we may find a greater level of 1E(live) through a
personal connection to the performer.
6.5.3 Indie gig
We will consider an ‘Indie’ gig as a relatively small performance by a rock
band that are not generally considered by those attending as ‘mainstream’.
Lingel and Naaman (2012) presents evidence that fans of indie music
often feel a personal connection with the band and that being a fan may
be felt to be an act of personal expression, providing 1E. We may further
draw from Auslander’s (1999) discussion of the importance of ‘authenticity’
in rock music that it is important that the emotional content of the music
is felt to arise genuinely from how the musician feels, making 2E important.
In order to maintain this perception of 2E, it is therefore important that the
expressive content of the music is not perceived to have arrived from a third
party (no 3E). As a result, 3C and 3T are generally disliked as well, and
indeed we may see the strong belief that a performer should write their own
music as a means of providing evidence of 2 as the origin of E through 2C
and 2T.
Therefore, indie performance norms typically demand a large amount
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of 2E(live) and some amount of 2T(live) but at the same time 2E(prep),
2T(prep) and 2C(prep). The extent of third party involvement is minimised.
3T is permitted provided it is thought not to provide 3E or to detract from
2T. Thus, mastering a record is acceptable whereas using AutoTune to dis-
guise poor singing is not.
6.5.4 Differing norms of perceived agency
We summarise the above observations in Table 6.1. Note, however, that
these observations are not presented as what actually happens or necessarily
what is perceived. They are our observations of what is considered important
within different musical paradigms and therefore indicate how performance
contexts may invoke these paradigms to infer norms that agency will (or
perhaps should) be distributed in this manner.
Table 6.1: Observed norms of perceiving agency in estab-
lished performance contexts.
Performance paradigm Expected perceived agency
Classical concert 1T 2TE(live) 3TCE(prep)
Jazz improvisation 1TE 2TCE(live)
Indie 1E 2TE(live) 2TEC(prep)
Where types of agency are merged this implies both types in the
given role, e.g. 2TE(live) should be interpreted as 2T(live) and
2E(live)
If a performance context implies a performance within one paradigm and
the norms of agency of this paradigm are not perceived, then the music may
be considered ‘inauthentic’. For example, a bebop performance in a busy
basement jazz club may imply the paradigm of jazz improvisation. If an
audience member observes that the performance was note-for-note identical
to a previous performance by this musician, then they may perceive 2C(prep)
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instead of the expected 2C(live) and object that this was not ‘authentic’
bebop. If they recognise the performance as being note-for-note identical to
that of a different performer then they may perceive 3C(live or prep) instead
of 2C(live), and again feel the performance to be inauthentic. However, the
same audience member may later find themselves at a recital by a classical
musician performing a piece note-for-note identical to many performances
earlier and take no exception to this fact.
In this way, we may see that whilst there is not a universal distribution
of agency expected from a musical performance, a performance context may
create expectations in the audience of a specific distribution and a perception
of inauthenticity if this is not met.
6.6 Perceiving agency in new performance con-
texts
We will now apply our framework to consider how an audience perceives
(or struggles to perceive) agency within new performance contexts. We will
not necessarily consider every role for each context but highlight distinctive
aspects. For example, most of the new performance contexts we consider are
quite niche and therefore their audiences may feel a sense of personal agency.
6.6.1 DMI performance
Returning to our opening topic of Digital Musical Instruments (DMIs), in the
context of agency we can see that a difficulty often arises in distinguishing
between (live) and (prep). DMIs are often performed in a classical concert
context which would imply the need for 2T(live) and 3E(live). But as there
is not an established norm of how much material is prepared within the
DMI, this may not be assumed through the concert pact (see Section 6.1.4).
Therefore, evidence is required to make it clear that these agencies are being
exercised.
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However, there is scope for additional agency within a DMI performance.
The instrument itself may be seen as the result of technical and creative skill
prior to the performance, allowing the instrument designer to be attributed
3T(prep) and 3C(prep). There is also additional potential for 1T(live) as the
audience may feel they are demonstrating technical ability as they develop an
understanding of the mapping. However, in contrast with composed instru-
ments, with DMI performances, this role is typically sought to be minimised
as it is typically necessary to understand the mapping to perceive the live
agency of the performer (see Section 6.1.1).
The difficulty in distinguishing between preparatory and live agency may
also help explain why DMIs are often only performed by their creators (see
e.g. Fels 2004). When the creator is performing, the difficulty is in distin-
guishing between 2(live) and 2(prep). However, if the instrument is created
by another person, then this becomes the difference between 2(live) and
3(prep), potentially limiting the performer’s ability to demonstrate agency.
6.6.2 Generative music: machine agency
Generative music—that created by a computer without any input—can be
either performed live or rendered oﬄine with a recording presented. We shall
consider performative generative music here.
Can a machine have agency? From a philosophical viewpoint, Auslander
(2005) argues that they can if they are acting as performers and not following
a script. The framework is applied subjectively, so we do not need to worry
about whether a machine can ‘really’ have agency. However, it is reasonable
to infer from Auslander’s comment that a viewer may perceive a machine
as having agency. This point is relevant with regards to self-reflectiveness
(Section 6.3.1), the requirement that an agent to believe in its own power.
Whilst belief is an ambiguous notion with regards to a machine, we may
perceive a machine to be acting as if it believed in the power of its actions.
Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that a generative system may
be perceived as exercising live technical and creative agency, 2T(live) and
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2C(live). However, as with other computer-oriented systems, without evi-
dence of its generative capacity, it may be difficult to distinguish between
2(live) and 3(prep). Without input, providing conclusive evidence of live
agency is difficult. However, we may still perceive agency if this seems more
likely than a recording. This may be based on how ‘unhuman-like’ the output
of the system sounds what we are told about the system.
A key difference between machine and human agency is that machines are
typically perceived as having been created by a human. Indeed, the output
of a generative system is generally attributed to its creator (Ariza 2009).
Thus, the agency exercised by the machine may well be seen as a product
of its creator. In this way, demonstration of live agency by the system is
simultaneously a demonstration of preparatory technical and creative agency
by its creator. Agency is perceived at two complementary levels.
6.6.3 Rowe’s Interactive Music Systems
Recall form Section 2.2.4 that Rowe (1993) defined three aspects by which
to classify his Interactive Music Systems:
• score or performance driven in input,
• sequenced, transformative or generative in output3 and
• the instrument vs player paradigm.
Rowe’s description of a sort of artificial player implies an expectation that the
system will be interpreted as its own agent. Thus we have two performing
(2) agents. Let us refer to them as musician and system, which we shall
denote as (2M) and (2S) respectively.
Under our framework, this third aspect may be seen as the difference
between the output of the system being perceived as a demonstration of the
musician’s (2M) agency (under the instrument paradigm) or the system’s
3Note that the input and output clarification was our interpretation and not explicitly
defined by Rowe (1993).
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(2S) agency (under the player paradigm). Systems falling under the instru-
ment paradigm we may consider as analogous to a DMI and hence defer
to Section 6.6.1. We will therefore consider only systems within the player
paradigm here.
The first of the above aspects distinguishing between score or performance
driven may be perceived as where the balance lies between whether the de-
cision of when to play was determined in advance by the system’s designer
or is to be determined live by the musician. This leaves this aspect as a
spectrum of where creative agency is perceived with 3C(prep) describing the
score-driven system and 2MC(live) the performance-driven system.
In a similar manner, the extent to which the output of the system relies
on prewritten material may be seen on a spectrum between 3C(prep) and
2SC(live).
In both of the above distinctions, the musician performing with the system
may also be known to be its designer, which would make 3 and 2M the same
person.
Note here that the live agency of one performer allows the live agency
of another to be perceived. We saw a similar example above with the jazz
group where bouncing ideas evidenced the improvisatory (i.e. live) agency of
the performers.
We may consider the Continuator (Section 2.2.4) as an example. The
Continuator (I would argue) is likely to be perceived as an agent embodying
2ST(live). This agency is then attributed to its creator as 3T(prep) (that’s
clever) and 3C(prep) (an imaginative idea). Of course, it would not be
as impressive if we believed its responses to be preprogrammed (3T(prep)
instead of 2ST(live)). But, through the interactions with the (improvising)
musician, the system’s agency is demonstrated to be live.
6.6.4 Composed instruments and the Serendiptichord
The composed instrument, in the form presented in Section 3.3.1, is similar to
the DMI in that the distinction between preparatory and live agency is am-
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biguous unless causality is explicitly established. Forming an understanding
of the mapping forms a part of the audience experience requiring 1T(live).
I would argue that a strong motivating reason for the audience to form this
understanding is the desire to distinguish between 2(live) and 3(prep).
We exploited this desire with the Serendiptichord (Section 3.2), maintain-
ing ambiguity of the extent to which agency was 2(live) or 3(live or prep),
i.e. whether the instrument was interactive or whether the sound was either
a recording or controlled backstage. Furthermore, over the performance the
instrument began to project an impression of agency itself which, using the
notation of Section 6.6.3, created ambiguity between 2M and 2S. By present-
ing the instrument in a more theatrical manner rather than that of a classical
concert (Section 3.2.5), we explicitly avoided the concert pact (Section 6.1.4).
This allowed the potential use of preparatory agency to be presented as an
implicit challenge for the audience to work out rather than a potentially
distracting concern that the pact was being violated.
6.6.5 Live coding
In live coding performance, the performer’s code is usually made visible to the
audience often with comments to aid audience understanding (Section 2.2.4).
This gives a strong 1T(live) agency through the audience’s attempts to de-
cipher the code (often drawing upon specialist knowledge). The projection
also serves to demonstrate the live agency of the performer. It not only
allows causality to be inferred but provides an unusual insight into the per-
former’s thinking process demonstrating some of the more specific attributes
of agency (e.g. self-reactivity). The use of previously defined procedures
within live coding also allows for preparatory agency to be introduced ex-
plicitly (and therefore ‘honestly’) without disrupting the perception of live
agency.
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The above analysis demonstrates that whilst the distribution of agency is
less established within new performance contexts, perceiving agency remains
important whether or not it is explicitly considered by performers or specta-
tors. In the case of the Serendiptichord, we have seen how uncertainty over
the norms of agency may then be exploited in the performance of a composed
instrument.
Table 6.2 shows an illustration of how a spectator may perceive agency
from the different contributors involved in a musical performance. Observe
in this table that whilst the sound engineer may need to be creative and
technically skilled in how they balance the different audio channels on a mix,
in this illustration they are not perceived to be exercising agency. Perceived
agency is not an objective reality of who does what but of who is perceived
to be responsible for it.
6.7 Perceiving agency in interactive music
As we consider participatory interactive music paradigms, the boundary be-
tween 1 and 2 may seem blurred as the audience may also be considered
the performer. However, as we have seen so far, listener agency is common
throughout all performance contexts. Thus, the framework may be applied
most consistently by keeping the participant, which we shall denote P as 1
(the perceiver of agency), the system, if perceived to have agency as 2 and
its designer as 3.
As we are only considering interactive music that does not require non-
participant input during an interaction, 3 is always preparatory. Where
other participants are involved, then they will be 1 if collaborating with P,
3 if spectating and 2 if they are participating but P is not.
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Table 6.2: How the agency of different contributors to a musical
performance might be perceived. Note that this is an example of
how one individual might perceive agency not a statement of how far
these roles actually contribute or demonstrate skill.
Role Perceived agency
Recital instrumentalist 2TE(live, prep)
Orchestral instrumentalist 2T(live, prep), 2E(live)
Improvising instrumentalist 2TCE(live)
Indie performer 2E(live), 2TCE(prep)
Offstage singer 3TE(live)
Conductor 2E(live, prep)
Studio composer/producer 3TCE(prep)
DMI designer 3T(prep)
Composed instrument designer 3TCE(prep)
Generative music creator 2TC(live) implying 3TC(prep)
Rowe’s artifical performer 2STC(live) implying 3TC(prep)
Sound engineer (none)
Where types of agency are merged this implies both types in the given role,
e.g. 2TE(live) should be interpreted as 2T(live) and 2E(live)
6.7.1 Reactive music
Reactive music systems respond to environmental input that was not typi-
cally intended as input (see Section 2.2.5). This provides evidence that any
agency being perceived is live rather than preparatory. In this sense, we may
see reactive music as akin to generative music with the addition of evidence.
There is a further consideration to reactive music. Reactive music re-
sponds to environmental consequences of the listener ’s actions (e.g. sounds
from the place they have chosen to be, their subconscious bodily movements).
We might consider cases where the listener is acting with agency over what
they hear such as choosing environments with interesting sounds as having
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listener agency of our familiar types (perhaps 1C and 1T). But even without
this intention, the listener may still feel a sense of personal ownership of what
they hear, which fits within our looser definition of perceived (performative)
agency (Section 6.3.3).
6.7.2 Interactive music systems
With interactive sound installations, the participant has typically not re-
hearsed or done any preparatory work prior to the interaction, meaning that
there is typically no 1(prep). In contrast, with interactive sound applications
this may not be the case (see Section 2.2.3).
A potential participant may not be expecting their agency in the ex-
perience to extend beyond their interpretation. The first challenge of the
system is often to communicate to that their agency extends beyond this
through establishing a perceptual feedback loop. Without this, the system
is subjectively equivalent to a generative or reactive system.
As the participant develops a mental model of how they may interact with
the system, they are exercising 1T(live). This interaction may provide the
participant with evidence of the live agency of the system, 2(live), which, as
with generative systems, may likely lead to 3(prep) agency. Some designers
may also wish for their participants to feel a sense of 1C(live), 1E(live).
Well, this may be what the system’s designer had in mind. However,
the participant may perceive the context as requiring more 1T or 1C than
they are prepared for (I don’t know how to use it or I don’t know what
to do respectively). They may feel that the system provides 1E and feel
uncomfortable exposing themselves in front of others. On the other hand,
they may reach a stage where they feel bored with the limits of 1T (I’ve
learned all there is to know), disappointed with the limits of 1C (I don’t have
enough control over the output to create anything that is mine) or 1E (the
sound doesn’t speak for me).
As we can see, similarly to DMIs, the norms of interactive sound in-
stallations are not exact in determining where agency should be perceived.
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Thus, difficulties may arise when participants feel entitled to more agency
(or intimidated by the degree to which they have been granted it).
6.8 Discussion
Perceived performative agency defines the structure in which skill may be
demonstrated. The perception of agency is different from authorship. It is
not just ‘who did it?’ but ‘what was the structure in which they did so?’
Perceived agency is what allows us to discern how much skill was demon-
strated given an outcome. A key conclusion is that the perception of skill,
creativity and expression depend as much on what could have been done as
it does on what was done. The idiomaticities of an instrument define not
only its voice (Tanaka 2006) but a space of potential musical acts. Audience
understanding of this potential allows the significance of the one performed
to be understood.
We may now return to the question we asked at the beginning of this
chapter: does skill matter? The performance contexts considered suggests
that a demonstration of skill does matter. Although there is diversity in terms
of what skills are demonstrated how and by whom, it remains important
that it is done so within the scope for agency implied by the norms of the
performance context.
Without established norms of agency within interactive music, we have
not ruled out the possibility of creating an Interactive Music System (IMS)
that does not require skill of its participants. However, problems may arise
when participants infer expectations of agency that are then not met by
the system. For example, assumptions by a participant that a system ex-
ists as a means for them to be creative may make them unappreciative of
any musical ideas embedded within the system—regardless of the quality of
those ideas. Conversely, expectations of discovering music within a system
may make a participant unappreciative of an interaction in which they must
exercise agency in order to determine an outcome. Both of these cases repre-
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sent a mismatch between the designer and the participant over the balance
between 1C(live) and 3C(prep). In either case, someone needs to take re-
sponsibility for what is heard. But this suggests that it is not enough simply
to demonstrate agency; it needs to match the participant’s expectations.
Whether or not the participant demonstrates skill, the framework sug-
gests two reasons why interactivity may still enhance the appreciation of a
work. First, interactivity provides the means to establish whether agency is
live or preparatory, for example with a reactive music system (Section 6.7.1).
Note though that such a demonstration is possible without the participation
of the perceiver as we saw, for example, with Rowe’s artificial performer (Sec-
tion 6.6.3) or musicians within an ensemble bouncing musical ideas off each
other (Section 6.5.2). Second, interactivity allows an individual to feel a sense
of personal agency over an experience as it is unique to them. (This latter
reason depends upon the looser definition of personal agency of Section 6.4.3
which excluded the requirement of intentionality over an outcome.)
We saw in Section 6.1 Spiegel’s (1988) assumption that there is a pleasure
to be had simply in making music that aligned with one’s ‘intent’. In terms
of the framework, this corresponds to a system offering 1E(live). We would
assume to do so a system must be technically impressive (2T(live)) and ei-
ther creating original music (2C(live)) or adapting a rendition of a stored
composition (3C(prep)) such as Mathews’ Radio Baton (Section 2.2.4). We
questioned whether such a machine could really be enjoyable. Using the
framework to draw on the lessons of other paradigms, the tentative answer
is yes although with similar caveats as above: the participant must feel that
this arrangement of affairs is appropriate for the context. However, we might
speculate that with such a system, providing expressive agency does not com-
pensate for poor content (C) or execution (T).
The framework also indicates the problem with Rokeby’s operational
cliche´s (Section 2.1.5). We might imagine a system that is interactive but
whatever actions the participant takes, a fantastically accomplished, original
and emotive outcome results. With an understanding that skill is perceived
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with respect to perceived agency we may see that such outcomes do not allow
the participant to feel technically skilled, creative or expressive. If the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate these skills were a motivating factor in the interaction,
the participant is liable to feel dissatisfied. More dangerously, however, is if
the participant perceives 1 agency but later discovers their interaction was
predetermined to arrive at ‘good’ outcomes, for example when observing an-
other person use the system. They must then reassess the extent to which
they have demonstrated skill. What they thought was their own has turned
out to have been an operational cliche´. There is a parallel in this situation
as with the potential of a Digital Musical Instrument to dishonestly violate
the concert pact (see Section 6.1.4). We might speculate from Rokeby (1998)
and Schloss (2003) that overestimating skill as a result of having been ‘fooled’
through a misperception of agency is worse than having not perceived any
skill at all. Once again, however the distribution of agency is perceived,
consistency and confidence remain crucial.
6.8.1 Relationship to the Emerging Structures model
In terms of the Emerging Structures (ES) model (Section 4.2), perceived
agency is closely related to a perceived capacity for action, although it also
considers social and contextual norms. Perceived agency might be considered
as perceived potential capacity defined in terms of what actions were available
to the participant if they had all the relevant knowledge and skills. As such,
it is crucial in determining the value of the participant’s perceived capacity
and what sense of accomplishment it warrants.
6.8.2 Perceiving agency with incremental constraint
unlocking
The framework may assist our understanding of what went wrong with our
attempt in the previous chapter to implement an IMS with emerging struc-
tures using incremental constraint unlocking. The IMS of the implementation
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provided first person agency, 1(live). However, the parameters in which this
agency could be exercised were limited. We constructed the system with the
goal of creating anticipation of further capacity: elements were displayed as
‘locked’ and written messages were presented stating when new functionality
would become available. It was therefore clear that these limitations were
decided upon by the designer, 3(prep). Hence 1C(live) was limited through
an exercise of 3(prep) leading to some participants feeling frustrated that
they were being constrained.
Although the limitations did literally limit the space of available outputs
available to the participant, the framework we have presented suggests that
the distribution of agency is more important than the actual parameters.
Therefore, we may argue that had the participant not been led to attribute
these to an active decision by the designer then they would not have felt as
limited by these constraints. Furthermore, the constraints were controlled
by a timer and so were quite clearly the result of preparatory agency. As
a result, there was clearly no means by which the participant could exert
influence over how the unlocking unfolded.
However, given the diversity of distributions of agency covered within this
chapter, why was this one problematic? There are two points to consider.
First, we observe that only some participant found the constraint unlocking
an imposition. We might speculate that those who took exception were those
who felt that the norms of the situation did not justify 1C(live) being limited
by 3(prep). This may be the case, for example, for individuals used to using
creative software on a computer and inferring those norms about this system.
Second is the possibility that it was the varying of the parameters of 1 agency
that caused the issue. The participant might have begun with a greater sense
of personal agency but then had this withdrawn when the nature of constraint
unlocking became apparent, resulting in a loss of perceived ownership of what
they had done so far—similar to the above discussion of operational cliche´s.
One observation we have drawn from the framework is that there does not
appear to be a universal preference for norms that maximise the parameters
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of agency being exercised. Rather, preference seems to be given to contexts
in which the perceiver is familiar with the way in which agency is typically
distributed. This suggests that limiting the user’s agency is not necessarily
a problem providing it does not appear to be an exercise of another’s agency
in violation of the user’s expectations.
In Section 4.4.4 we proposed that to make an interactive music experience
captivating we need perceived capacity to be continually increasing. However,
in this chapter we have seen that doing so through altering the participant’s
perceived agency—i.e. the perceived potential capacity for action—may not
be a suitable approach to do so. We may argue that this is because the
participant’s perception of agency in which that capacity was established is
lessened, diminishing the sense of accomplishment that arises from establish-
ing it.
To conclude, the sense of achievement gained by increasing capacity is
defined by the perceived extent to which other individuals might have found
it. This is determined both by the diversity of control granted to the par-
ticipant and the involvement of other agents. In other words, discovering a
‘hidden garden’ (Arfib et al. 2003) is more rewarding if you think few others
would have found it. Therefore, if the interactions available to the partici-
pant are to be constrained then this should not be done so through varying
their perceived first person agency or through the unexpected involvement of
another agent. In the next chapter we will apply this observation to improve
on our previous design principle of incremental constraint unlocking, which
will then be implemented and put to the test.
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Chapter 7
Implicitly constrained
interaction
In this chapter, I define an implicit constraint as a constraint that as before
limits the rate at which the participant may access the input space—but does
so without altering the parameters of perceived 1 agency. I present ‘mir-
roring’, where two participants must match each other’s body position, as a
potential means to achieve this. This is implemented within the collaborative
sound installation Impossible Alone (IA), which I describe in detail.
The initial attempt at implementing incremental constraint unlocking in
Chapter 5 suffered a number of shortcomings. The key challenge, which
we identified before the study, was determining when the constraints should
unlock. However, in the previous chapter we identified a further potential
problem with limiting the parameters of perceived 1 agency (Section 6.8.2).
In particular, we concluded that any limitation on the perceived potential
capacity for action may be perceived as a limitation of 1(live) agency. Such
limitations may be seen as an ‘unjustified imposition’ if they are the result
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of 3(prep) agency.1
A further issue that we identified was that the system may have been too
simple. Creating IMSs for an experimental context leads to systems that are
quite distinct from those that might be used outside of the lab, particularly
when using quantitative methods (Marquez-Borbon et al. 2011). This is to a
large extent a necessity of isolating the effect of a single aspect of a system.
Evaluation methodology will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, we
note simply that our model of emerging structures is designed quite closely
around the notion of perceiving complexity. As such, it may be unreasonable
to assume generalisability of results from a simplified system designed with
a user study in mind.
Therefore, in this chapter I describe a system designed for public exhi-
bition, Impossible Alone (IA) which I created with creative input from the
performance artist Tiff Chan. As with the Serendiptichord, we follow an
art-driven approach (Candy and Edmonds 2002), although working within
the following set of requirements to overcome the issues outlined above.
7.1 Requirements
Our requirements for IA are as follows.
• The system should be constrained so as to provide emerging structures
of sound and interaction. These constraints should unlock gradually in
response to the participant but without an explicit goal being set.
• The participant should not perceive an alteration to the parameters of
1(live) agency as a result of the constraints. In particular, any limi-
tations arising from the constraints should avoid the perception that
they arise from 3(prep).
1Capacity for action was defined in Section 4.2.4. The ‘3(prep)’ notation was defined
in Section 6.4.
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• The system should embody the above requirements without sacrificing
its artistic merit or potential for public exhibition.
7.2 Implicit and explicit constraints
Requirements 1 and 2 together essentially demand for an approach to con-
straining interaction that does not alter the parameters of 1(live) agency.
We define an explicit constraint as a constraint that arises through a
limitation of the parameters of 1(live) agency and an implicit constraint that
arises through a limitation within the parameters of first-person agency.2
Thus, the implementation of constraints in Chapter 5 was an example of
explicit constraints. We explicitly constrained the space of inputs available
to the user which limited the parameters in which they could perceivably
exercise 1 agency. As it was clear both that the input was limited and that
this limitation was purposefully implemented, the constraints were likely to
be perceived as an exercise of 3(prep) agency. Note, however, that perceiv-
ing agency requires perceiving intention. This may not be the case if the
limitation seemed inevitable rather than purposeful.
So how can we create an implicit constraint? It may seem that the so-
lution is simple not to tell the participant that new inputs will be made
available. However, without expectation of further inputs we may not estab-
lish anticipation of new inputs, which was a motivation behind constraint
unlocking (Section 5.1). Furthermore, some kind of feedback will be nec-
essary to make the participant aware of this novel type of input. But by
providing this feedback, and by continually providing new functionality, we
have landed back where we started: the participant is aware that there are
inputs that they are being denied at the whim of an unseen party.
A potential solution is to design our system so that the constraints arise
due to the participant’s ability to exercise fully their perceived 1 agency.
2There may be constraints other than implicit and explicit. For example, the partici-
pant may choose to limit the set of available inputs they use.
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That is, inputs are unavailable due to the participant’s ability to perform
them. At the same time, the participant should be aware of the potential
existence of these inputs (although not necessarily certain of what they are)
and able to improve their ability during the experience in order to access
them. Furthermore, we would like to avoid choosing a constraint that some
participants may already be armed with skills to overcome. We cannot simply
choose complex and instrumental movements.
7.3 Impossible Alone: Constraints through
collaboration
7.3.1 Multiparticipant interaction
How can we constrain the exercise of 1(live) agency without imposing 3(prep)
agency? Our approach will be to create a collaborative system.
Multiplayer environments are particularly popular in games (Wood et al.
2004; Mandryk 2005). Both competitive (competing against each other) and
cooperative (collaborating to compete against a common goal) modes are
common in games. Beyond the social aspect, an advantage of competitive
multiplayer is that it allows for a range of different degrees of challenge
whilst maintaining consistent parameters of 1(live) agency—in other words,
the success of the players is determined only by their abilities rather than
decisions of the game designer (3(prep)).
Within a collaborative IMS, requiring participants to negotiate to provide
an input allows us to limit individual 1 agency (‘I’) but retain collective 1
agency (‘we’). Through this, we propose that the limitation will no longer
seem an unjustified imposition from a third party but an inevitable and
necessary aspect of the interaction design.
The use of a collaborative system raises evaluation issues. For example,
mutual engagement (Section 2.3.3) may lead to a more positive experience
overall irrespective of the constrained interaction design. On the other hand,
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the need for participants to negotiate, work together and maintain awareness
of each other might make their exploratory processes more conscious and so
more easily probed in interview.
7.3.2 Mirroring: an implicit constraint
Mirroring is a drama exercise in which two people move together whilst
continually reflecting each other’s pose. The activity is designed to make
each aware of their movements (Dayton 1990, p. 108). We will use the terms
mirroring, reflecting and matching interchangeably. In each case, we mean
each person positioned as if they were a reflection of the other.
Sometimes it is done with a leader but it may also be done through equally
mutual influence. In the activity, each person is effectively attempting to
match their own pose, but with the error introduced by each participant’s
perception of the other’s pose and motor accuracy establishing a positive
feedback loop. Thus, even without a leader movements arise naturally.
Mirroring prevents the participants from moving completely freely. At
the same time, they are able easily to imagine and anticipate a greater range
of inputs. Through negotiating and working together, they are free to ex-
plore the entire range of potential gestures providing them with consistent
parameters of 1(live) agency (albeit collective rather than individual). Thus,
requiring two participant to mirror in order to provide input to the system
provides an implicit constraint. In order to access more complex movements,
a rapport needs to be developed between the participants providing a pace
to the interaction. Therefore progress is dependent upon skill—both social
and technical. Whilst the participants remain free to establish their own
goals, the challenge that they must overcome in order to achieve these goals
remains clear. We propose that this constraint will lead the participants to-
wards conducting deeper exploration whilst sustaining an awareness of the
greater space, thus establishing anticipation.
The challenge provided by mirroring also allows us to introduce greater
scope for 1T(live) agency.
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7.3.3 Overview
Impossible Alone (IA) is a two participant IMS that uses the Mirroring con-
straint. It uses a skeleton-tracking system to sense the body position of
both participants. Whilst the participants are not matching, there is a fairly
monotonous and discordant deviation sound. As they tend towards a match-
ing position, the deviation sound morphs towards a more harmonious sound.
When the participants are matching, a range of more musical sounds are
available through movement.
7.3.4 Process
IA was developed with creative input from Tiff Chan, a performance artist
specialising in movement and dance. In a series of six workshops spread
over six months, Chan and I met to test the system and discuss its future
development. In some of these sessions, others were invited to participate to
test the system and provide feedback. To assist oﬄine testing, we also took
recordings of input data from two participants.
Chan researches and conducts therapeutic movement classes. Throughout
the process, we had slightly different viewpoints about the system, with Chan
viewing it more as a movement game whilst I saw it in terms of an IMS as
we have been discussing in this thesis. These differences were helpful in
identifying and addressing what kind of system we were creating and how we
wanted it to be perceived by participants (discussions which contributed to
the arguments we have already met in this thesis).
Through this development process, two different versions of the mapping
were developed. Both are described below.
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7.3.5 Implementation
Joint capture
We describe a participant’s body position in terms of their joints. This
provides a ‘stick-man’ like representation, sensing of which is described as
skeleton tracking.
IA was implemented in C++ using openFrameworks3 with Ableton Live4
providing sound synthesis. Sensing was done using a Microsoft Kinect5
infrared depth camera, with skeleton tracking calculated with the NITE
(PrimeSense Inc. 2011) algorithm from PrimeSense6 running on the OpenNI
(2010) framework. This provided independent measurements for the torso
(including its absolute orientation), elbows, hands, knees and feet. Data for
joints below the hips tended to be somewhat less reliable than those above,
in terms of both missing and inaccurate data.
Joint data captured through this method is less accurate than that done
using motion capture (see Section 2.2.4). The single viewpoint also makes it
liable to occlusion (i.e. limbs of the participant being obscured by other parts
of their body or another participant). However, it has the strong advantage
of being portable, easy to set up and significantly less expensive.
The joint data it provides is noisy. Through experimentation, we de-
termined that low latency was more important than spatial accuracy with
contactless bodily interaction (i.e. without touching a physical controller).
However, when considering the positions of the joints in relation to each
other we found accuracy became more important at low velocities and when
measuring acceleration in order to establish a sense of reactive control. In
other words, when moving, we would be sensitive to the effects of noise in
measuring acceleration, and when still we would become sensitive to noise
within the relative position between joints. To address this, a smoothing tech-
3http://www.openframeworks.cc
4http://www.ableton.com/live
5http://www.xbox.com/kinect
6http://www.primesense.com/
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nique was developed that combined a double exponential estimator (Wilson
2006; Kalekar 2004) with a weighted moving window average. This allowed
us to tune a balance between sluggishness (latency on the first and second
derivative) and exaggeration (oversensitive second derivative with a result as
if limbs were elastic). This approach was compared to that using a Kalman
Filter (see e.g. Simon 2001) and found to be superior for our purposes.
Measuring deviation
We define deviation as the extent to which participants are not matching.
As matching was the key skill to be developed for the participants to explore
the input space, deriving an algorithm that closely aligned with the partici-
pants perceptual interpretation of ‘mirroring’ was crucial in order to ensure
their limited ability to do so was a result of their own abilities (1 agency)
rather than a failure of the system (3(prep) or potentially 2(live)). To do so,
considerable time was spent developing, testing and tuning an algorithm to
determine deviation. We refer to a participant’s joint’s opposite as the other
participant’s reflected limb (e.g. for participants A and B, A’s left elbow
opposes B’s right elbow). A joint and its opposite forms an opposing pair of
joints.
The original proposal for IA had the two participants separated by two
skeleton tracking cameras, leaving a distance of approximately four metres
between them. Quite early through the workshops we found that rapport,
communication and eventually mutual engagement were easier and more en-
joyable to develop without the distance or equipment separating the two
participants. However, this presented difficulties in capturing joints with a
single camera. We wanted the participants to look at each other but also
avoid occlusion. We ultimately compromised with participants stood 45 de-
grees apart, which was marked out with tape on the floor.
We also observed that what we perceptually considered to be matching
changed based on distance. When separated by a few metres and asked to
reflect each other, participants would align themselves through matching the
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angle of opposing joints. However, when closer together, matching was in-
stead done through imagining a mirror was placed between them. This would
often lead to different joint angles, especially with participants of different
heights when, for example, raising their arms. Furthermore, the ability to
maintain an accurate match dropped dramatically when joints were mov-
ing. Instead, participants (and spectators) tended to perceive similar speeds
in opposing joints—with their position measured relative to the torso—as
determining the extent to which they were matching.
The final algorithm conducted a joint by joint comparison drawing on a
number of methods: the 3D angle created by the joint relative to its parent
joint, speed and mirror deviation. Mirror deviation was calculated by defin-
ing an ideal reflective plane (i.e. an imaginary mirror) as the plane defined
by the mean of the midpoints between opposing joints normal to the mean
of the lines connecting opposing joints. The mirror deviation for a given
joint was then calculated as the distance between opposing joints when one
had been reflected in this plane. The final value of deviation was arrived
at through taking a weighted combination of these methods using the Lp
norm with p = 0.43. This value biases the combined measure towards the
method that is presently most ‘generous’. The overall measure was then cal-
culated through a weighted mean over the joints. Individual joint weightings
were again derived empirically through the workshops to arrive at the most
perceptually satisfactory measurement. Overall, they prioritised the mirror
deviation method and the hands and arms. Deviation measurements were ex-
ponentially smoothed with smoothing parameters set on a per-method basis.
These weightings are shown in Table 7.1.
Mapping: Version 1
The first version was more game-like than the second (described below). As
participants moved without deviating, a ‘charge’ built up, which was sonified
as a deep electrical buzzing growing in volume and intensity as the charge
increased. If a charge was built up and the participants then deviated, it
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Table 7.1: Weightings used to calculate deviation.
Method Weight Joint Weight
3D angle deviation 0.43 Torso 0.38
Speed deviation 0.1 Elbow 0.23
Mirror deviation 0.47 Hand 0.23
Foot 0.015
would be ‘dissipated’: the charge would rapidly decrease and the system
emit a deep crack of thunder would resound through the room, proportional
in intensity to the level of charge.
The soundscape was divided into a sequence of levels which were activated
when the charge reached a given threshold. At each level, different tracks of
music—mostly loops ranging from a few seconds to a few minutes—would
come in as well as new inputs recognised, providing control over the volume
and effect parameters of some of the tracks. As the participants progressed
through different levels, the requirements to build up charge would become
more stringent, eventually to the stage where continuous movement above a
certain speed was necessary to avoid dissipation.
The charge and level system was motivated by the desire to form musical
structures of tension and release within the system. However, advancing
through the levels became an overriding goal that detracted participants’
engagement with the more musical functionality. Although the participants
remained free to move as they liked, they built up charge providing it was
with enough speed, and it was this build up that became the primary goal
rather than exploring the mapping. Different ways of ‘gaming’ the system
could be found such as repeating simple arm movements to rapidly advance.
The music served more to indicate the achievement of the goals rather than
the focus of attention.
Furthermore, the levels within the system effectively served as an explicit
constraint. Although this early version was not formally evaluated as was the
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system in Chapter 5, the issues of perceived agency did not arise. However,
this is likely because the system was perceived much more akin to a game
than a tool for personal expression leading to different norms of agency being
inferred by the participants.
This first version did not establish an implicit constraint as intended.
However, its development was informative in identifying how introducing
game aspects—in particular a level structure—can alter the attitude and
exploratory approach of participants.
Mapping: Version 2
In order to retract some of the game-like elements and create a more music-
oriented system, the charge and levels were dropped in the second version.
The development of this mapping was more strongly influenced by the
effect of the matching constraint on participants’ movements. In the work-
shops, we found that this caused a tendency towards certain types of move-
ments, in particular in the order in which limb movements were tried. Partici-
pants tended to commence with arms with torso and leg movements following
later.
We began with the idea of interpreting abstract qualities of the movement
of the participants, working with Laban Movement Analysis (Davies 2001)
and affect recognition (e.g. Bernhardt and Robinson 2007; Kapur et al. 2005).
However, over the course of the workshops, we moved towards more reactive
and easily understood mappings.
This mapping was developed through a number of iterations. The result
was as follows. The deviation sound fades out when participants are match-
ing and moving. If participants deviate, or stay still for more than a few
moments, the musical sounds (described below) fade out and the deviation
sound returns. As the mapping is only effective when matching, we may
define it in terms of one participant.7 Relative to a participant, we define
7As we saw, there is some leeway in our deviation measurement. In practice, we reflect
the second participant in the reflective plane and use the mean position of opposing joints
within our mapping.
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three planes: vertical (left/right and up/down), horizontal (front/back and
left/right) and sagittal (front/back and up/down) (Davies 2001).
• The hands are mapped to an 8 bar looped string section with the
position of each hand in the vertical plane controlling timbral effects
(low-pass filter frequency and resonance, FM drive and harmonic den-
sity). The mean speed of both hands control the volume of the strings.
Through experimenting, we found that using the mean of the current
velocity and a decaying peak velocity provided a satisfying ‘conductor-
style’ means of controlling the level.
• The contraction of the arms (i.e. the distance of the hands from any
part of the torso) controls the level of a rougher pad sound, with the
level decreasing as the arms contracted.
• ‘Stabbing’ the hands below the height of the hips creates a deep percus-
sive hit. The intensity of the hit could be controlled by ‘accumulating’
energy through fast arm movement before the stab took place. Note
that this is not quite the same as the velocity of the arm at the moment
of the hit determining intensity—this discrepancy from what might be
expected confused some participants in the evaluation. If the hands
are kept below the hip line after a stab then moving them within the
horizontal plane gives control over effects applied to the decay of the
hit sound.
• A generative two bar drum loop can be triggered by simultaneously
passing the hands and elbows through the horizontal plane at the height
of the shoulders, with the algorithm’s two input parameters controlled
by the mean velocities of these joints in the up/down axis and the hori-
zontal plane. Each arm controls a different drum (and each participant
had different drums providing four in total, although two would typ-
ically be triggered concurrently due to matching). The drum sounds
pass through an effect which controlled by the mean up/down speed
and mean elbow angles. Triggering of the drum loop is quantised to a
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semiquaver, which is the shortest note duration within the loop. Extra
loops may be created and triggered simultaneously by moving the arms
out of and back into the trigger zone. Through this, complex rhythms
can be created through moving the arms as if imitating a bird flapping
its wings.
• Clapping the hands triggers a short generative sequence of bell sounds.
Inaccuracies in the skeleton tracking made it difficult to determine when
an actual clap occurs so a threshold of hand proximity was used as a
trigger. As the hands move towards the threshold, a ‘tension’ sound
of a steady pitch can be heard, with its volume linked to the closeness
of the hand distance to the threshold. After a clap is detected, the
closeness of the hands controls the phase on a (non-oscillating) phaser.
7.3.6 Exhibition
Version 1 of the system was shown at the Secret Garden Party music fes-
tival in July 2011 with the Guerilla Science group (Figure 7.1), where it
received a favourable review from New Scientist’s CultureLab (Else 2010).
See Section 1.5.2 for a full listing of exhibitions.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have established implicit constraints as a means to im-
plement incremental constraint unlocking without disrupting the user’s per-
ception of 1(live) agency. We have realised this concept through the mir-
roring constraint. As well as being an implicit constraint, mirroring brings
other aspects to participation. From my experiences so far, I can report
that it establishes a strong sense of mutual engagement, creates a situation
in which both participants provoke each other into experimenting with un-
familiar movements. It has a strong disinhibitory effect. However, this is
potentially illustrative of a shift from singular 1 agency (‘I’) to collective
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Figure 7.1: Two participants interact with Impossible Alone
in front of a crowd at the Secret Garden Party, 2011.
(‘we’).
Collaborating with an artist from a different background highlighted
where assumptions were being made. In particular, it made us address po-
tential trade-offs between music-oriented and game-oriented aspects. My
approach with IA has been to create from the ground up a system that em-
bodies an implicit constraint, rather than attempting to ‘bolt on’ constraint
unlocking to an existing idea. I have argued that this is the fairest way to
assess the real-world potential of our approach to creating interactive music.
However, conducting a rigorous evaluation of such a system—and the prin-
ciples underlying it presents a challenge, one that we will tackle in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation of Impossible Alone
In this chapter I present an evaluation of the previous chapter’s implemen-
tation of an implicitly constrained interaction design, Impossible Alone (IA).
The outcomes of this evaluation have informed the theoretical work in ear-
lier chapters. Before doing so, a number of shortcomings of the quantitative
approach to evaluation used in Chapter 5 are discussed, with the conclusion
that a rigorous qualitative method is most appropriate. I opt for Discourse
Analysis (DA), review a number of different approaches to this method and
opt for an adaptation of an approach taken by Stowell (2010). I report on a
mixed set of experiences and present the key findings of the study in line with
the earlier work of this thesis, exploration and perceiving agency, as well as
some interesting findings regarding the rights and obligations perceived by the
participants. Finally, I offer an informal evaluation of our methodology.
In Section 5.6 we identified a number of shortcomings with the constraint
unlocking study. The approach to constraint unlocking limited perceived
agency (see Section 7.2). Furthermore, the constraint implementation did not
sufficiently reduce the complexity of our interface (see Section 5.6). However,
there were also a number of issues with our methodology. Before describing
the evaluation of Impossible Alone (IA), we therefore will critically analyse
271
our earlier methodology to best consider how to proceed.
8.1 Methodology
Engineering for pleasure requires different approaches than when the goal is
utility (Gaver et al. 2004). In this section we will outline a number of short-
comings that can arise when quantitative approaches are used to evaluate
creative or aesthetically-driven systems. I will then propose that a qualita-
tive approach is more suitable for our needs.
8.1.1 Problems with quantitative evaluation
Quantitative evaluation has a key advantage in that it allows the researcher’s
subjectivity to be detached from data analysis. Whilst few argue for art to
be evaluated through quantitative methods (Ho¨o¨k et al. 2003), it is common
when evaluating technology used within creative practice to ‘factor out’ the
aesthetic components and just consider utilitarian aspects such as usabil-
ity, learnability and efficiency (e.g. Wanderley and Orio 2002; Jorda` 2004).
However, I will argue here that quantitative methods are unsuitable for the
evaluation of a design principle for use in a creative work. There are four
key issues which we will discuss in turn.
1. Evaluating design principles based on the mean response of an audience.
2. Assuming audience responses are independent.
3. Neglecting the situatedness of interaction.
4. The need for a creative work in the evaluation.
1. Evaluating design principles based on the mean response of an
audience
The mean response of an audience does not necessarily determine the success
of an artwork (see, e.g., Wellcome Trust 2010). A work may not be made with
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the goal of eliciting a single homogenous experience (Morrison et al. 2007).
The average experience reported by statistical methods is not necessarily
representative of a single experience (Gaver et al. 2004). As Ho¨o¨k et al. (2003)
points out, it is the anomalies, complexities and individual peculiarities that
are of interest.
More helpful is an analysis of why a work elicited a particular experience.
This is not in conflict with our goal of establishing generalisable approaches
that may be applied to create specific effects (Section 1.4). Rather, that we
may better achieve it by going beyond statistical aggregation and considering
individual experiences in more detail.
2. Assuming audience responses are independent
Quantitative studies typically assume independence for each datapoint. This
is usually a requirement when testing for significance (Kruskal 1988). But
appraisals of art work often are not independent. Our response is influenced
by our preconceptions and expectations (Leder et al. 2004), many of which
may be formed by responses of others, media coverage, critical reviews. The
behaviour of others within a gallery may influence our opinion as may knowl-
edge of the artist, as we saw in Section 6.2. It is not uncommon to attend
galleries with friends and there may be mutual influence within a group.
Not only are these important factors to consider, but they likely interact
with each other too. For example, a friend’s recommendation may be less
influential if we have already heard about a work from the press.
Therefore it may not be reasonable to assume that the success of an
artwork is determined by its ability to be successful with many independent
viewers. If the responses of individuals are mutually dependent, then it is
not valid to assume it is a population (in the statistical sense) that may be
independently sampled. This calls into question the validity of generalising
from the lab into the wider world.
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3. Neglecting the situatedness of interaction
Throughout this thesis we have considered the means by which an aesthetic
experience is established through how we form an understanding of a system.
Suchman (1987) argues that the actions we take to explore a system, and
thus the means by which we form an understanding of it, are situated, mean-
ing that context and environment are strong determiners both of behaviour
and the interpretation of its consequences. In addition, how individuals re-
spond aesthetically has been shown to be dependent upon the environment
of reception (Leder et al. 2004).
It is not always possible to test things in the field, and lab-based research
remains a vital tool. But this change in context limits the extent to which
we may generalise conclusive results of whether something was the case.
However, with a richer understanding of how experiences are formed and
systems explored we can more easily theorise the effect of the situation.
4. The need for creative work in the evaluation
In order to evaluate engineering principles that are developed for creative
applications, creative works need to be involved.
When evaluating a design principle through a creative work, the re-
searcher’s artistic ideas become entwined within the evaluation (for it usually
is the researcher’s own work that is being evaluated). Even DMIs embody
musical ideas (Jorda` 2005). As artistic goals may limit the validity of the re-
sults, they may well remain undisclosed. But art is typically created to serve
some kind of greater artistic goal. A particular design principle may or may
not contribute to that goal. I would argue that those who may be interested
in applying the outcomes of such research are likely to be interested in the
design principle in terms of how it assisted the artist in achieving these goals.
Evaluating it against a general ‘positive user experience’ metric as we did in
Chapter 5 may make the results easier to interpret and compare. However,
it obscures the extent to which the design principle contributed towards any
artistic goals.
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Furthermore, evaluation of an attribute of a system under the standard
hypothesis testing paradigm requires a control condition to be established
that ideally varies only in terms of this attribute. Therefore, the researcher
must convince their audience that any effects recorded are due to this at-
tribute rather than other design decisions. The simplest means to do so is
to disable a particular functionality of a system that embodies the design
principle. However, the earlier on during the design of a system that a de-
sign principle is adopted, the more sympathetic the design as a whole will
be to that principle. Decisions taken during design depend upon each other
and attempting to create a system that works both with and without that
principle may lead to a compromised system that does not work in either
case.
We saw a potential example of this issue in Chapter 5 with our systems
that were considered too complex by some participants but were perhaps still
too simple for incremental constraint unlocking to be effective (Section 5.6).
Constraint unlocking is a means to continually introduce complexity. When
a commitment has been made to it, there is more opportunity—arguably a
need—to introduce complexity into the design.
Quantitative testing is designed to evaluate the effect of a treatment on
a population. But the population that design principles are applied to is
interactive artworks, not the individuals who experience a single work. If we
were truly to evaluate the principle quantitatively, we would need to sample
from the population of ‘potential artworks’, recruit a team of artists and
somehow convince half of them to implement the principle in their work
without biasing the rest of their input. It is an absurd idea. Otherwise,
however, the only generalising power provided by our statistical tests concern
the effect on the audience of this particular work.
Whilst quantitative methods remain important within NIME research for
evaluating traditional HCI issues such as usability, efficiency and learnability,
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as we start to consider the interactions between these issues and aesthetic
outcomes, more subjective and individualistic influences become involved.
When we are evaluating the experience of interacting with an IMS, a large
number of assumptions are necessary to maintain the validity or generalis-
ability of any findings. As we have seen, many of these assumptions may not
be valid.
As a result I opted to conduct a qualitative evaluation of Impossible Alone
(IA).
8.1.2 Qualitative approaches
Whilst quantitative research focuses on finding generalisations across popu-
lations, qualitative approaches often privilege the individual’s point of view,
seeking rich descriptions that capture the constraints of everyday life with
all of its interacting aspects (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).
It follows an open approach where the potential outcomes of the research
are not predefined before it is undertaken, making unexpected findings more
probable. Perhaps most importantly from our point of view, it facilitates
interpretation of how data arises from a specific individual’s experience.
I argued above that when design principles are applied to artistic works,
applications are likely to differ both in implementation and in intention.
Therefore results derived from a single work may lack the generalisability
often associated with quantitative methods. However with a qualitative ap-
proach, whilst the specific outcomes may not offer generalisability, we provide
descriptive details and interpretations of case-studies allowing us to under-
stand why events turned out as they did. This allows others to adapt the
lessons for their own situation. It is through considering the many facets
of an individual’s experience that we may understand the role their spe-
cific opinions, idiosyncrasies and experiences played in its construction. We
may also interpret the extent to which specific details of our implementation
played a part. As a result, qualitative approaches allow us, if not to avoid,
at least to recognise non-generalisable aspects of our result. For this reason,
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we might argue that in some contexts they may provide more scope for valid
generalisation.
Limitations
A key limitation of qualitative research is that it requires a significant amount
of subjective interpretation by the analyst (i.e. the researcher). As a result,
there is potential for the preconceptions and biases of the researcher to distort
or misrepresent the data. There are, however, procedures to help limit this
possibility. As mentioned in Section 2.5.5, there are diverse levels of rigour
to any approach and procedural documentation is essential to allow a reader
to assess the validity of the analysis. Our procedure is documented below in
Section 8.3.
A consequence of the above is that further analysis is required of the
reader to ascertain that the interpretation provided is a fair interpretation of
the data.
8.2 Discourse analysis
Discourse Analysis (DA) describes a range of techniques for detailed analysis
of text. There is no single fixed method (Banister et al. 1994). However, the
term DA is used within the social sciences to demand a depth of analysis
beyond simply reading and interpreting the transcript (Antaki et al. 2003).
DA was popularised by Foucault (1969), although he did not define a
specific set of methods and a number of differing approaches have formed
(Pera¨kyla¨ 2005). Common to these approaches is the application of a sys-
tematic analytical method to uncover not only the surface meaning of the
text, but how language is used to construct a common reality (Banister et al.
1994). As a result, discourse analysts often talk about the ‘work’ a text is do-
ing (e.g. Stowell et al. 2008; Holstein and Gubrium 2005) or the ‘machinery’
of language (e.g. Banister et al. 1994; Silverman 1998).
Key to DA is the viewpoint that there is not a unified concrete reality
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hiding inside an individual which may be ‘accessed’ through an interview
as if they were a noisy measuring device. Rather, talking and interacting
are a fundamental part of forming subjective reality (Pera¨kyla¨ 2005) and
understanding our experiences. It is through discourse that we construct our
reality and bring meaning to our experiences (Holstein and Gubrium 2005).
Our approach will be to rigorously understand the reality that is con-
structed through the discourse of a post-experiential interview. This does
not imply that we are uncovering ‘what really happened’. As the experience
is put into words meaning is imposed upon it. It is rationalised and no longer
an experience but a reconstructed experience from a memory. However, it
does still provide insight into how different aspects of a work elicited differ-
ent responses from its participants, as well as how a participant relates to
and draws upon previous experiences when forming an understanding of this
experience (Stowell 2010).
8.2.1 Analytical approaches
One of the strengths of DA is its adaptability to differing needs. However,
this adaptability means that there is not a unified systematic approach that
may be followed (Inskip 2010). While rough guidelines have been provided
(e.g. Banister et al. 1994; Baker 2004), these tend to be provided more as
examples to aid those intending to apply the technique in developing an
analytic mentality rather than a set of stipulations to identify ‘bad’ analysis
(Potter 2004).
Being open to a variety of methods for analysing text does not mean
that ‘anything goes’. In particular, analysis needs be systematic and explicit,
going beyond simply summarising, pulling quotes or forming an opinion based
around the data (Antaki et al. 2003).
Unlike, for example, grounded theory (Section 2.5.5), DA does not re-
quire the analyst to ‘suspend’ their experience, knowledge and prejudice
when analysing the data (Inskip 2010). But the risk remains that, either
intentionally or accidentally, the analysis technique is applied simply to con-
278
struct evidence of the preconceived opinions of the researcher. Awareness
of this risk becomes particularly relevant when we wish to use DA meth-
ods in fields that have traditionally adopted more quantitative approaches.
Therefore those applying DA within an engineering context, such as Stowell
(2010) (whose method ours is based upon) and Inskip (2010), have adopted
highly systematic and thorough methods that are explicitly documented,
demonstrating not only how, but also the extent to which the discourse was
analysed.
Although discourse analysis techniques have been applied directly to the
interaction between humans and machines (e.g. Suchman 1987), we are in-
terested in understanding not just how someone interacts but how that in-
teraction makes them feel, what they think about it and what experience
they take away with them. In Section 2.5.5 we established that that think
aloud methods are not appropriate. But trying to determine this entirely
from what participants do gives an incomplete picture. Therefore we have
chosen to analyse the experience after it has happened through a reflective
interview.
Interviews are common within qualitative research as they allow access to
past events and experiences (Pera¨kyla¨ 2005). However, it is important not to
overstep this and assume that we are somehow analysing the experience itself.
The representation of the experience is being constructed in the interview
(Baker 2004) and it is this discursive representation that we are analysing.
However, by producing a rigorous interpretation of our participants’ discourse
we may make inferences of their prior subjective experience and how it was
formed through their interactions with a system.
To summarise the above, the key requirements we require of our analytical
technique are as follows.
1. It involves a depth of analysis that goes beyond the surface meaning of
the text.
2. It is applied in an explicit and systematic manner that limits the po-
tential for distortion or omission of parts of the data.
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3. It is open to arriving at unexpected conclusions when they are sup-
ported by the data.
4. The validity of the above may be demonstrated to a reader.
8.2.2 Stowell’s method
Stowell et al. (2009) build on the approach described by Banister et al. (1994,
ch. 6) to present a method of analysis that that involves a rigorous and
systematic procedure to extract predicate relations from the discourse. The
ultimate object of study is not the discourse but it is through understanding
the discourse that we hope to understand the events that caused it. In this
sense, we might consider it applied DA in that the theories and methods
developed within DA are utilised but with different objectives and outcomes.
The method is as follows.
1. Transcription. The interviews are transcribed in a fashion that includes
all speech events (repetitions, fragments, pauses, simultaneous talking
from different individuals). These transcripts should be made available
to the reader to allow for analytical transparency.
2. Free association. The analyst reads the transcripts and notes down
surface impressions.
3. Itemisation of transcribed data. All pronouns are resolved using the
participant’s own language as far as possible. The items and actors
(which includes objects that act with agency or sentience) that appear
in the transcript are identified. For each of these, a description is ex-
tracted from the speech, again using the participant’s own terminology
as far as possible.
4. Reconstruction of the described world. The participant’s described
‘world’ is reconstructed into a conceptual map, such as a network of
relations. The participant’s language is retained throughout and so
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this world is primarily a methodical reorganisation of the participant’s
language through close reading of the text.
5. Examining context. The analyst may compare between different dis-
courses and draw upon their knowledge of the world beyond that de-
scribed by the discourse.
A key strength of this method is that it addresses the entirety of the data.
Every utterance is systematically included as a predicate, item or description,
or explicitly excluded as a conversational mechanism. The data is analysed
in a strict and methodical fashion that highlights where subjective decisions
need to be taken, allowing the analyst to avoid unintentional bias.
The method is particularly suited to analyse retrospectively an experience
that could not be addressed directly, as is the case in our context. As such,
an amount of data is disregarded: the discourse is ‘flattened’ in time to
produce a static conceptual map. Many of the mechanics of conversation are
considered less relevant in uncovering this aspect and disregarded.
Flexibility
We argued in Section 8.2.1 that an advantage of DA is its flexibility, yet also
of the need to be systematic. These need not be contradictory requirements.
With the above analysis, we have outlined our means of ensuring that the
entirety of the data is systematically covered. By making this process explicit,
we are able to identify where data is being disregarded. In particular, where it
becomes apparent that our ‘flattening’ of the data is disregarding potentially
valuable information, the analyst is free to include extra details within the
analysis.
Subjectivity and transparency of analysis
DA is not a magic bullet that turns discourse into objective data. However
methodical, analysis is done by an analyst. The strength of Stowell’s method
is not in removing this subjectivity but in making it explicit, making the
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analyst conscious of it and ensuring it is applied to the entirety of the data
rather than to parts that might initially look ‘interesting’ (i.e. useful!).
As alluded to above, with such a diversity of approaches it is important
that, as well as being systematic, analytical methods are documented explic-
itly (van Dijk 1990). Where the term ‘DA’ is used without any description
whatsoever of an analysis (e.g. Deweppe et al. 2009), as readers we cannot
determine the extent to which a structured method has been used. As well
as documenting our procedure, in line with Stowell (2010), full transcripts of
the interviews used in our analysis are available online (see Section 8.4).
8.3 Method
Our evaluation was conducted using IA, described in Chapter 7. We are
particularly interested in identifying the effects of the matching constraint.
As discussed in Section 8.1.1, we cannot assume that simply ‘removing’ this
constraint will leave us with a plausible system. The mapping has been
constructed around this constraint (Section 7.3.5). However, in order to
allow participants to better understand the effect of the constraint, they
were also asked to use the system without the constraint.
The orders were not randomised (so as to not infringe upon the freshness
of the ‘actual’ experience). Furthermore, at the point when the participants
used system without this constraint they had already been interviewed and
asked to consider its effects. This second session was conducted less to be
an experience for them to report on and more as means to allow them to
further develop their understanding of the effect the constraint had on their
first experience.
8.3.1 Pilot studies
Three pilot studies were conducted which uncovered a range of practical
issues, primarily regarding the system design. A short extract of an interview
was transcribed and analysed in order to identify any prominent issues within
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the analytical procedure.
8.3.2 Participants
Six pairs of participants took part in the study.
In order to maximise the participants’ potential to establish a rapport
within the study, participants were chosen based on their prior skills as far
as possible. However, the pilot studies had indicated that the deviation
algorithm deteriorated as the difference in height between the participants
increased. Therefore, maintaining similar heights was given preference to
matching skill when pairing participants.
Participants were recruited through sending recruitment adverts to mail-
ing lists. Participants were invited if responding to provide their height as
well as self-assessed ratings on their music and dance experiences on a five
point scale ranging from None to Professional.
One respondent requested to take part with her friend, which was accom-
modated. Two of the other pairs were aware of each other from working in
the same department, but unacquainted. The other three pairs did not know
each other.
Participants were each paid £10 for their participation, which ranged
from approximately 25 to 75 minutes.
8.3.3 Conditions
Although we did not consider the effects of prior knowledge with the Emerg-
ing Structures (ES) model, we saw both in the constraint unlocking user
study (Chapter 5) and then with the framework of perceived agency a par-
ticipant’s expectations of a performance or interaction can play a crucial role
in their response. Therefore, to investigate this effect, half of the pairs of
participants were provided with an overview of the available mappings, half
of them were not. Pairs of participants were randomly assigned to either
group in equal number.
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We emphasise that this was not an experiment. Our interest is less in
generalising outcomes and more to understand the processes that led to them.
8.3.4 Data collection
Each session within the study was video recorded. The sound output from
the system was recorded separately and a portable sound recorder was used
to record the interviews (in addition to the video recording in order to provide
a backup).
Whilst participants were interacting with the system, observations were
recorded. However, in order to minimise any inhibitory effects, this was done
primarily through looking at a video display of the participants on a laptop
rather than at the participants directly.
The consent form provided to each of the participants included options
to allow them to opt out of the normal anonymity requirements of the data
being recorded in the study. It was made clear that these answers could be
changed after the study. Approximately half of the participants chose to do
so.
8.3.5 Procedure
The following procedure was followed.
1. Participants were welcomed. An overview of the study was provided
and the participants were asked to read, fill out and sign the consent
form. The overview did not include details of Impossible Alone beyond
describing it as a musical system that they would use.
2. An overview of the system was provided that covered the following.
(a) The system responds to their movements with sound.
(b) To hear the sounds, the participants had to match each other’s
bodily position as if there were a mirror separating them, and
could not remain still for more than a few moments.
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(c) There would be a ‘dull feedback sound’ to inform them when they
were deviating or staying too still.
(d) The system does not respond properly if their limbs are not visible
to the depth camera or if they move beyond the range of the depth
camera (marked by tape on the floor).
(e) If applicable, participants were given an overview of each input
of the mapping of the system. Otherwise, participants were told
that they would not have the mapping explained to them.
(f) The participants were free to use the system for as long as they
like and should inform the investigator when they would like to
stop.
3. The participants were then asked to calibrate with the system1 and the
system was then switched on.
4. After the participants had indicated they would like to stop, a group
interview took place. During this, the investigator avoided as far as
possible to influence what was said beyond probing certain issues and
steering the discussion towards topics of interest. In particular, care
was taken to use terminology introduced by the participants wherever
possible and avoid potentially ‘loaded’ terms (deMarrais 2004). Note
that such an approach is an ideal. In practice, it is inevitable that an
interviewer’s influence will extend to some extent beyond the general
topics that are discussed.
5. The participants were invited to use the system again but informed that
this time they would not need to follow the matching requirement.
6. Steps 3 and 4 were repeated.
7. The participants were thanked for their time and paid.
1The OpenNI (2010) software used in this study required participants to calibrate by
holding a specific pose for a few seconds before they would be tracked.
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8.3.6 Analysis
Our method of analysis builds upon that of Stowell (2010) (described in
Section 8.2.2) and is as follows.
1. The discourse is transcribed. Note that the extent of detail used within
some transcripts is not always practical when large amounts of discourse
is involved due to time constraints (Inskip 2010). Our transcriptions
include all details such as fragments, interruptions, overlapping speech,
pauses. However, it does not include the timings of pauses, changes in
the speed or pitch of talking, or emphases except where necessary in
order to understanding the surface meaning of the text.
2. The entire discourse is read through, with initial thoughts and points
of interest recorded.
3. The text is broken down into utterances that are entered into a spread-
sheet. During this process, potential item categories are noted.
4. The text is itemised: the items and actors used are grouped into cate-
gories across utterances. The description used is saved with each cate-
gory.
5. Predicates relating categories are extracted from each utterance (more
than one predicate may follow from a single utterance). Predicate
descriptions are constructed from the text of the utterance as far as
possible.
• Where utterances relate more than two items, two items are chosen
as subject and object by the analyst with other items kept within
the description. This decision is made to preserve the original
meaning of the predicate as far as possible.
• On other occasions there may only be a subject and no object.
• Where participants have constructed a sentence together then the
predicates are created for both speakers.
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• Where an utterance is a concurrence of a prior utterance from an-
other person then it is disregarded unless it actively goes beyond
normal conversational mechanics, in which case the predicate to
which it concurred would be created for both speakers. For ex-
ample, ‘yeah’ would be disregarded; ‘yeah, it was’ would possibly
be disregarded depending on the analyst’s interpretation; ‘yeah it
was, wasn’t it’ would not be disregarded.
• Note that as the predicate descriptions were simply extracted from
the participants’ words it is not necessary to interpret a logical
meaning or even to fully understand what was said.
6. The resulting predicates are used to construct a conceptual map for
each speaker where nodes represent items and are labelled by all de-
scriptions used for that item by that speaker, and arcs represent rela-
tions and are labelled with the descriptions.
These maps are often quite complex. Part of this process involves
organising the map into clusters to keep it as simple as possible.
7. From the map, contradictions and ambiguities may be identified.
8. A description of the conceptual map is recreated from all of the pred-
icates on it in the language of the participant. Note that such a sum-
mary is not the ‘result’ of the analysis. Rather, it is an outcome that
is useful in providing a non-temporal description of the participant’s
contribution to the interview. It also assists a reader their verification
of the analytical process and conclusions that are drawn.
A motivation for using this technique to recreate the discourse is that
it preserves and aids the identification of ambiguity and contradictions
in what was uttered as they will tend to have been clustered together
during the construction of the map.
9. The above procedure is repeated for both interviews. A summary of
the key findings from this pair of participants is then written, drawing
287
on all of the above analytical material as well as the analyst’s own
knowledge and noted observations from the study.
Note that as well as analysing what was said, following the above proce-
dure further serves as a means for the analyst to become fully immersed in
the data.
As mentioned in Section 8.2.2, whilst our method is systematic to ensure
we cover the entirety of the data, on occasions it may become apparent that
it is disregarding important information. In these cases, the analyst remains
free to include additional material as a part of the analysis.
8.4 Results
We present here the findings from each analysis (see Section 8.3.6, step 9).
Details of observations and the reconstructed summaries may be found in
Appendix C. Full transcripts of the interviews are available online http:
//timmb.com/phd/transcripts.
In this study participants were initially stood side by side. Based on this,
they are described within each study as L and R referring to the participant
on the left or right respectively. All skill ratings are those provided by the
participant in their email and in the range 0–4 inclusive.
Note that the results of the analyses from this chapter led to further re-
finements Chapters 4 and 6. As such, the approach taken by the interviewer
as well as the language and findings may seem undeveloped in light of the
material we have presented so far. However, I have opted to keep our presen-
tation of the results in line with the original analysis so as to allow the reader
to understand the way in which our earlier theoretical content is supported
by this data.
8.4.1 Participant pair 1
These participants had the mapping explained to them before they began.
The first sessions lasted five minutes and the second nine minutes.
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Participant Gender Musical skill Dance skill
L F 0 1
R F 2 1
Findings
The participants did not seem to develop a strong rapport with each other.
R was more dominant while they were using it and both sessions were ended
with R’s lead.
There was quite a difference here between the participants in that L
seemed to feel she was supposed to be adapting to the music and fitting
it. R on the other hand seemed to have embraced the idea that the music
should be following her. However, she seemed to have set herself the goal of
understanding how the mapping works and was frustrated not to be able to
do so. Whilst she reported briefly losing herself in some of the collaborative
moments, she implied that the system was obliged to behave in a consistent
way, to allow her to explore its affordances and to use it to express her own
creativity. She reported deciding to stop using the system when she could
not go any further with this. In the second interview, R expanded on this
stating that in the first session the participants were trying to ‘crack’ the
system. But in the second, not only did she report that they went ‘deeper’,
but also that they ‘happened upon’ something new.
The new thing that they discovered was what it sounded like when they
were very still. This seems slightly counterintuitive - a key aspect of matching
is that it should slow down the participants, so we would expect sounds from
very small amounts of movement to have arisen in the first session. But,
perhaps matching gave them pressure to keep up a constant movement.
Either way, discovering something that she had not expected to find seemed
to provoke a more positive experience than those aspects that had been
explained. It is tempting to conclude that explaining the mapping establishes
an implicit task of trying everything out and then making something of it
whereas leaving things to be serendipitous discovery does not.
In this sense, the constraints seemed to have failed in their objective.
The participants were not slowed down but were (for L at least) limited from
repeating earlier discoveries.
Overall, L did not speak too much in the interview, but her general
response seemed to be dissatisfaction with what she heard. She felt the
music should be inspiring her to move (rather than the other around), and
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its failure to do so became more of an issue when she did not have a partner
to follow.
8.4.2 Participant pair 2
Participant Gender Musical skill Dance skill
L M 3 1
R M 2 1
The participants had the mapping explained to them before they began.
The first session lasted five minutes and the second four minutes.
Findings
The participants seemed to have a good rapport.
The participants were both very positive about the experience after the
first session. A fair bit of the discussion revolved around how to classify
the system. L made a number of connections with music production but
was reluctant to consider it more than a way of generating ideas. Both
participants, however, felt it was closer to a game than anything else.
In spite of this, the participants reported much preferring the second
session. This time, they report a much more musical experience. Both
participants report this session as being more about the sound than the
movement, indicating transparency developing. These differences are shown
on closer analysis of the text, where we see a shift around line 29 where
intention becomes expressed in terms of sound output rather than intended
movements or triggers.
We also find a difference drawn out here between externally motivated
(‘you had to’) and internally motivated (‘you chose to’) cooperation suggest-
ing a loss of perceived personal agency when matching. This would suggest
that the constraint of matching was not perceived as ‘implicit’ as intended.
On a number of occasions, the interviewer attempted to draw out dis-
tinctions between different types of exploratory approaches (broad and deep)
but the participants did not respond to this idea.
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8.4.3 Participant pair 3
Participant Gender Musical skill Dance skill
L M 4 3
R M 4 2
The participants did not have the mapping explained to them before they
began. Both sessions lasted 19 minutes.
Findings
The participants had a good rapport but did not seem to make much eye
contact. As a result they had observable difficulty in communicating inten-
tion.
They had a lot to say in the interview. R mentioned that he had done
similar sorts of mirroring exercises before at drama school. His idea of mir-
roring was more akin with how we had originally intended it—making eye
contact and starting off with slow movements. However, he was frustrated
that he could not make eye contact and that they had started off right from
the beginning at a quick pace. He felt that as a result of this they got tired
too soon and lost momentum. This indicates that the matching constraint
may not have worked entirely as hoped.
Both participants discussed different possible uses of the system and
make clear that different scenarios would impose different obligations on the
system. For example, in performance the mapping would need to be known
in its entirety by the performer. This given, they seemed quite unpeturbed
by perceived inconsistencies in the mapping. They mentioned that the drum
that is hit below the hips does not seem to respond to velocity as might be
expected but that this adds to the ‘glitch element’ which makes it OK. This
seemed to demonstrate that perceived obligations of the system can make
the difference between an unexpected behaviour being seen as frustrating,
amusing, thought-provoking, requiring further investigation and so on.
R gave an interesting description of how one goes about exploring the sys-
tem. ‘Anchors’ are found. From these familiar points, new unknown territory
is explored but when there is a lull, these are returned to. Both participants
described their exploration as beginning with ‘randomly exploring’ (‘just go
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mental’) which is followed by look at more ‘technical’ aspects. In this sense
it seems like we can distinguish between task-driven usage (though not as
task-driven as traditional HCI tasks) where either a particular outcome is ex-
pected (or being tested) and non-task-driven usage, where the input space is
more randomly explored until something is experienced that the participant
would like to hear again. This use of repetition was also mentioned by L as
a means of testing hypotheses about the mapping and their role within it.
Overall, the participants reported preferring the non-matching version
but also said that there was a strong ordering effect (R: ‘I’m glad I did the
first one as I think it made me appreciate it more’, L: ‘it would be confusing
as a first experience’) although they were very positive about both systems.
They related the system a fair bit to experimental musical instruments (the
Theremin and a number of times the Reactable). In these contexts, mirroring
seemed to restrictive, primarily as both participants had to create the same
sound.
8.4.4 Participant pair 4
Participant Gender Musical skill Dance skill
L M 2 3
R F 1 0
The participants did not have the mapping explained to them beforehand.
The first session lasted 16 minutes and the second 6 minutes. This was the
only pair where the participants were of a different gender.
Findings
They quickly established a good rapport. These participants really pushed
the system to the limits of its abilities - particularly the skeleton tracking
capabilities. They were quick to try lying on the floor. At one point R
stood on his head which the system struggled with (as the investigator, I
also intervened at this point to ask him to stop as I was nervous that it went
beyond my risk assessment). A number of occasions I also had to ask one of
them to recalibrate the skeleton tracking as it was lost from them through,
e.g., lying on the floor.
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The participants both seemed to respond more positively to the mirroring
session, with L generally being more positive than R. In particular, L described
the shared experience as being uninhibiting and intimate but also safe and
playful. When describing how they went about exploring, they gave a similar
description as in study 3: finding things that ‘worked’, then either trying the
same thing in a different context (development) or trying something totally
different (broad exploration) and then returning to something they knew
worked.
The participants were quite explicit in saying that they stopped because
felt they had exhausted the possibilities of the system, which they attribute
to not enough musical control: ‘it felt too much like you were cutting or
fading into a piece of music that was already playing’. Although R mentions
that they were expecting ‘a controller’, the participants generally do not
describe the system in terms of being an instrument (L: ‘a dynamic movement
matching system’, R: ‘a responsive audio system with forced collaboration’).
They do arrive at a sense of being responsible for controlling the sound: (R:
‘it is always following your moves. I found sometimes you want to react to
the system as opposed to it reacting to you but you will always be chasing
your tail if you try this’). There is, however, an implication that they have
the right to continually be able to develop an understanding of the system
through its audio feedback (R: ‘I think the feedback was a bit “blehh”. I did
not feel like I really worked out what was going on. I did not need to know
everything but the amount of movement and exploration we did justified
more.’). R emphasises that the possibilities of the system are closely tied
into the space and that he did not particularly like this space.
One interesting observation of this pair is that whereas the other partici-
pants spoke of being constrained as something the system had imposed upon
them due to its limitations, this pair expressed surprise that they themselves
had been restricted, for example in not leaving the marked boundary through-
out the study. Their restricted movements were something ‘the system led
you to do’.
8.4.5 Participant pair 5
The participants had the mapping explained to them before they began.
These participants were both older than the others, being middle aged. They
were also the only pair of participants that were good friends. The first
session lasted 20 minutes and was ended by the investigator. The second
session lasted 10 minutes.
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Participant Gender Musical skill Dance skill
L F 1 1
R F -a -a
a L invited R to attend this study as a friend. As a result,
no self-assessment data was provided for R.
Findings
The participants established before they began that R would lead and L would
copy. They initially began by doing familiar dance moves (both doing the
same dance move but without much other consideration to matching) but
after a few minutes followed the approach followed by the other participants
of staying relatively still and slowly moving the arms. From around nine
minutes into the study they were talking quietly (as to be out of earshot) to
each other. It had been explained that they should signal to end the session
whenever they wished to do so but in the interview they confirmed that in
the first session they kept on using the system longer than they wanted to
because they felt obliged by the experimental context. Towards the end of
the first session they seemed to be continuing almost as one would during
an exercise routine.
The participants indicated that although they gave it a good shot, they
did not really engage with the system. On a number of occasions they
referred to their age as a factor within this, seeing this kind of system as
well as the matching idea as something that young people might do but was
less suitable for them. Matching or mirroring was interpreted only as leading
and following. That said, their reported means of exploring was similar to
others—‘trying to find the system’s possible sounds’, beginning with familiar
movements and then pushing out to explore the system’s perimeters. Their
reported unfamiliarity with such types of system had an interesting effect
on their expectations. R mentioned an expectation that the mapping be
consistent, though referred to this as something implied by having had the
range of inputs explained.
When reflecting on the session without the matching constraint, the
participants seemed to talk more in terms of responding to the music rather
than vice versa. R compared the music to what might be heard at a spa,
framing it in terms of relaxation rather than movements and comments (‘it
is not something I would have chosen to play for moving to’). She said she
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was ‘responding to the music’ and that she needed to be ‘inspired by the
beat’.
Even after having clarified after the first interview that the participants
were free to stop whenever they felt like it, there was still evidence that they
had continued through obligation (R: ‘I was thinking “Oh God I want to
stop!”’).
8.4.6 Participant pair 6
Participant Gender Musical skill Dance skill
L F 3 2
R F 2.5 1
The participants did not have the mapping explained to them before
they began. Due to technical difficulties (described below) the first session
was restarted 3 minutes and 6 minutes in. Following this final restart the
remainder of the first session lasted 19 minutes. The second session was
uninterrupted and lasted 18 minutes.
Findings
Both of these participants were in their early twenties and researchers in the
field of digital music signal processing. In this session there were a number of
technical difficulties with the skeleton tracking, leading to the participants
being asked to recalibrate a number of times and the first session being
restarted twice. Prior to the second restart, R was asked to change from a
skirt into trousers, which somewhat improved the tracking but it was still
less reliable than in other sessions. They were also asked not to touch each
other as this has been known to cause issues. Although the session was
not subsequently restarted, the participants were interrupted and asked to
recalibrate a number of times. Counting from this final restart, the first
session lasted 19 minutes. The second session was not interrupted and
lasted 18 minutes. Although the participants recognised but did not know
each other previously, they established a good rapport early on and were
quickly smiling and laughing.
Both participants indicated a strong preference for the first session. They
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reported finding it more difficult to find out what was going on in the second
session as well as a greater sense of agency over the sound in the first
session (‘In the second one it seemed like the sound was already playing
. . . whereas the first time it felt like we were actually making the sound’).
Both participants estimated inaccurately the length of the first session but in
opposite directions. L initially estimated 30 minutes and R 5 minutes. After
negotiating they compromised to some extent with L saying at least 15–20
minutes and R ‘maybe 7 or 10 minutes’.
Their main comments on the matching constraint were that it assisted
them in identifying the source of the sound (particularly in terms of which
participant was responsible). In the second session, a lack of ability to make
sense of why sounds were coming made it seem to L less systematic and
more random. She contrasted this with the first session that felt more ‘like
it had a beat’. They also mentioned the disinhibiting effect it had by creating
a sense of solidarity. But L did also mention that in some ways she felt safer
in the second as she did not have to worry about moving in a way that L
could follow.
8.5 Overall Findings
We will here draw some more general findings from the above results in the
context of the earlier theoretical content of the thesis.
8.5.1 Perceived agency
As mentioned in Section 8.1.1, the second session was not a control in the
empirical sense. The mapping of IA was built around the matching con-
straint. In contrast, in the second session the mapping was calculating a
mean position of their joints. As a result, the system seemed less responsive
and it became difficult for participants to identify their own contribution.
This was borne out through frustrations from the participants.
However, even though participants perceived more singular 1 agency (‘I’)
without the matching constraint, their language indicated a much stronger
dislike of this second type of lost control.2 This provides tentative support
for our proposition in Section 7.3.2 that first person singular agency may
2The 1, 2, 3 notation for perceiving agency is defined in Section 6.4.3.
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be replaced with first person plural agency without appearing ‘unjustified’.
However, where the loss of agency is attributed to the ineptitudes of the sys-
tem, it becomes more frustrating. Also of interest is that the two participants
with the most musical experience (and who seemed to respond most posi-
tively overall) reframed these apparent ineptitudes more positively within
the glitch aesthetic (see e.g. Gurevich and Trevin˜o (2007) for a discussion of
glitch).
8.5.2 Exploration
As stated in Section 8.4, the above analysis subsequently informed the model
of emerging structures presented in Chapter 4. This is demonstrated in the
approach of the interviewer who continually attempts to distinguish between
participants that followed a broad (horizontal) or deep (vertical) approach
when exploring (in line with Gurevich et al. (2010)). However, although
participant pair 4 (Section 8.4.4) indicated that they began broadly and
then moved onto ‘technical’ aspects, the other participants did not seem to
respond to this. This is most notable with pair 2 (Section 8.4.2) where the
interviewer attempts two or three times to bring up the distinction but the
participants refuse to make use of the concept and start resorting to very
brief answers (‘nah just exploring’ ).
An alternative description of how the system was explored was given by
R in study 4: finding anchors—safe points to return to (perhaps comparable
to Arfib et al.’s (2003) rest points)—and then venturing from there to find
novel aspects of the system. This approach aligned more accurately with
the reports of the other participants and contributed to the consideration of
both the wider exploration of unexposed inputs and the deeper exploration
of exposed inputs in the Emerging Structures (ES) model (Section 4.2.4).
The most common reasons for ending a session appeared to be frustration
with mapping inconsistencies (especially when participants had set them-
selves a goal) and the sense of having exhausted the possibilities of the sys-
tem, which aligns with the ES model Section 4.2. A number of participants
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demonstrated this desire to alternate between inputs that were familiar and
inputs that were unfamiliar.
Differences were identified between serendipitous and deliberate discovery
of inputs. Those who were told what the inputs were seemed to set themselves
the goal of finding them all. They seemed more to position the instrument
as a tool to allow them to do ‘work’.
8.5.3 Rights and obligations
It is of interest to analyse the rights that participants inferred they were
granted by the context and the obligations these placed on the system (see
e.g. Banister et al. (1994, ch. 6) for a discussion of rights and obligations).
Participants who had the mechanics of the system explained to them ap-
peared to infer an obligation of the system to respond consistently and in
the manner explained. This assumption is not unreasonable when using
such a system, however those who were left to discover the input themselves
seemed to be more accepting of inconsistency. Obligations placed upon the
system to respond consistently went hand in hand with a right of the par-
ticipant to be able to use the system in accord with the understanding they
had developed of the mapping.
A number of the participants expressed that the system had an obligation
to inspire them to move (L from pair 1, L and R from pair 5).
Overall, providing an overview of the mapping to the participants, as well
as previous experience with interactive systems, influenced the rights they
assumed and the obligations they imparted on the system. Frustration was
the typical response if these rights were not fulfilled.
8.5.4 System-specific
Overall, the response to the system was variable. The experience seemed
to depend quite considerably on the rapport established between the par-
ticipants. Providing some initial task to establish rapport might have been
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beneficial, such as R from Study 4’s suggestion of starting slowly with eye
contact (see Section C.3.2).
The system was too lenient in its measurement of deviation for many
participants, who did not seem to be constrained enough. It is difficult to
know the extent to which this technical issue compromised the matching
constraint. Whilst most participants were still trying to match each other
even with this leniency, they might have been made to explore in a more
focused manner otherwise.
8.6 Discussion
Test subjects should be treated like the valued patrons of a restau-
rant. Listen carefully to what they say. They are experts on what
they like. But let the chef adjust the recipe. Subjects are not de-
signers. Their suggestions are valuable, but designers need to
think about the results carefully. (Clanton 2000)
For games at least, it can be difficult for the users to explicitly identify
what makes a good game (Sykes 2006). However, they are often quite capable
of identifying things that are nots enjoyable. What an individual wants and
what they like are distinct concepts (Litman 2010). In the business of ex-
ploiting anticipation, ambiguity and curiosity to create a specific experience
as we are, specifically denying your audience what they want may well be
the means to create an experience that they like. Thus, it has been essential
to analyse our user responses beyond the surface of what was said.
In this study, our success at creating a captivating interactive music ex-
perience has been variable. Whilst developing rapport between participants
seemed to play an important role in allowing them to engage with the system,
it was not enough (e.g. Study 3, Section 8.4.3). Perhaps the most valuable
insight that arose from this study is the role that expectation and perceived
rights played, as well as differences in task-driven and random exploration.
Those who felt that the system was setting them challenges seemed to run
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out of steam as soon as they could not perceive any new challenges. However,
those that were setting their own challenges were more content to accept the
system as it was—something to be explored rather than utilised.
As mentioned in Section 8.4, both the Emerging Structures model (Chap-
ter 4) and the framework of Perceived Agency (Chapter 6) were refined
following the findings of this study. Therefore, although the findings offer
supporting evidence for both theoretical contributions, it would be circular
to consider them a validation. Such an outcome is common when conducting
qualitative research in this field (see e.g. Edmonds and Candy 2010) and does
not indicate that the findings themselves are any less meaningful or reliable.
We will return to this topic when considering future work in Section 10.1.2.
8.6.1 Reflections on the method used
Analysis of the interviews took two to three times longer than anticipated.
From recordings to conceptual map took around a ratio of 90:1 analysis time
to interview time. Stowell (2010) reported a ratio of 40:1 for his analysis,
however this excluded the time taken to transcribe interviews. There are
nonetheless a number of differences that may have made our method longer
than Stowell’s:
1. Our interviews involved multiple participants. Although the amount of
talk would not have been significantly more, transcribing overlapping
speech is time consuming. However, overall we would estimate our
transcription to be less time consuming as in contrast to Stowell we
did not annotate pause lengths.
2. Some of our interviews were very long and creating the conceptual
maps became a lot more difficult (the complexity of clustering and
constructing the graphs did not increase linearly with the number of
predicates!). Furthermore, our approach to constructing these networks
differed from Stowell (2010).
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3. Our analysis included an additional step of resummarising the inter-
view.
On the other hand, Stowell’s analysis involved identifying different conceptual
‘worlds’, which our analysis did not.
More care should have been taken to ensure the interviews were kept to
a reasonable length. At the same time, some participants had very little to
say whatsoever. Those in the pilot studies were not especially shy and so
this issue was not identified before the interview approach was decided.
Our method involves spending a considerable amount of time extracting
the ‘meaning’ from the discourse. This approach gave the analyst a very
close understanding of the text, which greatly informed further development
of the theoretical contributions of this thesis.
When considering the analytical output, extracting predicates may ap-
pear to be somewhat contrary to the spirit of DA as an analysis that explicitly
avoids dealing with the mechanics of the text. However, reflecting from the
analyst’s point of view, the process of extracting even descriptive predicates
from interview speech required significantly more conscious analysis of the
discursive mechanics than would typically be arrived at through close read-
ing. It should be emphasised that whilst the time-consuming analysis of
the discourse required subjective decisions over how predicates were formed,
all findings and conclusions were drawn after the analysis was complete. A
lengthier analysis time does not therefore provide greater opportunity to un-
cover more subtle effects.
Overall, we are inclined to conclude that the method was successful. How-
ever, the time investment involved in following this analytical method was
considerable and it is not recommended that it be undertaken lightly.
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Chapter 9
Discussion
In this chapter we return to some of the questions raised at the beginning
of this thesis and consider how this thesis has contributed. This discussion
is framed around two issues in particular: what makes for an interesting
interaction and how can we describe it in a way that captures some of the
richness of our everyday experiences?
9.1 What is interesting in interaction?
We began this thesis with a quote from Edmonds et al. (2006) asking what
exactly is interesting in interactive experiences. The research presented here
suggests that discovering an ability to perceive, influence and control one’s
environment is one factor. However, there are important considerations. In
Chapter 4, I presented a model suggesting that what sustains interaction
is the anticipation of further discoveries. In Chapter 6, I then argued that
both when participating and interacting, the value of such experiences is
mediated by the extent to which skill has been demonstrated, which is it-
self determined by the perception of agency—the freedom and responsibility
provided by the context. The challenge for interactive artists is therefore to
design systems that provide continuous scope for a participant to develop a
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perceivably personal ability to learn and manipulate a system.
The above could be applied to a game and any other interactive sys-
tem. We, however, have focused on interactive music. I have endeavoured
to demonstrate that interactive music is not simply music that happens to
be interactive. Interactive music is the participatory dual of the composed
instrument as it was considered in Section 3.3.1—an exploration into sound,
gesture, and how these relate. Musical interaction is in a sense closely re-
lated to dance and musical audio in being an abstract medium of expression.
However, the use of sensing and computing technology introduces causality.
As a medium it remains non-representational but lends itself to explorations
into how we relate to the world, understand it and control it.
In combining both the experience of causing effect and perceiving our
environment, we have drawn upon two analogous theories: Csikszentmiha-
lyi’s (2002) theory of flow which suggests that enjoyment is derived from
an increasing ability to act, and the expectation-oriented models of musi-
cal perception (Section 2.4.3) which suggest that enjoyment is derived from
an increasing ability to perceive. The Emerging Structures (ES) model of
Chapter 4 describes how these two enjoyments are fundamentally interre-
lated through the act of exploration. Both of these are examples of the
pleasure of learning. However, the ES model suggests that what we expect
to find out is as important to our enjoyment as what we do find out. In
terms of the curve (Section 2.2.12), we need not only to ascend the curve but
to see where, with just a bit more persistence, we might ascend to. Likewise
with the Wundt curve (Section 2.4.3), the hedonic value of a stimulus may
be maximised by balancing simplicity and complexity. But for sustained en-
gagement, expectations must be established in the viewer that this balance
will be maintained.
We have approached this and many other issues within this thesis from
a subjective stance. Whilst understanding events in terms of how they are
experienced makes for tricky engineering, as we saw throughout Chapter 6
many of the effects researchers within this field are trying to achieve, such
303
as interest, pleasure and aesthetic appreciation, are inherently subjective. I
suggest that too often these are translated into objective engineering goals
without a thorough examination of how they arise. I hope that the material
presented herein will assist others in determining what they are trying to
achieve, why and how best to go about it.
In both the constraint unlocking study (Chapter 5) and the evaluation
of Impossible Alone (IA) (Chapter 8) we saw that the experience provided
by a system depends not only on its affordances and capabilities, but how
the participant makes sense of these aspects. Considering how a system is
subjectively experienced has required us to consider not only how interac-
tion is perceived but how an individual draws upon their wider contextual
knowledge to make sense of it. A participant’s expectations of what they
should be able to do is important, as are their beliefs of what others would
have done in the same position. This has direct practical consequences for
those creating interactive music. For example, the findings of Section 8.5
suggest that simply explaining to participants how a system functions may
alter their goals when using it and their interpretation of its behaviour.
We addressed this issue from the perspective of perceived agency (Chap-
ter 6 and developed a framework to theorise about how personal value is
attributed to the phenomenological experience of spectating or interacting.
The importance of considering how different types of agency is perceived and
in whom was justified through identifying universals of existing musical prac-
tices and highlighting how new contexts of performance and interaction may
fall short. One area where this may be of practical use beyond those creating
interactive music is that of DMI creation and performance, where it may be
used to identify what types of skills are expected of a performance context
and whether their respective types of agency will be perceived. However,
the framework is intended as a tool to question and understand the role and
impact of technology within music rather than to impose hegemonic require-
ments on musical practice or judge what ‘is’ or ‘is not’ music. In particular,
we have seen that there is not a ‘correct’ distribution of agency that must be
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perceived but rather that problems may arise when expectations of agency
are inferred from a context which are not then demonstrated.
The uncanny valley describes an observation that as a robot increases in
realism it becomes more familiar (Mori 1970). However, as it approaches a
point just short of being realistic it rapidly becomes disturbingly unfamil-
iar. It is interesting to consider this in terms of the perceived agency of a
system. We might argue that as an IMS becomes more similar to a musi-
cal instrument, although remaining clearly outside this category, it becomes
more familiar and pleasing to interact with. However, there a point in this
progression may emerge where the system will be similar enough for a partic-
ipant to begin inferring expectations of it granting the same degree of agency
as an instrument. Should the IMS fails to live up to these expectations, it
becomes frustratingly unaccommodating and falls into the uncanny valley.
Whilst the ES model is a simplified abstraction of how a participant
may explore a system, it allowed us to derive practical design principles:
incremental constraint unlocking (Section 5.1) and its successor the implicit
constraint (Section 7.2). Evaluating them is difficult as any implementation
will involve a creative work which introduces its own effects. Our approach
in testing the latter was to allow artistic goals to drive the development of
IA—as we imagine they would in any other ‘real world’ application—and
consider in detail how adopting the principle interacted with these goals
and shaped the final result. The detailed qualitative analysis conducted
in Chapter 8 then provided an understanding of how the many facets of a
participant’s expectations, understanding and interaction with the system
combine to form their overall experience.
In Section 1.2 we chose not to restrict what types of system we were in-
terested in, seeking instead to focus on the experience of interacting with an
arbitrary IMS. We did, however, limit the scope of our enquiry to non-expert
individuals interacting with an IMS for the first time. We may reasonably
assume that any such experience will involve the participant learning how
their actions affect the system (even if they learn that their actions do not
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appear to have an effect). Whilst the dynamics of an inexperienced partici-
pant forming an understanding of a system for the first time is not necessarily
the concern of all IMS designers, I propose that both Emerging Structures
and Perceived Agency may be applied as a means to analyse and guide the
development of any such system.
This generality arises through the abstract and subjective nature of both
theories. Therefore practical design principles derived from the theories
may not be so universal. For example, incremental constraint unlocking
attempted to guide the emergence of structures in a specific manner through
encouraging participants to explore deeply before broadly. As discussed in
Section 5.6, this may require a certain degree of overall complexity within
the system and limitations over how and when it is communicated. It may
also disrupt the perception of agency making it more suitable for game-like
systems where a participant is not expecting musical decisions of the designer
to become apparent midway through the interaction (see Section 6.8.2).
9.1.1 Relationship to Speech Act Theory and Musical
Acts
In Section 2.4.1, Speech Act Theory (SAT) was described as a means to
reason about agents seeking to alter their beliefs through effective utterances
called speech acts. SAT was then applied into the musical domain as the
theory of Musical Acts (Murray-Rust and Smaill 2011, see Section 2.4.1).
The ES model is similar to SAT in that the participant forms intentions
based on an overall desire—either to maximize capacity or minimize uncer-
tainty. In this case, similar to Herzig and Longin (2002), the desires of an
agent are defined with respect to their beliefs. Following this analogy, the
output of the participant might be considered equivalent to the utterances
of speech acts in that its performance can serve both the direct purpose of
creating a sound and the indirect purpose of providing information to inform
the participant’s beliefs.
However, Herzig and Longin’s application of SAT to allow agents to adopt
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new beliefs relies on cooperation between agents. An agent A will commu-
nicate an intention to acquire a particular belief; B, being cooperative, will
then provide an assertion regarding this belief. Similarly, in Musical Acts,
an agent will seek to change the commonly agreed musical state through
playing music corresponding to a different state—but the efficacy of this ac-
tion relies on other cooperative agents interpreting this intention and acting
accordingly. In contrast, the ES model reasons about participants behaving
without a presumption of cooperation from another agent. We do not assume
that an IMS is programmed to respond with the intention of altering the par-
ticipant’s beliefs about its future behaviour. The focus of the ES model is
on how the desires of the participant affect how enjoyable their experience
is, the participant’s ability to form and perform intentions that will allow
them to realise this desire, and how the prolonging of intentions can alter
the perceived value of the belief in question once its adopted.
There is, however, a clearer relationship between SAT and the framework
of Perceived Agency. As we saw in Chapter 6, a performer needs to perform
not only the ‘direct utterance’ of a particular musical output but also the
‘indirect utterances’ communicating their intention to create this specific
output and the parameters of agency within which the act is taking place.
These three meanings may then be combined to infer the belief among an
audience that the musician is skilled. I argued in Section 6.1.3 that the need
for this latter indirect utterance is perhaps a peculiarity of musical acts where
the audience is unfamiliar with the musical interface being used.
9.2 Putting theory into practice
As mentioned above, both the ES model and the Perceived Agency framework
are most applicable in the conceptualisation, design and composition of IMSs,
as well as informing the context of their use.
307
9.2.1 Emerging Structures
The ES model suggests that an IMS should be designed not as a static
product but in terms of how an individual forms an understanding of it.
Techniques such as storyboarding (see e.g. McQuaid et al. 2003) are helpful
in breaking up a canonical interaction trajectory into segments that may
then each be analysed through the lens of ES: How much understanding has
the participant formed? How much has their experience so far suggested
that there is more to understand, and that this further understanding is
attainable through continued use? How far has this understanding allowed
the participant to do things? Is the experience so far likely to have formed
expectations of a further increase in the participant’s capacity to act through
the system?
This process underlay the development of Impossible Alone. With the
fixed testing schedules provided by the workshop schedule (see Section 7.3.4),
we were able after each development iteration to reconsider how the inter-
action design would lead the participant along a narrative. For example, we
considered what kinds of exploratory movements matching individuals are
likely to try initially—arms then torso then legs—and whether the system
would reward this kind of early behaviour with new musical capabilities.
The ES model is therefore used to inform a temporal approach to design.
It is also applicable in how a work is presented. We have seen suggestions
both in Section 8.5.2 and from Costello (2009) that providing too much in-
struction can reduce a participant’s enjoyment of an installation. However,
applying the ES model, we see that the pleasure is as much in becoming able
to use something as it is in its actual usage. This is in contrast to Costello
and Edmonds (2009) who argue that working out how a system works is a
distinct antecedent of engaging with a system. Therefore, adopting the ES
model allows us to form clearer goals of what the provision of instruction
should achieve. Rather than telling the participant how something works,
instructions should be just enough to inform them that there are interactions
to discover. Where aspects of the interaction design may prevent an indi-
308
vidual from forming anticipation of a work’s potential, as for example the
matching constraint did in Impossible Alone (Section 7.3.2), then instruction
may be necessary to overcome this hurdle. But for long-term engagement it
is important to communicate that only a fraction of what is possible has been
described.
9.2.2 Perceived Agency
The key practical applications of the Perceived Agency framework also re-
gards communication. The framework suggests that the agency perceived to
be granted by an IMS needs to match that which the participant believes is
implied by the context (Section 6.8). Whilst there is a spectrum of possible
configurations of first and second person agency within IMSs, failing to live
up to the participant’s expectations risks frustration, annoyance and dissat-
isfaction. This need to balance expectations with outcomes should inform
communication with the participant. This includes preliminary material such
as any provided instructions or description of a work—words such as ‘instru-
ment’ carry implications. The framework may also inform how feedback is
designed. Whilst we saw in Section 2.2.7 that feedback is important for a
participant to learn how to control a system, we see here that it plays the
more fundamental role of proving that a participant is controlling a system,
and that there is the potential to greater control in the future.
The framework provides the means for designers to consider more closely
why a work they are creating should be interactive. Jorda` (2004, p. 324)
argued that ‘faked or useless’ interactivity degrades contemporary art. The
Perceived Agency framework helps avoid this fate by demonstrating three
categories in which interactivity allows a participant to take ownership of
an outcome. There will be other factors shaping the perception of agency;
however, those creating interactive work requiring no scope to demonstrate
skill or originality or for expressive communication may need to consider more
closely what exactly they are hoping to achieve with interaction. Does the
provision of interactivity allow a participant to make an experience unique
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to themselves? This is not a question that necessarily needs have a positive
answer but it is an important aspect of how interaction affects an interaction
in need of consideration.
To demonstrate how this may be applied in practice, we might consider a
work that produces sound through a brain interface (e.g. Electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG)) provided to a participant. Applying the Perceived Agency
framework we see that if the interface is presented as an interactive instal-
lation but does not create the perception of first person agency then it may
create a dissatisfying experience. For such an interface, expressive, techni-
cal or creative first person agency may be technically unfeasible. However,
referring to the framework we see that we may still establish (‘loose’) first
person agency by providing a sense of uniqueness. This suggests that if we
were able to design the system so that it responded to each participant in
a unique but consistent manner, we may sidestep the challenge of provid-
ing perceptible control. Note now that seeing the interface in the hands of
others forms a fundamental part of the participant’s experience, introducing
additional requirements upon the context in which the system is presented.
Having defined more clearly the relationship between participant and system,
we may observe that describing the system as allowing the control of sound
through thought may create false expectations. Perhaps better would be a
description of the system as providing a window to experience the existing
signals eminating from the brain.
9.2.3 Personal reflections
The work within this thesis has led me to identify and reappraise many
of my assumptions about why I—and others—are drawn to creating musi-
cal interfaces. I began from an engineering perspective of seeking to solve a
problem but found it increasingly difficult to disentangle motives surrounding
usability and expressive potential with those of my own musical ambitions.
Conversely, I presumed that creating music and participating in musical acts
were purposeful ends in and of themselves. Of course, music and art need no
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utilitarian justification. However, to examine why some musical interfaces
failed to satisfy the musical ‘urge’, I found it necessary to consider more
closely the origins of the desire for musical expression. Although I regarded
my own musical practice as often being quite solitary in nature—both in
terms of creating and playing instruments—social action and communica-
tion appeared to underlie nearly all musical practices much more that I had
considered. Many are understandably cautious about reducing aesthetic ex-
periences to scientific ‘causes’ or less appealing aspects of human behaviour
such as status seeking. However, I found that rather than explaining away
the beauty of music, the more I examined its origins the greater the presump-
tion that music is primarily about sound appeared something of a hegemonic
restraint on interactive music (Small (1998) argues this point in more detail).
The consequences of this shift in attitude may be seen with Impossible
Alone. By considering music as a social experience rather than purely an
exercise in sound creation, I was able to concern myself less on ensuring a
participants would be pleased with what they heard and instead focus on how
the installation and the context it established would allow two individuals to
form and explore their relationship with each other.
Whilst these are reflections on a personal journey, it is possible to draw
more general lessons. As we saw in Section 2.2, the field of instrument design
often measures its success through comparison with traditional instruments.
Whilst traditional instruments were designed for a range of considerations,
the most obvious is surely to produce a specific sound. With digital in-
struments this is no longer the case. Even if a new musical interface is
created for performance in the concert setting traditional to Western art
music, in the vast majority of cases, the sounds could have been composed
and pre-rendered beforehand (see Section 6.1.4). However, digital musical
instruments allow for new musical events—the realtime control of a digital
sound—and consequently opens up possibilities for new types of events such
as this sound playing a role in an interactional situation. Whilst a DMI’s
purpose remains to produce sound, the need for it to be designed is often
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to change the context and social significance of the performance of certain
types of music. This suggests it is perhaps a mistake to think of new musical
instruments as entities divorced from the context in which they will be used.
A musical instrument is not just a means of providing control over a sound
space. It allows an individual to perform and so demonstrate ability. We
saw in Section 6.5 that different musical practices emphasise the importance
of different types of ability. If an instrument is to succeed in a particular
context, then its design will need to allow this ability to be made evident.
9.3 Reflections on the research process
A PhD is a journey in which both the research question and the process
through which it is investigated are evolving throughout. With an interdis-
ciplinary topic such as ours, it is necessary to consider at each stage not only
what to investigate but also which research methods will be most suitable in
doing so. It may therefore be helpful to future researchers to briefly reflect
on some of the decisions that were taken and what I might have been done
differently with the benefit of hindsight.
The research question of this thesis, how can interactive music be made
more captivating?, is broad and open ended. I decided in Section 1.3 to allow
the specifics of what interactive music is, and how we might define and mea-
sure captivation, to arise naturally over the course of the thesis. A strength of
this approach is that it allowed us to draw on a wide range of disciplines, in-
cluding psychology, musical perception, Human-Computer Interaction, New
Interfaces for Musical Expression and interactive art. We were able to iden-
tify common themes in how these fields address engagement and consider
how these might be applied more specifically to interactive music. However,
this broad approach raised difficulties. Without declaring at the outset a
specific indicator of success, following an engineering methodology became
more difficult as we were faced with the concurrent tasks of identifying our
problem, solving it and developing a convincing objective indicator of our
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success. In retrospect, this was perhaps too ambitious. This is a long thesis
yet there has not been the opportunity to validate its theoretical contribution
empirically to complete satisfaction.
We saw in Section 1.3 that the goals of interactive art are often subjec-
tive and so addressing subjective requirements is a necessity when considering
the engineering challenges of interactive music. I maintain the position that
subjective models and frameworks such as those of Chapter 4 and Chapter 6
provide an effective tool to do so. However, mixing subjectivity and engineer-
ing requires a diverse canon of research methods and greater consideration
should have been given as to how quantitative and qualitative methods may
be used complementarily rather than as alternatives. It is possible that had
the qualitative study of Chapter 8 been conducted earlier, a better targeted
quantitative study may have led to hypotheses that faired better than those
of Chapter 5.
Ultimately, however, I am glad to have had the opportunity to draw upon
such diverse fields of research. And whilst the findings of Chapter 5 were not
statistically significant, understanding why this was the case formed the basis
of the subsequently more successful evaluation of Chapter 8.
9.4 Types of interaction
In Section 2.1 we reviewed a number of attempts to describe different types of
interaction such as discussions of ‘conversational’ interaction (Section 2.1.3).
We shall consider here how this distinction might be better thought of in
terms of perceived agency.
Many of the notions we met in Section 2.1.3—mutually influential (Jorda`
2005), a two-way exchange of ideas unique to a pair of participants (Paine
2002), cognition and memory (Bongers 2000)—are attempts at objectively
defining what makes conversational interaction special. However, we have
been arguing that interaction is more usefully considered subjectively from
the perspective of the participant. From our day-to-day experience, we are
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able to determine the difference between a conversation and simple non-
conversational exchanges of words based entirely on what we perceive. We
do not need privileged insight into the subsequent state of mind or levels of
cognition of the other party in order to determine whether we were conversing
or they were simply providing scripted replies. I will here propose the position
that for an interaction to be perceived as conversational it is necessary to
have perceived both 1 and 2 agency where, following the notation we defined
in Section 6.4.3, 1 corresponds to the participant whose perspective is of
interest and 2 to the participant’s interlocutor. We shall consider these two
roles in terms of ‘I’ and ‘You’.
Recall the earlier requirements of agency: intention, forethought, self-
reactiveness, self-reflectiveness. Now consider communication between two
parties where
1. You appear to be, or I am, speaking without the intention of being
understood by the other party;
2. You appear to be, or I am, unwilling to use your understanding of the
other party in order to turn this intention into concrete plans of what
to say;
3. You appear to be, or I am, unable to determine when we have or have
not been understood by the other party;
4. You appear to be, or I am, resigned to the fact that the other party
cannot understand what is being said.
Furthermore, including the requirement of perceived performative agency as
having scope to exercise agency (Section 6.3.3):
5. You appear to have, or I have, no significant choice over what we are
saying.
I argue that any of these subjective experiences are enough to convince an
individual that their interaction is less than conversational. As a result, the
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perception of live 1 and 2 agency is a necessary component of conversational
interaction.
We saw that a performance system could demonstrate live agency in Sec-
tion 6.6.3 with Rowe’s artificial performer. However, we also saw that Rowe’s
performer receives musical input (Section 2.2.4). Furthermore, Rowe’s third
classification dimension considered systems to be either in the instrument
paradigm or the artificial player paradigm. From this we may argue that
Rowe sees his systems as offering a user either the means to exercise 1
agency (the instrument) or a demonstration of 2 agency (the artificial per-
former) respectively—but not necessarily both. Conversation can be a mis-
leading metaphor for describing interaction with an Interactive Music System
(IMS) as it is easy to neglect the importance of first person agency. For a
participant—let us call her Alice—to converse with an IMS in the language of
music, the system must provide both her and her interlocutor with the means
to express themselves and therefore simultaneously provide the perception of
1 (‘I’) and 2 (‘you’) agency. (Note, we are considering Alice’s point of view
here so 1 agency is her perception of her own agency and 2 is her perception
of agency from her interlocutor.)
We might imagine that the simplest way in which Alice might perceive
this arrangement would be to construct a mental model that divides the
system into an instrument (her voice) and a modifying agent ‘hidden inside
the system’. Such a construct is exactly what we saw in Section 2.1.2 with
Cornock and Edmonds’s (1973) ‘modifying agent’ (Figure 9.1).
We objected to Cornock and Edmonds’s system because it was defined
as an objective reality but the modifying agent was effectively imperceptible
to the participant and so irrelevant in determining their experience. It is
important to note that we are here considering a mental model that has
been constructed by Alice in response to the system’s behaviour, not an
objective definition of the system.
However, whilst we may imagine a few unusual exceptions, conversations
typically happen through a common medium such as a shared acoustic en-
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TimeArt work
Modier
Participant
Figure 9.1: Cornock and Edmonds’s dynamic-interactive
system (varying). See also Figure 2.2. Adapted from Cornock
and Edmonds (1973).
vironment. Such a medium is accompanied by a common understanding of
how an agent may affect that medium and how this will be understood by
the other party. If Alice is conversing she can hear her own voice and believes
the other party may do the same (aiding her perception of self-reactiveness
and self-reflectivity). Furthermore, by the need to perceive 2 (‘you’) agency
argued above, Alice also needs to believe that these conditions hold for the
other party. This produces a perceived system in which both parties are able
to influence predictable control upon a common medium (Figure 9.2).
One thing we may observe from this diagram is that the output of the sys-
tem mixes together both Alice and her interlocutor’s influence. It is therefore
essential that she is able to predict the effect of her own influence in order to
disentangle these two inputs. When we converse with speech we take turns;
one effect of this is that it makes it easier to understand what is said by the
other party. However, note that this still requires both parties to be able to
be reliably quiet when it is the other’s turn to speak, something that is not
necessarily possible with an Interactive Music System (IMS) without some
knowledge of the mapping. In Section 2.1.2 we argued that this was silently
assumed of the varying system in Cornock and Edmonds’s classification.
With this perceived difference between an agent within this system and
a mutually accessible medium, we are able to understand why Jorda` (2005)
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Common medium Agent in
the system
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SystemParticipant
Figure 9.2: A mental model of conversational interaction.
did not think why an adaptive signal processing unit did not involve human
to machine communication and why Paine (2002) thought a racing game
would only be interactive if the racetrack started changing (Section 2.1.3).
Whilst these systems may provide the means to exercise 1 (‘I’) agency, their
behaviour does not provide evidence of an agent within the system.
Note that we are not saying that the perception of 1 and 2 agency is
necessarily sufficient for conversational interaction. However, I would argue
that justifications provided for cognition, mutual influence, memory, com-
plexity or being left in a different state (Jorda` 2005; Bongers 2000; Paine
2002; Dannenberg and Bates 1995, see also Section 2.1.3) are all subsumed
under this requirement.
Recall Chadabe’s (2005) three metaphors of interaction: the powerful
gesture expander, sailing through stormy seas and the conversation (see Sec-
tion 2.1.3). Considering these in terms of a mental model as a split between
instrument and agent, we may more rigorously define the different experi-
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ences they describe.
The gesture expander may be seen as establishing a feedback loop that
offers reliable control, i.e. one in which the participant may control the output
with intention (Figure 9.3). There is no perceivable agency from the system,
however it provides the participant with perceived 1 agency.
Participant
1: ‘me’
Mental model
Gesture expander
Figure 9.3: A mental model of the powerful gesture ex-
pander.
Sailing through stormy seas may be perceived as an unreliable controller
where the above feedback loop is distorted in a manner that is unpredictable
from the participant’s perspective (Figure 9.4). Note that in order to be able
to determine how much influence is arriving from the unpredictable source,
the participant requires a model of how their input would be transformed
without its influence (which may be estimated if the influence disrupts the
input in a consistent manner, such as adding Gaussian noise). In terms of the
sailing metaphor, it would be difficult to estimate the extent of a storm based
only on the efficacy of the ship’s controls without a prior understanding of
how effective they are usually.
Chadabe’s third metaphor of conversational interaction has both the par-
ticipant and an agent within the system perceived to be influencing and
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Figure 9.4: A mental model of sailing through stormy seas.
reacting to the common medium (Figure 9.5) as discussed above.
The other categorisation of interaction we saw in Section 2.1.3 was John-
ston et al.’s (2009) instrumental, ornamental and conversational distinction.
Instrumental involves input from the participant, ornamental from the agent
and conversational from both—in Johnston et al.’s example this was seen as
turn-taking between the above.
Johnston et al. present an example IMS in which participants interact
with a model of a dynamic system of particles joined by springs. They argue
that this system facilitates all three types of interaction: the participant
could directly move the particles but when they let go they would move and
then stabilise in a manner which is difficult to predict.
In order to consider this conversational in the manner presented above,
we may perhaps assume that the participant is able to predict the effect they
have on the particles, but not the subsequent effect of the dynamic model in
which case the spring action would be the interlocutor. This would provide
for a mental model splitting the participant’s control from that of another
party (Figure 9.6). However, the requirements of perceiving agency in the
springs are unlikely to be met. Whilst we may argue that the dynamic model
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Mental model
Common medium Agent in
the system
2: ‘you’
Figure 9.5: A mental model of conversational interaction.
is self-reactive as the effect it has on the particles is dependent upon their
current state, its actions are unlikely to be perceived as acting with intention
and forethought—i.e. forming goals and executing plans in order to achieve
them—or as having been chosen from a set of possibilities. As a result, we
would argue that Johnston et al.’s model does not fully capture the potential
for conversational systems. But it is worth remembering that the perception
of agency is subjective. It may be that a participant feels that the springs
are acting with intention, that they planning and choosing to apply force to
the particles in order to effect a particular state upon the common medium.
However, the experiences described by Johnston et al. (2009) do not suggest
that this was the case.
What makes for good conversational interaction? For that we defer to
the Emerging Structures (ES) model of Chapter 4. We may see the capacity
for action, which we would like to be continually increasing, as the partic-
ipant’s ability to act on the common medium. We might imagine a truly
captivating conversational interaction where it is through learning from and
communicating with the agent within the system that this increase happens.
There are further paths that this discussion may be taken down. For
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Figure 9.6: Mental models of Johnston et al.’s (2009) cate-
gories of interaction.
example, we might argue that Chadabe’s metaphor of navigating through a
storm was intended less to describe unreliable controls and more to describe
a system that creates a perception of agency shaping the overall musical
output rather than through conversing with the participant. This might
be addressed in terms of the parameters of agency (see Section 6.3.1)—an
interlocutor exercises agency over communicating with us whereas such a
storm would be exercising agency over the common medium. My intention
here, however, has been to illustrate how the theoretical material within
this thesis may inform the understanding of interactive music systems and
highlight one area in particular that it might contribute towards.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
In this thesis I have argued that captivating interactive music should pro-
vide an experience with emerging structures of musical interaction without
hindering the participant’s perception of agency. It is an exploration into an
ever unfolding world of musical interaction, where emerging structures are
how it unfolds and perceived agency is what makes us explorers instead of
sightseers.
In Chapter 3 I described how musical interaction may be composed, per-
formed and experienced and as a result argued that temporal organisation
needs consideration here much as it does in conventional composition. From
this I refined the concept of the composed instrument and of interactive mu-
sic as temporal experiences, much like music, with interactive music being
the participatory dual of spectating a composed instrument performance. It
is this crafted exposition and development of sound, gesture and their re-
lationship that has the potential to turn interactive sound into interactive
music. It is a vision is similar to Minsky’s (1981) analogy of a guided tour
through the building, however instead of being shuttled through a building
on a train, we are free to wander on our own terms. The task of the interac-
tive music composer is to construct a world that makes such wanderings as
musical as the train ride, without removing the sense of freedom. To assist us
in achieving this goal, I presented in Chapter 4 a new model of exploration,
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the Emerging Structures (ES) model, that furthers our knowledge of how this
world results in a subjective experience and provokes further action from the
participant. In Chapter 6, I then presented a new framework of Perceived
Agency to understand better what a sense of freedom really means, the dif-
ferent ways in which it may manifest and why it is important. To put these
theoretical tools to work, I have presented, implemented and evaluated two
new design principles: incremental constraint unlocking (Chapter 5) and the
implicit constraint (Chapters 7 and 8).
Throughout, I used these models to argue that it is the possibility to
learn more and do more that makes for a captivating interactive experi-
ence. Continually emerging structures are a fundamental aspect of interac-
tive music—as they are music. But interactive music has the potential to be
so much more than simply music that demands participation. It is the music
of musical action. Through exploring the performance with the creation of
the Serendiptichord in Chapter 3 we saw that structures emerge not only in
what we hear but how we create what we hear. However, it is not enough
to provide a system that steadily introduces complexity. From the ES model
of Chapter 4 we concluded that consideration is necessary of how the partic-
ipant will perceive and form an understanding of how it functions, what it
allows them to do and, crucially, what it is about to allow them to do.
In the ES model there are two ways in which structures emerge: through
exposing novel inputs and through refining an understanding of exposed in-
puts. These correspond to Costello’s (2009) investigative and diversive types
of exploration or, in the words of one participant of the Impossible Alone
evaluation, ‘you just go mental and start pushing buttons’ and ‘go into the
technical aspect’ (Section C.3.2). But they also align in a somewhat different
way with Litman’s (2005) two types of curiosity: an interest in finding new
knowledge and a sense of deprivation in our existing knowledge, in which
case individual differences may play a considerable role. This model pro-
vides a new way of describing the exploratory process which allows us to
unite and apply different psychological theories to further our understanding
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of interactive music.
We observed the importance of considering how agency is perceived in
Chapter 5 when we evaluated our first design principle based on the ES
model, incremental constraint unlocking. The framework of Perceived Agency
I introduced in Chapter 6 provided a new way to understand what these roles
are and analyse how they interact with contextual norms.
Asking the audience to take an active role in the experience means giving
them an active role to play. Agency is not just about freedom but about
responsibility. If you do not have the agency to create bad music then you
cannot have the agency to create good music either: it is simply how it would
always have been. The trick is not to make things easy for the participant
but easy enough. But as we saw in Chapter 6, agency is a perceived quality of
an interaction. If it is not perceived, or if an unseen agent is perceived to be
making the decisions, then the participant is unlikely to feel the experience
is really their own. Without agency, we are simply tourists on the beaten
track. However beautiful the sights are, they never quite match the hidden
gems you think nobody else has found.
Conversational interaction has remained an elusive goal for many re-
searching Interactive Music Systems (IMSs) or interactive art. With a closer
consideration of the subjective experience of conversing through the frame-
work of Chapter 6, I argued in Chapter 9 that fundamental to conversation
is the perception of agency in both the participant and their interlocutor.
This may be a particularly fruitful way to apply the findings of the ES model
in future IMSs. An interesting person may say interesting things. But the
best conversationalist makes you say interesting things. Likewise, the best
interactive music systems will not be the ones that produce beautiful music
but the ones that make you produce beautiful music.
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10.1 Future work
A number of avenues for further work now await. I describe here a few of
particular interest.
10.1.1 Emerging structures through conversational in-
teraction
The approach taken towards creating systems with emerging structures have
been focused on constraining interaction. However, in Section 9.4 we saw
how the framework of perceived agency may together inform the design of
more conversational interaction offering an alternative means to apply the ES
model. This may be a promising direction of future research into interactive
music.
10.1.2 Validating the Emerging Structures model
The extent to which the ES model has been formally validated by this thesis
is limited. There were a number of directions that could have been taken
following this outcome; I decided that we needed a better understanding of
the social and subjective issues that determine how expectations of a system
influence the experience of interacting with it. Whilst the evaluation of
Impossible Alone in Chapter 8 provided supportive evidence, a number of
predictions within Chapter 4 await further evaluation.
10.1.3 Further development of the Emerging Struc-
tures model
The ES model is oriented around a cognitive understanding of interaction.
Although it may be applied both to conscious and embodied thought, we
have not differentiated between these. Further consideration could also be
given to the role of erroneous inference on the part of the participant or how
their knowledge changes over time (e.g. forgetting, distortion).
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The ES model at present does not consider prior knowledge in much detail
or the effects of repeated exposure and vicarious learning through observing
other participants. In particular, these three factors are likely to inform the
participants expectations of perceived agency. For example, one participant
in the evaluation of Impossible Alone suggested that she would be better
able to make sense of their experience if she were able to see others use the
system (Section C.5.2).
10.1.4 A computational model of emerging structures
As discussed in Section 4.9.1, whilst the ES model is defined subjectively
from the perspective of a participant, its basis on the information dynamics
models of Section 2.4.3 leaves open the possibility of modelling a participant
using machine learning tools.
A particularly interesting possibility opened by this would be to apply a
suitable machine learning algorithm to the interaction logs of participants us-
ing an IMS. This would allow an estimation of uncertainty, encounter entropy,
implications (expected decreases in uncertainty), capacity for action (channel
capacity). These could then be compared against subjective measurements
such as questionnaire responses allowing for a more formal validation or ad-
vancement of the ES model.
10.1.5 More interactive music
Finally, we have presented our notions of what interactive music could be, as
well as a number of prototypical implementations to evaluate these ideas. But
the true test will be whether any others creating Interactive Music Systems
(or other Digital Music Systems) are able to apply these ideas to their own
work, as a means both to understand why audiences respond in the way that
they do or to guide the creation of new work.
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10.2 Final remark
A skilled musician may arrive at a static Interactive Music System and de-
velop their own structures. But a system for non-experts must do more.
As much as we are granting the participant freedom over what music they
create and how they go about doing so, the experience, their ability to see
potential, their motivation to explore and learn to use the system—these all
remain our responsibility.
Just as in any medium, some works will be more challenging than others
and may be created for more seasoned audiences. The composer of interactive
music of course remains free to create challenging work. What we have sought
to establish here is the basis of the medium. Rules are made to be broken.
Hopefully we have clarified some of the consequences.
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Appendix A
Further details of the
percussive mapping model
This appendix provides further details of the percussive mapping model used
with in the Serendiptichord, outlined in Section 3.2.4.
The percussive mapping model draws on the embodied metaphor of strik-
ing an object, which has been found to be quickly learnt by performers
(Bevilacqua et al. 2011). Note however, that our model associates objects
with orientations rather than positions. In this way, our approach seeks to
provide with a consistent sequence of sounds to a given bodily gesture in a
way that is intuitive to both dancer and audience.
Sensor inputs from both noisemakers are concatenated to produce a po-
sition within the combined orientation space. Within this space each sound
object is assigned a random position when it is loaded. The object is trig-
gered when the combined input comes within a (Euclidean) distance d of its
associated orientation, with the trigger volume determined by the speed of
movement towards the sound object. In this way, sound objects may be seen
as spheres of radius d within the controller space that the noisemakers ‘hit’.
When the noisemakers move away from the sound object, the sample is
stopped when a boundary slightly greater than d is crossed to provide a slight
sense of ‘stickiness’ to the objects and prevent rapid triggering around the
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Figure A.1: A dancer’s trajectory (blue line) through the
controller space and within the boundary of a sound object
with centre O. The sample is triggered once from entering the
boundary and again from returning back towards the centre
having started moving away. The dotted line shows the stop-
ping boundary.
boundary. In initial testing, however, dancers found it difficult to predictably
trigger a sample twice in a row as they had no way of explicitly knowing
where this boundary was and needed to escape it and return to retrigger the
sound. This was addressed by considering the speed of approach towards or
away from the sound object (Figure A.1). Thresholds were set requiring a
minimum speed of approach to trigger a sample and allowing retriggering
once a minimum speed of departure had been reached.
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Appendix B
Further details of the constraint
unlocking experiment
B.1 Assessing musical experience
Participants’ musical experience was assessed prior to selection by asking
applicants to answer the following questions in their responses.
1. Do you play an instrument? Yes / No
2. How would you rate your proficiency? Beginner / Intermediate / Semi-
professional / Professional
3. Have you ever composed your own piece of music? Yes / No
4. Have you performed music to an audience within the past five years?
Yes / No
Participants were given a point for each ‘Yes’, and a score in the range 0–3
for their answer to question 2, giving a total score in the range 0–7. Within
two days of the recruitment email being sent, 57 responses had been re-
ceived and only these applicants were considered for the study. Their mean
score was calculated as 2.7 and so those with a score ≥ 3 were allocated
to the musically experienced group (25 applicants) and those with a score
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≤ 2 to the musically inexperienced group (29 participants). Three applicants
did not answer the questions and were not further considered for participa-
tion.
B.2 Statements used in the questionnaire
The following table shows each statement of the questionnaire alongside the
hypothesis that it was measuring. Each statement measured either a positive
point for the hypothesis or a negative point. Negative points are shown with
minus signs.
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Q The best output was produced
T I connected with the system
–Q I did not feel satisfied with the result
A I expressed myself the most
D The system had a broad range of musical possibilities
–L I was concentrating hard but did not make any progress
L I understood what was going on
E I was completely involved in what I was doing
D Other people using this would probably sound quite different from me
Q I would like to listen to a recording of the music
–A The music was determined less by me and more by the system’s creator
–T The connection between the music and my actions was difficult to understand
–E I was not entirely focused on what I was doing
–F I didn’t enjoy myself
–A It wasn’t my fault when it didn’t sound good
–L I learnt how to use the system quickly
–T The interface was intuitive
–Q I did not like how the music sounded
–D The system has a limited range of musical output
–E I put in effort to achieve particular results
–D The sound was overly repetitive
–F The experience was not worth the effort I put in
F I would have liked to have used the system for longer
A I was creative during the session
–L My ability to use the system improved during the session
–F I would like to use the system again
–E The experience was not engaging
–T There was not a close relationship between my input and the systems output
Appendix C
Further details of the
evaluation of Impossible Alone
C.1 Participant pair 1
The mapping was explained to the participants.
C.1.1 Observations
Overall, the participants did not seem to establish a good rapport with each
other.
First session
The participants did not talk except for a few quiet words three minutes in
when they were trying to reproduce a specific sound. They made eye contact
fairly early on and were making quite large movements early on. R seemed
to be leading for most of the time although L led at one point as well. They
asked to stop the session after 5 minutes, a move which seemed to be initiated
by R.
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Second session
The beginning of this session was delayed by a few minutes due to calibration
difficulties with the system. In this session, the participants’ movements
seemed somewhat more repetitive. To some extent, L still seemed to be
following R as before. At seven minutes into this session, both participants
became quite still and focused on small slow movements. During this, they
seemed to be exploring more deeply than before. The session was stopped
after 11 minutes, led by R.
C.1.2 Reconstructed summaries
First interview
Participant L I found it interesting but found it difficult to catch the music.
Sometimes it felt the sound was always the same but I haven’t too much knowledge
about music so maybe it’s a little bit hard for me to know how to do actions that
match this music. Sometimes after the music has finished I may think of something.
I think we learnt quite quickly how to use the system. We can see each other so
sometimes we can feel all ‘what should we produce’ and then I can produce the same
actions. Perhaps with our previous experience we can come to the same idea for a
similar sound. Maybe with a different partner we can try to have different actions or
something.
Participant R First of all I was trying to get some kind of communication going
with you, trying to work the system together. In the beginning I wanted to find out
the broad range of what the system could do. Then I was trying to see which kind of
sounds we could produce with which kinds of movements. Then after, I think we tried
to recreate specific sounds and get more into how the thing works and see what we
could do with it.
It felt like we were trying to take the same kind of approach. I was trying to work
out if I could reproduce certain sounds or make a stronger connection between certain
actions and certain sounds. Sometimes we produced new interesting sounds but we
couldn’t work out what we did to produce it.
The first thing that became clear was what the not-in-sync sound. That was fun
and worked really well. That was the easiest thing to learn: when we were in sync and
what sound that produced, as opposed to specific movements that would produce a
specific sound. The nicest bits were when R did something new and then I was like
336
‘Ah yeah let’s do that’. These collaborative bits where eI forgot about the study were
most enjoyable. It could be interesting to try it with somebody else.
I would have liked there to be more differentiation between the sounds. I found
it quite difficult to know which actions would produce which sounds because there
wasn’t much differentiation between the sounds. It would have been easier to learn
if they were more distinct. I was a bit frustrated because I would have liked it to be
clearer. I learnt vaguely which actions produced which sounds but not enough to my
satisfaction.
I was trying to remember what kind of movements you said you could do. I wasn’t
sure if I had exhausted all of the possible sounds I could produce so I’d be interested
in trying to find out what other sounds the system could make. If you hadn’t have
told me what the possible sounds were, I would probably have tried a bigger range of
movements because I remember you mostly spoke about the things you could do with
your hands. Maybe if you hadn’t said that I would have tried to use my whole body
much more.
I stopped when I felt I’d exhausted the possibility of making a stronger connection
between certain actions and certain sounds. And I had maybe got a bit frustrated
because I couldn’t do that.
Second interview
Participant L This second one was more difficult than the first one. In the first,
you can conference with your partners and do the movement that they are doing. In
this one, you have to find some special movements that are different from your partner.
Sometimes we found the connection between us and the music but mostly we did
not know how to find the sounds. We did not know what we should do for this kind
of music. I actually found the music was not for me. It has too much silence and
sometimes you do not know what to do with it which I found a bit frustrating. There
is music that I find makes you exciting and makes you want to move but this cannot
let you feel exciting. Sometimes you do not want to move any more and it made me
feel like I want to stop, I need to stop.
The system is quite good but I do not know what it could be useful for.
Participant R I found this second system both frustrating and interesting. I got
more involved this time, but this may have been because we had already had the
experience from earlier. But this time, especially towards the end, it was more like free
collaboration. We were still working together but not relying on each other and doing
our own thing - something we were perhaps afraid of. In the first one, we were kind
of tied to each other. We had to really communicate and cooperate to get anything
done. But the second version I felt we got more the hang of it and I understood more.
We went deeper as well. It felt like there was more to discover and we created whole
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soundscapes that we were not able to get to in the first version. In the first session we
seemed more to be trying to crack the system, energetically attempting to discover all
of the sounds.
We might have got more of the hang of it because at one point we stopped moving.
I do not really remember why I did this but possibly it was because I was confused
and frustrated by not being able to tell which sounds I was influencing and which
sounds she was influencing. So perhaps I just wanted to watch L. But I did not know
that we could produce a new sound through stopping. This was something we almost
discovered without trying and was just happened upon. It made us realise there was
more to discover.
Matching each other had limited the musicality of the system. That said, although
I thought beforehand that it would be much easier without us being together, at some
point I realised that it seemed quite fruitful that we were together. I think losing the
matching requirement was more the reason that the two experiences differed rather
the fact we’d already had experience with it.
The system has lots of potential but I would have liked more control to finely
tune the sounds. The sounds were also too similar to each other and I would have
liked more variety and delineation between them. I do not think either session would
necessarily have been that different if I was working with someone I knew.
C.2 Participant pair 2
The mapping was explained to the participants.
C.2.1 Observations
First session
The participants quickly seemed to establish a good communication and
eye contact. They had a good rapport and were laughing although they
appeared slightly squashed by the marked perimeter. L interrupted the study
5 minutes in to ask a question about occlusion. After hearing the answer, L
led the participants in asking to stop the session. Throughout this session,
the participants did not particularly come across the mapping of the hand
speeds to the string level [something that has proven quite popular in other
scenarios].
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Second session
There was not much eye contact or communication. L began exploring the
string volume slightly more around 2 minutes in. The participants ended the
session after 4 minutes, led by L.
C.2.2 Reconstructed summary
First interview
Participant L The system is really interesting, good, nice, fun and is best de-
scribed by the term ’interactive music system’ although it could be a game. It could
be seen as movement-based production, especially if you could load your own sounds
onto it but more as a fun way of coming up with ideas rather than for something like
mixing. However, it is better described as a game.
At the beginning we were mainly just messing around but then we started finding
the locations of particular sounds. The sound design was really nice. I occasionally
play music with other people but this was more like a game.
The matching requirement brought another dimension to the experience and this
made it more interesting and exciting and meant that neither of us was alone when
making use of the system. Cooperation just happened and was funny but good with
the matching requirement. Matching was fluid and it affected the way we went about
exploring the system although we didn’t have a particular ’approach’ and were just
generally exploring it. It didn’t lead to turn-taking.
Participant R The system could be a game. It could be described as a detection
system with music but it was more like a game.
I seldom play music with other people. At the beginning I was reminded of my
street dancing classes. I was trying to do something done by the other participant
but then I thought of something of my own to try and I started to move something.
I particularly liked it when we were trying to clap and heard something like a ’bling
bling’ sound.
The matching requirement sometimes affected how we explored the system. Our
use of the system was simultaneous in the way two things led together.
Second interview
Participant L I preferred the second time. It was nicer and definitely had me
thinking more musically. It felt more musical because I would look out for what he
339
was doing and then think of sounds to go with his. I could hear his sensing and then
mix it off with a couple of moves, like the rhythm, say. The interesting part of the
second was how many different things you could do and making them work together.
Maybe R would do the bell thing which would make me do the pad kind of sound. All
these combinations made me carry on using the system.
I would not describe either time as difficult or challenging but the second was
much more interesting and fun than the other one where you were more forced to
cooperate. Here, we were looking out for what each other’s doing which felt more like
real cooperation. The matching prevents us from enjoying ourselves as much because
we have to both make the same sound. It makes us both have to be part of a motion.
The second session was more about the sound whereas the other way was more about
the motions. I lost track of the time more in the second and was thinking less of what
we were doing. Although we knew the gestures from the first session, I do not think
the order we used the systems had much effect. If I were to use one system again, it
would be the second one.
Participant R I preferred the second one. I had some kind of harmony that I
really liked. It was fun and would be my choice if I were to use one system again. I
would describe it as about the same level of challenge or difficulty but the first one
was more stressful. When I was exploring it, I would have to think of something that
I want to do. In the second one, I did not even think about my movement. I just
thought ’I want this music’ and did it. Exploration was guided by music rather than
movement. Whilst I was using the second one, I almost forgot the time when I was
trying to do something to explore the music.
C.3 Participant pair 3
The mapping was not explained to the participants.
C.3.1 Observations
First session
The participants got involved in what they were doing fairly quickly. They
had a good rapport but they did not establish eye contact. There seemed
to be a desire to explore the string mapping but their ability to do so was
limited. They appeared to be trying to work together but found it difficult
to communicate their intentions. There did not seem to be a single person
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leading. At one point both participants became quite slow and went into a
more concentrated exploration. The session was stopped after 20 minutes by
R.
Second session
The participants occasionally fell back into matching each other. They had
a fair amount of rhythmic consistency and built up an intense sound by
continually triggering drum loops. At one stage they took on roles with R
doing rhythm and L the strings. At another, they swapped sides. Around
10 minutes in R slowed down attempting to explore slow movements but
was having little effect as L was still making more active movements. L
subsequently slowed down. 14 minutes in, R left the space and left L to carry
on alone. 2 minutes later L leaves the space and R moves in to use it alone.
However, the system has lost R’s tracking data and is actually interpreting
random input from his movement (although R does not realise this). After
3 minutes of this, R leaves the scene and the participants agree to stop the
session. The total length was 19 minutes. There is a calm atmosphere at the
end.
C.3.2 Reconstructed summary
First interview
Participant L The system was really amazing, for personal reasons. It’s like a
mind-body movement, virtual theremin-synth system - a pad that is triggered in a
three-dimensional area rather than a two-dimensional area. I had to find out what it
does as with any piece of software and getting better takes practice as it would with
an instrument. Key to understanding it were finding the sweet spots and mechanics
of the hand mapping. You have to go through the recognition of all of the sounds.
While using it, I was not trying to move more quickly or slowly but go with the
changes on the rhythm. I wanted to be able to drag around the pad synth where
sounds could be found and then moved somewhere. R mentioned incorporating layers
in the system and this would be nice to work with the pad. You could have the same
modulations of going forwards and sideways but then have three or four layers that
you could play, perhaps lower, middle, etc. which would give you enough space. Also,
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you could have one hand on the pad and then the other on the drum loops or on the
melody. But if it’s a performance art piece then there would not necessarily need to
be a melody or harmony.
The drum loops are OK but are stuck with a single tempo which you have to
recognise. This is a pro and a con. Any loops sets a tempo and it would have been
nice to be able to modulate this.
I though the whole thing lasted eight minutes. It would have been longer and flowed
in a different way without the need of two people to be synced. This means you need
a feather threshold area and it had an impact on the continuity of the experience.
Without the matching requirement, I think we would have found our roles. It would
also be possible to split the area into individual instruments (although this goes against
the whole system). It would involve a different kind of trigger and you could give one
person a tap tempo though I imagine this would be hard to do.
A key aspect of this is the sound it makes when you’re not mirroring, the ’err’
sound. It makes you question whether you are following or being followed. The
difference between following and leading can become hard to tell. There are always
going to be some microscopic differences between the participants unless you had
about a month of preparation.
Participant R It was an unusual and abstract experience, like being a baby again
trying to rediscover your environment. You’re trying to find out where everything is,
sync with the system and find the sweet spots. Early on it is quite disorientating
because as a human you are visually oriented and you try to find some kind of visual
target or visualisation of the space. You feel blind as you fumble around unsure of
whether it is you or the other person triggering the sounds. It is a kind of reward
system, or a weird dialect, sometimes it speaks to you, sometimes it does not.
There’s something primordial about the experience, something within you that
marks your territory, possibly ego or something more primordial that makes leading and
following seem like a master and slave thing. You want to go back to a particular place
and are trying to lead the other person there. The experience is not a competition
(although maybe subconsciously it is), though I found myself intellectualising the
process rather than going with it, which made it seem more competitive. I think we
were always subconsciously questioning who was leading.
We would have used it a lot longer if we didn’t have to mirror each other. It was
quite physically exhausting due to the pace of the other person. I wanted to do my own
sort of exploration and take my time, potter a bit, which I think anyone does when faced
with a hands-on kind of challenge. Without the matching, I think we would have found
our roles, for example the rhythm-oriented person, the synth-oriented person, ending
up something more like Kraftwerk. We’re speaking as musicians though; different
participants would have a different opinion. Mirroring had a big impact on whether I
could get into the flow. It made me more reliant. L was quick at the beginning and I
was trying to keep up with him. I wanted to take the lead and explore a particular place
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but could not and felt like I could not express myself. I found it especially confusing
being left-handed - I got confused between doing the mirror image or the mirror image
of the mirror image. Our ability to use the system improved slowly - give it another
hour perhaps.
The system would have been more intuitive as a solo performance. I think any kind
of shared space imposes some kind of matching requirement meaning that you have to
know the other person, intrinsically understand them. At the very least you need eye
contact, which we did not have. With a more symbiotic relationship we would have
been able to notice the more peripheral and microscopic movements. Moving slower
would have made a more stable performance with sounds that were more coherently
ordered and repeatable. Without more awareness of the other participant, the mirroring
is more rough and the things that you find together cannot necessarily be found again.
After you have discovered the sweet spots, then you can start moving a bit more
quickly and making big sweeping gestures.
The mirroring was a restriction, which is not necessarily a negative thing, but it
requires some kind of coherent structure and I think some kind of preparation would
have helped with this. I used to do drama and we did similar exercises. It would involve
starting off facing each other with eye contact, then noticing microscopic movements.
Then slow movements would begin as one person leads and then another, followed by
larger movements. Leading and following happen naturally. It is more of a transference,
which we did not get here. I was trying to grab eye contact a lot and slow it down to
find and explore those individual sweet spots. I think with more eye contact we might
have had a more symbiotic relationship with each other and with the space, which
would have made a more interesting experience. We also lost some momentum from
having started off so quickly.
However, we did have some moments of continuity and flow. Often, it was lost
when you heard the deviation sound. At first the sound is quite nice but then you
realise it’s a negative sound and it throws you back. It makes you start panicking and
you have to start moving your body. You question if it is you or your partner. You tend
not to be able to find that spot you were at before but return to something familiar,
like that nice tom sound on the floor or the synth which gets you back into the flow.
I wanted to explore more of the system. There were repetitions of some sounds.
Some I wanted to hear again but I wanted a broader palette as well. I was looking for
something other than that synth, which just seemed to come there, swell and repeat
two chords. I wanted to find other sounds and I think that there might be some that
we did not find. We kept finding that drum down there on the floor too. I wondered
what else was on the floor and wanted to go down and have a look but could not.
Some sounds seemed to be triggered at the same time and they might have been
separated better.
The synth modulates outwards when we come here and became quite distorted
when we went there. I was not sure if it was a sample or had a specific rhythm but
we were clearly triggering a specific loop. I would have been interested to change the
tempo of the loop and modulate other sounds rather than just the pad. It might be
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good have the system in layers.
The system could be set up without the mirroring and then you could have, say,
one side of the room does percussion, one does everything else. That would be
interesting (and scary). The system was restrictive in having a fixed tempo which is
understandable for the samples. I guess a tap tempo might be quite difficult as it is
getting quite advanced. Losing the mirroring might go against the whole system, but
the system is meant to be broken, experimented on. You could have an invisible band
with a guitarist and a virtual theremin, though with different technology as a theremin
would probably be using microwaves.
All this said, I am a musician and so would probably express myself and have a
different opinion than, say, a group of expert dancers. The system would be interesting
if used by interpretive dancers and used as a dance oriented detection thing. They
would probably give it a much more positive response, treating it less as a sound thing
and being more about the space it creates. They would probably use it for a lot longer
and might just naturally resonate better with the system. You could do some yoga
experts on it.
Or it may suit performance artists and be a part of something like a Jean-Michel
Jarre performance. As a performance art piece, we would have much more abstract
and less rigid expectations than we do coming from a musician’s environment. As a
movement piece, our bodies themselves would be something to be explored. It is still
relevant for musicians though. It is a bit like a Reactable. It would be cool with a few
of those ideas involved, like being able to grab a modulation from there, activate it
and then drag it over here.
Second interview
Participant L This was an improvement on the first one. The matching thing
was interesting but this one definitely had more control and was much more fluid. But
it would be confusing as a first experience if you do not know what is being done by
each part of the body or which sounds were being made by you. Who was making
each part was a curious aspect which we found out through repetition. Learning to
use the system through discovery while using it did not get in the way of having fun
because, whether you are controlling it or experimenting, it is all about the flow of
your body movement. The sound was always coherent, in time, with harmony, with
rhythm, with tempo. It was like we were walking on the same path, in the sense that
it was very safe, like a road with flowers and trees and each one of us goes for one
thing and that works out just fine.
Having multiple instruments to control makes it more difficult to focus on one
sound. We had random exploration, where you just go through it, which was followed
by more technical aspects.
The triggering of the samples is not absolute. For example, with that kick the
velocity does not seem to respond to speed the same way each time, which you would
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expect it to. It was hard to realise how it worked. But sensors are easy to trick. You
always wonder ’is it here?’ You have a constant doubt about whether there are any
uncontrolled external factors making the sound, which can be confusing. It reminds
me of a book called ’How real’s real?’ which talks of a study where people have to hit
three of eight buttons and then a central button, which displays whether the correct
buttons were pressed. The participants have to figure out what the next sequence
is but in the end it turns out to be absolutely random. The study investigates how
the human brain always has a need to find coherence in a system and I think people
struggle in the same way with this system. This doubt about coherence is the biggest
struggle for when you are just starting although it does not stop you from getting into
the flow.
I would describe the system as challenging in a way similar to when you play with
someone for the first time. But the purpose of the system makes a big difference on
your response to it. It could be an experimental performing interactive art piece, like
those that are on tube station steps. People go around and marvel themselves for
ten seconds and move along. That is a different thing from if it were an instrument,
like the Reactable where you play with it and marvel and the tangible pieces and
make some wild sounds. An instrument you would get along with after some hours
of training - a guitarist does not know where the notes are when they first start. But
the Reactable is meant to be experimental like this system. Even when played on by
professional musicians it has a lot of randomness. There will be variables, mistakes
and differences from the exact way you wanted it to play so even though it has visual
content and the performer knows what is going on there will be happy accidents. But
on this system, however much control you add, it will never be an absolutely accurate
instrument and always be very experimental. You could perhaps solve a performer’s
need to know where everything is with something simple, like a virtual rack or a net
of intervals made out of thread.
It is a bit of a stupid thing but the purpose of the mirroring one could also be
for one of those team-building things, in the sense of working together with someone
because it requires joint effort. Only, you could have a much more dramatic and really
disturbing deviation sound. What would also be good would be instead of being its own
sound, it was reflected within the sound as dissonance when you were not matching.
Participant R The second time round was an improvement on the first session.
It was much more fluid, intuitive, enjoyable and fun. It was more interesting, sonically,
as a performance and just to look at. I felt more free. In the first one I wanted
to stop but this time I was more happy to continue because I was getting more out
of it and still finding sounds. I am glad I had the previous experience though as it
made me appreciate this experience more. They were both challenging but in different
ways. The first time because you were playing blind. That was frustrating because
you wanted to get it right. The second time the challenge was on a different level.
You wanted to have a more semantic exploration and find these shapes. Being less
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bound we explored more. I am still not visually there in my head but I am more of an
abstract person than visual.
How you explore it is like when you do photoshop or learn a new piece of music
software. You do not read the manual or calibrate everything but just go mental and
start pushing buttons and learn it through self-discovery. You find a sticking point,
your anchor. From there you find maybe another anchor that you are familiar with
and you can move between these kind of like call and response and lets you find out
what is instrument, what is sound. Moving between the two leads onto the kinetic
aspect, which means it is about moving as well as watching. This brings in more of
the sounds, more exciting sounds and might lead you to create a more active sound.
When there is a lull you return to your anchor.
This type of learning is fun though I guess that is not a necessity. It does not
necessarily lead to learning the whole thing and it might not be so good if the system
was to be used as a technical tool or a performance related thing but as a learning
tool, a novice performance education tool this would be fun to have. The age of the
user would probably affect how they respond to this approach with younger people
responding better. If it is an overall tool for just everybody then children will find
something from it. Only they would be exploring by running round, having fun and
much more intuitive. This random exploration does eventually need to be followed by
the technical aspect which we did though we were pretty familiar with this from the
earlier experience. I think for more exploration we would need more control. I suppose
it is in the innate nature of human beings to want control - particularly men!
But your response will depend on your background. We are from a musician or
performance background so are talking in terms of what we like to see technically. We
have preconceived notions from things we have seen on Youtube like the Reactable. As
a performance art kind of thing, I guess something like this has already been done but
maybe not as an instrument or a virtual band. But a guitarist knows where his guitar
is. A drummer knows where his drums are. It could be like a quirky Reactable kind
of thing. It seems like a natural progression from needing a physical table and objects
to modulate and create the sound. As an instrument, we could have a space here
with a virtual rack of effects, etc., which could be done with markings. It would be
interesting to know what the system is for and how far in the development it is, though
not make it any more or less fun. The calibration will be broad and depend on how it
is used, which will depend on your expectations of what it is for and what it can do.
A performer would need to know where everything is. Someone more technical would
also want more control, to be able to calibrate it to make very precise movements and
place sounds where they like. Performance artists would maybe want to be able to
have it more random and discover the system with the use of their body.
Repetition is not always successful. This can be fun as it adds to the glitch element,
which is quite cool. But I wondered whether it was perhaps a certain movement
or certain speed it was responding to because there were more sounds when I was
making much bigger or faster movements. It may have been that the sweet spots were
not necessarily static. Where everything is did not feel static. I stepped out of the
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performance space because it seemed to have come to its conclusion but this allowed
me to observe L. This was not planned. When you start observing one person on
their own you start seeing that there definitely is that sound there. It let me improve
my understanding of where everything is and made me want to know more. So after
watching for a bit I returned to the space and L came out.
But a bunch of sounds do not seem to stay in the same place. There was that
kind of staticky sound here and that modulation there going up and down that seemed
like it was operating some kind of wave or cutting through a stream. I was not sure
where the percussive things were. They seem to be randomly placed rather than more
specifically like in percussive groups. That tom down here misses sometimes and did
not always trigger, which would make you think ’oh shit. Down there it seemed more
resonant and further left more verby though that might have been because of that kind
of static on the other side. It was not always in time which is something you would
want it to be. It was possibly synced to a sixteenth or a thirty-second. The drum
loop I could not find. It seemed to stop when you got slower and stay in the more
kinetic you were. Sometimes it seemed more an amalgamation of sounds if you move
a certain speed or a certain direction rather than individual sounds that you triggered.
I think having multiple instruments to control leads you to rationalise it and make it
more logical. It is human nature to look for coherence and solutions to problems so
when you doubt this you start the repeat thing. It does not stop you from getting into
the flow but it is a struggle if you have the study L mentioned in the back of your
mind!
Overall though, the system felt very safe. Whatever we did, it was going to
produce a coherent thing, in tune that would be some kind of loop if you laid it out on
a computer. This second time it had less or hardly any of the ‘uhh-uhh’ sound. I think
it would be better without this sound - deinhibiting and less intrusive to the performer.
I can see you might need it if you were going for the motivational team-building thing
but if that was its purpose I would take the drama route where they teach you to look
in the eyes, do the movements slowly, build, start from that, and so on. I suppose this
is programming the other person to behave in a certain way. But we did not have this
introduction here so the matching was more experimental. The system worked better
without the matching but I think I am too selfish for it! I suppose you get used to it,
like breathing underwater, but I found we were much more symbiotic without it. We
still found ourselves finding specific roles. However, there is more doubt about what
they are generating and what you are generating, whether it is just an amalgamation
of sounds based on all of your movement, what the other participant’s true reading on
the sensors is. That is why I wanted to swap and explore the other side. This allowed
me to get more spatial awareness. Even then it felt like there was more to find. It
would be interesting if the sounds from each person were played through different
speakers. Or it could be the opposite, so my speaker plays his sounds and vice versa.
It would be very interesting to have each sound coming through its own speaker. As
a solo performance you would become more in tune and confident.
I would love to have something like this where you can use your own rhythm. I
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think yo use it daily would be quite inspiring actually. I always admire artists like Aphex
Twin and Squarepusher who do erratic jazz timings and all but I get really frustrated
that I cannot sit at home on music software and program something as random and
chaotic as that. I love random elements in my own music and would love to have
something really glitchy like that. I have a theremin at home. I do not use it very
much as my setup is crap but I would like to. It is not a proper Moog theremin which
is a proper thing with a proper box. I would probably use it more if it was. But as I
am sure you know, the theremin is not played by touching but by playing with space
and that appeals to me. When I was younger I loved movement and things as well as
dancing and drama.
C.4 Participant pair 4
The mapping was not explained to the participants.
C.4.1 Observations
First session
The participants quickly established a good rapport and were laughing and
communicating successfully from the outset. L was quick to try extremes and
led the participants towards interacting on their knees, facing backwards,
jumping. However, throughout the participants discussed their interaction
as a joint activity. At one point L stood on his head, at which point the
investigator interrupted and asked him not to do so as it was likely in breach
of the study’s risk assessment. The skeleton tracking did not work well in
this session, sometimes able to track only the torso. The participants asked
to stop after 16 minutes without a clear leader.
Second session
There was again a lot of raucous movement and the investigator asked the
participants to be careful not to hurt themselves. They asked to stop the
session after 6 minutes, again without a clear leader.
348
C.4.2 Reconstructed summary
First interview
Participant L At the beginning it felt like a learning experience to get it to work
at its best. We were going between static points exactly matching. We had a strong
sense of not wanting to make the ’nn nn nn’ sound from not matching. The sound
is not horrible; it is actually quite a nice noise but you are still aiming not to hear it.
Sometimes, the system still made the noise even though we were matching. Towards
the end, it was more freeform with us trying less hard to match. I was much more
immersed in the experience at the end and the time did not seem to last very long.
Generally, I was less conscious of what was going on in the fun parts, for example
when R was on his head but it still seemed to be working. These bits were just funny
really. It felt like we were aligned with each other and I forgot about what we were
doing with the system.
I have only really said ’hello’ to R before and I felt more self-conscious about
working with someone I did not know than I did about moving my body. That said,
whilst I do dance, I probably would not have signed up if someone had asked me to
just come and dance. If it was just me moving, I probably would have felt really self-
conscious (without alcohol at least). I did not feel self-conscious about the camera.
But I was not really dancing as I felt I needed to know what was being done by the
system. I would not say we were talking or problem solving so much. It was more
just movement and it became more fluid as the session went on. I do not think the
system would be very good for dancers as there is no pause in the sound so there are
no moments to stop and regroup. When you are dancing, there is a shift between the
songs or the tracks of the music.
That we had to match each other made me think initially of leader and follower,
which is established quite quickly. We did not have very much eye contact but were
more just able to see what each other was doing with our peripheral vision which was
enough. It was quite bonding between us which was nice. The matching is quite
an intimate thing but in a friendly, playful environment which made it feel very safe.
Without the matching, I think we may have found the sweet spots and triggers more
quickly. We would just be zipping around as there is no negotiation. So we would
probably use it for less time unless we started unravelling things that we were not able
to get to this time. But it would not have been as much fun on your own as the shared
experience is a big part it.
We both had quite a similar approach to exploring the system. We had small
strategies to find one thing. If that worked then we would try moving around. After
trying something in a different context, we would return to something we knew worked.
We were quite constrained in what we did. We remained enclosed within the markings
and did not go out of them at all. Perhaps we would have done if there was more of
a gap around. You cannot run around in this room.
I think it would evolve the more you used the system, if you had the same partner.
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But generally, there seemed to be quite a limited set of sounds. There may be more to
it but we kept hearing the same stuff again and again, which made me feel that there
was not much more. Whilst the ’voom’ sound was really responsive and had quite a
gross movement, there was not so much fine ’ding-a-ling-ding’. The feedback was not
great. I wanted to control the sound more and was trying to find a way to make the
music, rather than have it react.
Participant R The experience was cool - slightly strange but really enjoyable.
It was slightly stilted in some way. It became more fluid but we were working it
out rather than dancing. We were quickly problem solving to get it working and at
the beginning it felt more like a goal. We were going to test the system and while
doing that find out its limitations. To start with, I was thinking of shapes rather than
movement and it became less about the dynamic and much more about static points,
controlling the system from one point and moving from form to form while keeping
in the same position. Even if there was a small amount of movement, it was about
keeping that movement the same and avoiding the deviation sound. However, the
system was working at some points even though we were not in the same position. At
other points even when we were pretty much exactly matching bar a finger it would
not work.
I realised for quite a bit of it I was not looking at L. I was thinking less explicitly
of what L was doing, relying more on feeling a sense of it through peripheral vision
and then occasionally checking how I was doing. It felt nice to get sorted. We had
little bits of talking, which was good, though not right at the beginning. Leading and
following was quite a bit in my mind. I do not really know L at all and neither of us
have ever done anything like this but we had a playful relationship and the experience
was a really fun way to get to know her. You should do it with everyone!
I do not feel self-conscious about movement, less so than with public speaking for
example, and I forgot about the camera. But it would not have felt doable if we were
just asked to do some dancing. It gets you moving and felt doable because we were
expecting a controller. That said, we were restricted compared to what we could have
done. It was pretty much rotation and extension of the arm and movements that the
system led you to do. You could not include things like compression and opening stuff.
We did not even touch going beyond the tape. But it felt weird moving in this room.
In a way it was a bit like a dance floor but it makes a weird space for movement. I
think in a different space we would have explored beyond the marked area.
It was more just movement than dance. For dance, there are more dynamics in
the music and it tends to be building but the sound will never do this if it is always
following your moves. I found sometimes you want to react to the system as opposed
to it reacting to you but you will always be chasing your tail if you try this.
We were initially made hesitant and unsure by the matching requirement. It felt
kind of restricted in some ways but it got more dynamic. It made it easier to learn to
use the system and I think it would definitely have been shorter without it as you would
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try lots of things quickly. Possibly it prevented us from unravelling the possibilities but
on the other hand it might make you lead each other into the sweet spots and find
more of them.
We definitely had a number of exploration strategies but I could not say what they
were. When we found a little thing - like when we were going ’voom voom’ - and
it worked then we would try to break that up and find a new thing. Maybe if that
worked then we tried something totally different, or maybe the same thing in a slightly
different context, for example on the floor or with our legs. At times I felt like jumping
across and doing slightly more silly things, like standing on my head.
If we were to use the system again, we would get more refined and with the same
partner it would evolve. I would maybe try different things or get a little bit more
exacting with it. However, if I had to come every day for a week and it was in the
same space, it would get tedious. A different space would lead to a different experience.
For example, I would have found out what happened beyond the tape somewhere else.
But I don’t have a sense of really wanting to explore this more. It did not feel like it
would lead to more discoveries. To explore this, I would want to try it in a different
context. That would make my mind start working, asking ’How do I use this? And
what for?’ It would make the repetitive sound less of an issue. But I do not feel like
there are more possibilities to explore. Or maybe there are but I do not feel motivated
to explore them. It was not like a program where you might think ’I can’t do very
much’ but there are so many possibilities. I think the feedback was a bit ’blehh’. I did
not feel like I really worked out what was going on. I did not need to know everything
but the amount of movement and exploration we did justified more.
You should be able to have more musical control. It felt too much like you were
cutting or fading into a piece of music that was already playing. The bit where we were
going ’voom voom’ with the synth was less like that. That was actually something
that makes you think ’yeah that’s good’. Some parts were fun. Towards the end it
was great and I definitely lost track of time a bit. I think the whole thing lasted about
20 minutes.
Second interview
Participant L The first system was a dynamic movement matching system that
responded sonically to how well you mirrored the other person. I am not sure if I agree
with R’s expression ’forced collaboration’. Perhaps ’mutual collaboration’, ’compulsory
collaboration’, or something else.
This second session was less tight in the shared experience and less focused than
the first one. I preferred doing it with someone else. That was more of an important
factor in how enjoyable it was than how careful we were. The togetherness and having
to match meant there was more of an impetus to learn. The two systems gave a slightly
different sense of achievement but the first one had more. The deviation sound, which
was not there in the second, put in place a kind of reward system an gave a sense of
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a goal.
R has some dance experience but I am not a dancer. Towards the end of the first
session I was feeling less self-conscious. But in the second session I was more unsure
of what to do next and when I was trying to stop, it was because of this, as well as
the repetitiveness of the music.
The system seemed less responsive in the second session. The sound went in
and out and there seemed to be less attention on me. It may have been that the
responsiveness was less obvious in this session because we did not start with small
movements like we did in the first. I think this time ended up being mainly about the
dynamics whereas the first one was about the actual shapes you are forming as well.
Participant R The second session I was a bit more just dancing around. It was
more us just moving, which was nice. Our movements were more tied to the dynamics.
It had less of a goal and was more open from the start. Perhaps ’goal’ and ’open’
are not the right words. It was definitely less focused. There were points of mutual
influence and moments when we reflected each other but it felt more like we were
just both engaging in the same experience rather than a shared experience. We were
still aware of each other but mainly just of where in the space the other person was
whereas in the first one it was also about having the same shape. Perhaps if we knew
each other we would have had more awareness of each other and start interacting and
doing stuff like a new composition. I do capoeira a lot but have not been much of
a dancer recently. If we were improvising dance or doing contact improvisation, we
might start by just flinging around but eventually stop and ask which bits worked and
then try them again.
It might have been different if it was in a different space or perhaps if we had
longer, although I guess time was not a factor as you did not set it. But the first one
seemed to be about us interesting ourselves in each other movement-wise as well as
finding out what was going on. We were much more considered and careful in our
exploration and curious about what would happen. It was fun to think of what to do
next and felt like there was more control. When we started the second one I wanted to
figure everything out but to be honest pretty soon I was just not as bothered. By the
end I was just looking to see if the system was going to do anything. It felt more like
a soundtrack. The tempo was the same and although there were more dynamics than
the first, it was like we were just catching to the music. Though when we both stopped
and I made a sudden movement, it did respond with a ’DUHH RUHH RAHH!’. At
the end of the first one I felt less unsure of what to do than in the second, and we had
both become less self-conscious.
I would describe the first system as a responsive audio system with forced collab-
oration. It is difficult to put it into a sentence though. The collaboration felt forced
because it will not work unless you collaborate with another participant but it was a
more positive step. ’Forced’ is a bit of a negative word and but that aspect was not
necessarily bad. ’Compulsory collaboration’ sounds even worse though! The first one
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had more of a build up which happened when we were just fooling around. I think
the two systems serve different purposes but they are both fun in different ways. Fun
is quite subjective term as it can be learning and controlling and eating something or
just throwing yourself around.
C.5 Participant pair 5
The mapping was explained to the participants.
C.5.1 Observations
These participants were exceptional within the study as they were friends
and somewhat older than many the other participants. They seemed less
confident that others about using the system before starting and agreed that
R would be ‘leader’.
First session
The participants began by performing familiar dance moves, matching in
style though not in actual pose. R was actively leading. Their movements
seemed quite unrelated to what they were hearing. At 9 minutes in they
began talking to each other quietly. At 14 minutes in, they were conversing
about matters completely unrelated to the study, still moving quite vigor-
ously. They then started whispering and began matching without reflecting
each other. The session was ended by me after 20 minutes. They were quite
relieved that it had ended. Although it was quite clear that it was up to
them to decide when to end the study, they seemed to have carried on out
of a sense of obligation.
Second session
Prior to this session it was restated that the participants were free to use the
system for as long as they pleased. L asked if the investigator would prefer
that they use it until he stopped them and he again said that that was not
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the case. 10 minutes into this session, the participants tried standing still for
the first time. The session was stopped after 11 minutes, led by L.
C.5.2 Reconstructed summary
First interview
Participant L It was an unusual experience. We caught onto the fact that it
was our movements that were causing the sound. I do not do this kind of structured
movement. We were both playing on the kind of movement in exercise, which is more
structured. We were putting our arms and fingers in the air and liked the sound. R may
think differently though as we did not discuss what we were going to do beforehand.
We came to recognise the sounds and both found together movements that we quite
liked the sounds of so tried to recreate them, which I suppose is just psychological.
Sometimes the same movements did not create the same sounds though perhaps we
were not in unison with it.
The sounds we created while we were doing it reminded us of things from the
sixties, the hippy days and we were playing on that. We tried to be rhythmic to see
what would happen but it was not really rhythmic. It was more limited too because
we had to keep within that space, which prevented us from doing certain dances. Not
that we’re very proficient at that. I have no coordination and cannot really do this in
time. I do not do that sort of group thing either because I do not like it. We are not
the sort of people out in clubs doing dances that people do today. I do not know what
they do today but I suppose they might automatically follow people. By the end, we
were getting bored and trying anything.
We are friends and definitely had a clear sense of who was leading throughout. I
did not think I was copying R very well. Copying each other is difficult when you do
not know what you are doing. I probably would have got lost in it because you can
go almost into a trance but I could not because I had to be aware of what R was
doing. Or maybe I would have just pretended to be lost in it. I had had enough really.
I do not know how long the session was. It felt like more than ten minutes but was
probably less than ten.
Participant R I love music and movement and that attracted me to the study
although I had no idea what we were going to do here. It was hard. We were asked
to move around and as you moved the music or the sounds changed and so we tried
to be more inventive with our movement to create the different sounds.
I quite like just moving about. Copying each other was OK because I was leading
which, logically, is easier. I was impressed by my friend, L, who must have found it
hard to copy my movements. She was very good at doing this even though she claims
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to have no coordination and said she could not but it is just movement. I was first of
all trying to recognise movements that I’m familiar with. We were playing on exercise
movements and tried to do movements that made nice sounds.
The way we used it changed over the session. Initially, I was trying to find the
system’s possible sounds. I was trying first of all to recognise movements I’m familiar
with. We did quite a lot of trying to explore what was possible but all within the
perimeters. I said let’s do a dance thing, let’s do something from class, throw a
tantrum, what kids do - anything, just within that space. It was quite spontaneous. I
do not like group things like this apart from the Zumba. But I thought I was repeating
myself and asked L to take over. It was OK but quite difficult to copy L - difficult
without a mirror anyway.
It might have been me being a little bit out but I was expecting from what you
said that if you did one thing and the system did something then if you did it again
the system would do the same thing again. We had quite a lot of raising the arms
and stuff like that which let you sense changes in the different sounds but they didn’t
always seem to follow your movement.
The sound reminded me of music from the sixties. It was maybe rhythmic and we
ad libbed as we went on. I probably could have got lost in it but I did not because I
had had enough really. It got a bit monotonous towards the end. L kept asking how
long it was going to be and when we would be out of here - it was like going out with
my daughter! I do not know how long we were doing it for - maybe 15 minutes. I
have never seen anyone else use the system. It must be fascinating for you running
this study to see all these people use it.
Second interview
Participant L It is quite difficult to draw a preference between the two systems. I
would not say we explored them in different ways. If I had to recommend one, I would
choose the second. It was easier because we were doing our own thing whereas in the
first one I was copying R at first and then R copying me. We could have been given
some time to make a plan but I think that would probably put people off doing it. I
thought R would prefer the other so I am surprised that she would also recommend
the second. I think the second one lasted more than five but less than ten minutes -
maybe six minutes. I looked at my watch in this one and I was much more aware of
the time. It went slower perhaps because you did not have the experience of watching
somebody else. In the first one I wanted to stop earlier but we thought we should not
because we have come here to do the thing. In the second one though I was thinking
’Oh God I want to stop’ because you are standing there doing all these movements.
The second one did not seem to create as much noise reaction. The sound was
not as powerful except perhaps the hand thing. That made me do the hand thing
more because it felt like it was brining more sound than the lower part of my body.
The nice bits were when we were doing it together because the sound was better.
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I think we did not behave differently because we were creating the noise ourselves.
Perhaps we might have done if we were not confined to this space.
One movement made a sound similar to what you hear at the spa. I thought I was
a city person and into loud noises and stuff but then I went to that meditation day
down the road. It involved just sitting on my knees doing what you are supposed to
do. I could not believe how quiet I was for the whole day. I was entranced by it. It
was weird because I did not think ’Oh my God I must use the phone’ as I would have
excepted to.
Participant R If I were to recommend one system to someone I would choose
the second one because you can do your own thing, the same as L. L probably thinks
I would choose the first one but the reason I enjoyed that one was because she had to
copy me which meant I was able to do my own thing. We decided that L would copy
me and then I would copy her. So I did also copy her as well. I do not think I have
asked someone to copy me since I was a little girl. Inventing things to do was made
harder knowing that somebody had to copy me though and I could not have carried
on doing that. Doing your own thing is nice. That said though, I think the first one
was more fun because it was completely new and we did not know what to expect.
There was not much difference between the sessions in the way we explored the
systems. The second one I started out trying to figure out how my movements made
the music change. I tried to see what the noises were but only really recognised the
sort of raised hand thing. I found it hard to decipher. I would think I had it and
then found that I did not and that was annoying. If I did something like that then I
thought ’aha that’s it’ and then I started it again and it did not do it right away. It
was very slow so maybe this was because my movements were quicker than it. I like
to move quicker than the system was though. This was annoying me, maybe because
I am older so I know what I like to listen to and I expect to know what the next thing
coming is going to be. Towards the end it had some nice noises but I wanted to stop
because of my cigarette.
There are only so many types of movement you can do to this type of music and
I think it limited me. The music makes you tend to do samey movements. It is
not something I would have chosen to play for moving to. I was responding to the
music and I would behave differently if you had put Michael Jackson or the Beatles or
something on. I did not move as quickly as I like because I have to wait to be inspired
by the beat. It is not like class because you have to do your own thing. The music
reminds me of the stuff you hear at a spa. We go to a spa abroad. The music is meant
to be soothing and everything but it irritates me after a while. I am not the sort of
person who goes for that kind of stuff. I am more of a city person. I like loud noises
and stuff.
I am an artist though and I imagine this kind of music could conjure up images
and abstracts and stuff for painting. Art and music might be interesting - we have
done that before. Maybe that could be your next PhD!
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C.6 Participant pair 6
The mapping was not explained to the participants.
C.6.1 Observations
First session
The participants instantly established eye contact and a good rapport and
were quickly laughing. However, there were technical difficulties, and the
skeleton tracking continually lost its calibration on R. She recalibrated a
few times, and the system was restarted to try to resolve the issue but the
difficulties arose again. R was asked to change into trousers in an attempt
to resolve the issues. The session was restarted (9 minutes after the original
beginning). The participants were asked not to make any contact as this had
previously been found to cause difficulties. The system began responding
slightly better. There were a number more recalibrations and at one point
the participants were asked to turn more towards the depth camera. The
participants asked to stop the session after 19 minutes (counting from the
point it was restarted).
Second session
In the second session, the technical issues were less severe. At 6 minutes, R
demonstrated the percussive stab mapping to L. The participants asked to
stop the session after 8 minutes, possibly led by R.
C.6.2 Reconstructed summary
First interview
Participant L The system is interactive and did not always work OK. Sounds are
made according to our movements. To use the system I had to work with another
partner and to make it sound good we had to have identical movements. Mirroring
meant that we can move together which made me feel more comfortable. We always
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had contact and communication happens all the way so we were aware of what was
going to happen next. Sometimes I led and sometimes R led. I would not really know
what to do if asked to use it individually. I am not a dancer and not so good at creative
movement
The beginning was just trying things out. Towards the end it was more familiar
and we knew how to fix stuff so we felt more comfortable and confident. I think we
were using it for around 30 minutes. I am surprised that R thought it was only five
minutes. It was definitely longer than that - at least 15-20 minutes. We stopped in
the end because we did not know any more poses that can cause other effects and
have an impact on the sound.
I am a musician and play with others. I play the drums and the bass guitar a bit. I
think this is quite different from when you play in a band. You cannot all do identical
things in a band. The most similar aspect is the communication. But when I play
with others I focus about 60 per cent on myself and how I organise my parts and can
maybe focus 40 per cent on the others. This felt like it involved a 90 per cent focus
on the other person and about 10 per cent on what I am going to do next.
Participant R The system is fine. It has an interactive soundscape thing where
your movements are mapped. How far we both mirror each other and maybe how fast
and repetitive we are triggers and creates sections of audio. It is OK.
I think we were using it for about five minutes. I am surprised by how long L thinks
we were using it for. Maybe it was seven or 10 minutes. I was a little bit lost in it -
just looking at each other going ’woo’. I was thinking about copying, watching each
other’s movements and listening to the sound. We found it interesting but stopped
when we did not really know what else to do and also my arms were starting to hurt.
Doing the same thing together made it feel less like I did not know what I was
doing which made it less scary - especially with us being recorded. It meant we were
in it together and it was not just a single thing. We took it in turns as to who was
leading. I think it would be more difficult if we were not doing the same thing. It
would be a bit scary and I would not know what to do. It would also be more difficult
to learn how we were creating a particular sound as we would not know where our
sound was coming from and whether it was us creating a particular sound. But, like L,
I am not a dancer. Maybe an actual dancer would not find it difficult without working
with someone else as they could do all this creative expressionist stuff.
Exploring the system involved seeing if we could find out what our movement did
to the sound. It was half and half between finding all of the possibilities and focusing
on one small part. It was mainly just finding what sounded good but then when we
found a sound we liked we kept on making it. We found that we could modulate the
sounds, like a ’wowowow’ sound. It became more intense if you go up a bit and the
more you do it, and the more repetitive, the more there is and the track starts to play.
I play the guitar. I used to play in a band but not so much any more. I am more
of a techie. I think this experience is different from making music. If you are making
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practice sounds then you know when other people will come in. It might be more
similar if you were improvising but I have never done anything purely improvisational.
Second interview
Participant L The second session was a bit shorter than the first one (if you do
not include the time wasted at the beginning when it was not working). If I were to
recommend one system I would choose the first one. I have no clue how the sound
works in the second one. It seemed more random - like pure sound effects coming
together without any systematic events. In contrast, the first one felt like it had a
beat. We found ourselves moving rhythmically and the music came up with a rhythm.
For a while we were really going on it. It was more fun, collaborative and interactive
than the second.
I did feel a bit safer in the second one because when we were doing identical things
I had to consider whether R would be able to match what I am doing. This meant I
tried more things that were different.
Even though we were not mirroring, I still wanted to have a relation with the other
partner in the second one. It does not make sense to do our own things without some
kind of correspondence. But it is more likely to be trying to cause her to do the
opposite thing from me rather than matching.
Participant R If I were to recommend one system I would choose the first one.
I did not find either challenging so to speak but I felt more comfortable mirroring. I
found it difficult this second time round to know where the sounds are coming from.
Doing our own thing meant things were not as simultaneous. It was confusing because
it was difficult to know if it was me making a sound. I felt more like I did not know
what I was doing which made me feel a bit more silly than before. I almost started
mirroring L automatically.
In the second one it seemed like the sound was already playing continuously with
us just having an effect on it whereas the first time it felt like we were actually making
the sound.
We stopped when we did because it felt like we had explored as much as there
was. I am not sure how long this second one was. I do not know if I am very good
at estimating time but I would say it was definitely at least a bit shorter than the first
one.
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